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Abstract
This thesis analyses interactions between rms and governments in climate change
and international trade.
First, a theory of international agreements on climate change is presented in which
governments negotiate targets and rms bear the cost of emission reductions. It
analyses the effect on negotiations of investment, on R&D for instance. The pub-
lic good nature of the problem implies that investment improves the government's
bargaining position. Anticipating this effect on the Nash-bargained outcome will
induce rms, surprisingly, to over-invest with respect to the second best.
The second chapter explores a different area in which rms and governments in-
teract: trade policy. This chapter analyses the incentives for trade protection in an
electoral college setting by constructing a new multi-jurisdictional political agency
model. The introduction of a spatial factor shows how the distribution of swing
voters across decisive, swing states affects trade policy incentives. The empirical
analysis introduces a measure of how industries specialise geographically in swing
and decisive states by augmenting a benchmark test of the Protection for Sale
mechanism. The evidence provides support for the theory.
A newly-available rm-level panel dataset for Belgium is described in the third
chapter, in a bid to understand the patterns in the trade transaction data. The -
nal chapter considers the determinants of rm exporting behaviour, in particular
liquidity constraints. A heterogeneous rms trade model shows how exporters in
general, rms exporting to more destinations and to smaller markets, weighted by
distance, are less likely to be credit-constrained. Finally, in the presence of liquid-
ity constraints, the impact of exchange rates on trade ows is decomposed. These
equilibrium relations hold in the Belgian data, measuring credit constraints with
rm-year-level credit scores. This highlights the potential role of governments in
determining, through their policies on credit constraints, the patterns of trade and
hence productivity levels and overall welfare.
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Introduction
This thesis analyses aspects of the interactions between rms and governments in climate
change and international trade.
The rst chapter presents a theory of international agreements in which investment in R&D
by rms in each country affects negotiations between countries on climate change. It seeks
in particular to analyse the effects of investment on the bargaining position of states in inter-
national negotiations on a global public good, namely greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Governments negotiate targets and rms bear the cost of emission reductions. Ex-ante in-
vestment by rms cuts the cost of future emission reductions. The public good nature of
the problem implies that investment improves the government's bargaining position. The
anticipation of Nash bargaining, and of the transfers needed to ensure participation in the
agreement, will therefore induce rms to over-invest relative to the second-best.
The second chapter of the thesis explores a different area in which rms and governments
interact, namely trade policy. How does the distribution of rms and industry across po-
litical districts inuence trade policy choice in the presence of electoral incentives? The
electoral incentives for trade protection in an electoral college setting are analysed by con-
structing a new multi-jurisdictional political agency model. In the unique equilibrium, it
is shown that political incumbents in their rst term of ofce build a reputation for pro-
tectionism. The introduction of a spatial factor shows how the distribution of swing voters
across decisive, swing states affects trade policy incentives. The empirical analysis intro-
duces a measure of how industries specialise geographically in swing and decisive states by
augmenting a benchmark test of the Protection for Sale mechanism. The condensed evi-
dence provides support for the theory and highlights a previously overlooked and important
determinant of trade protection.
The third and fourth chapters go further in the analysis of international trade. A newly-
available rm-level panel dataset, merging balance sheet and international trade transaction
data for Belgium, is described in the third chapter. Both imports and exports appear to be
highly concentrated in the hands of a few rms and seem to have become more so over time.
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Focusing on manufacturing, facts previously reported in the literature for exports only are
shown to actually apply to imports too. Around 80 per cent of exporters are actually two-
way traders. The number of trading rms falls as the number of export destinations or
import origins rises. The same is true when considering the number of products traded.
With regard to productivity differentials, rms that both import and export appear to be
the most productive, followed, in descending order, by importers only, exporters only and
non-traders. This chapter tries to understand the patterns in the trade transaction data. It
provides novel stylised facts and conrms previous ndings for other countries also apply
to a small, open and European economy.
The nal chapter considers the determinants of rm exporting behaviour, in particular liq-
uidity constraints. A heterogeneous rms trade model is presented in which liquidity com-
prises both an exogenous and an endogenous component. Some rms that are productive
enough to export protably might be prevented to do so due to a lack of liquidity. Ex-
porters in general and rms exporting to more destinations are then less likely to be credit-
constrained. This leads to a pecking order in which rms add countries to their portfolio of
destinations served in a decreasing order of the size of the importing country, weighted by
trade costs. Hence, rms exporting to smaller markets, weighted by distance, are less likely
to be credit-constrained. Finally, in the presence of liquidity constraints, the impact of ex-
change rates on trade ows is decomposed, identifying different variations in the extensive
and intensive trade margins at the destination level. These equilibrium relations hold in
the Belgian data, measuring credit constraints with rm-year-level credit scores, provided
by a private credit insurance company. This highlights the potential role of governments
in determining, through their policies on credit constraints, the patterns of trade and hence
productivity levels and overall welfare.
Chapter 1
The effect of investment on bargaining
positions. Over-investment in the case of
international agreements on climate change.
Introduction
This chapter presents a theory of international agreements in which the investment in R&D
by rms in each country affects the negotiations between countries. It seeks in particular
to analyse the effects of investment on the bargaining position of states in international
negotiations on a global public good and shows that the anticipation of Nash bargaining will
cause rms to over-invest relative to the second-best solution. The example of global public
good used throughout this chapter is that of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions
in order to mitigate climate change. Investment in R&D by decentralised rms is non-
reversible and is likely to strongly affect the cost of reducing (abating) GHG emissions in
the future.
GHGs, such as carbon dioxide, accumulate in the atmosphere, thus capturing more heat
from the sun, hence the term "greenhouse". The growth of man-made emissions throughout
the industrial era is thought to be exacerbating this phenomenon, causing climate change
at a global scale, now and in the decades and centuries to come. The global nature of the
problem has led politicians to seek a global response in reducing emissions. International
talks on this issue within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have agreed that greenhouse gas abatement targets are to
be negotiated periodically at global level. The rst negotiating round yielded the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 and targets for its signatories to be reached by 2008-2012; negotiations
have now started on the post-Kyoto era. The outcome of these re-negotiations is clearly
uncertain. However, when investments in R&D are made by rms to reduce the cost of
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emission cuts, they have a long-term effect, well beyond the commitment period of an
agreement.
The aim of this chapter is to understand the impact of these investments on future negotia-
tions towards emissions reduction targets, and more specically on the bargaining position
of countries. The main nding of this chapter is that the anticipation of bargained agree-
ments between governments will affect the investment decision of rms. A two period-two
country model is therefore presented in which rms invest in R&D to reduce with certainty
the cost of future emission cuts. The rest of the economic activity of these rms within each
country, any possible trade in goods and their effects on social welfare are abstracted from,
as I focus on a partial equilibrium, concentrating solely on the emissions reduction problem.
The rst-best social-planner's choice of investment and abatement cannot be reached due
to the inefciencies introduced by the timing of the game: rms would choose not to invest,
and it would then be too costly for the government to implement and emission reductions
target. The rst-best can however be approached by introducing emission permit markets
when there is a large number of rms. This is considered as the second-best case and would
be possible to reach if investment were veriable and rms and governments could sit at
the same negotiating table. However, the investment being non-contractible and sunk at
the time of the international negotiations, governments set their abatement targets through
a Nash bargaining procedure. If necessary, a transfer between the two countries will be de-
vised to ensure participation in the agreement. Regulation is ruled out, as it would lead
to a certain type of hold-up problem, as discussed further on in the chapter. Governments
could also choose to implement either national or international emissions permit markets. I
will also argue that, in the context of this model, international permit markets do not yield
any additional welfare gain, and will therefore focus on national permits. Once the emis-
sion targets and possible transfers have been decided upon, rms must meet their assigned
targets by reducing emissions or buying permits, with their cost of doing so determined
by the investment they have made in the past. The positive effect of investment is greater
on the social welfare in the outside option case of non-cooperation than in the cooperative
case in which some of the benets of investment are reaped by the other country. The re-
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sults thus show that investment improves the bargaining position of governments because
emissions reductions are a global public good shared by the two parties to the contract. An-
ticipating the effect of their investment on the negotiations will induce rms, surprisingly,
to over-invest with respect to the rst best.
The existing literature has considered how the anticipation of international agreements af-
fects rms' investment ex ante. In the case of non-public goods, it has identied the pres-
ence of a hold-up problem in international agreements. The hold-up problem has been
described at length in the literature on the theory of the rm (Williamson 1985, Gross-
man and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore, 1988). McLaren (1997) analyses international trade
agreements as incomplete contracts: rms in a country might anticipate future negotiations
in favour of free trade and invest accordingly, e.g. by making irreversible investments in
the export industry. Firms in this context act as decentralised agents and will reduce the
bargaining power of the country when it later needs to negotiate. By having a modied out-
side option, the country is shown to be put at a strategic disadvantage by its rms' previous
investments. For this reason, a country's government would benet from never commit-
ting itself to negotiate on free trade in order to solve the hold-up problem. A similar type
of argument is derived by Wallner (2003) for EU enlargement and allows one to revalue
the welfare effects of EU membership. Because of the incompleteness of contracts, the
surplus enhancement made by a country's corporate investments will be shared through a
transfer, reducing the benet to the investing country. Harstad (2005) studies how major-
ity rules can affect incentives for decentralised agents to invest in anticipation of public
projects, and how multilateral hold-up problems may arise in the context of the EU Con-
stitution. This chapter contributes to this literature by considering the case of international
negotiations on a global public good in which decentralised agents in the two parties to the
bargaining procedure make specic investments. The anticipation of Nash bargaining leads
rms to over-invest relative to the second-best.
There is also a large body of literature on how various policies might affect investment
and innovation in environmentally-friendly technologies. Jaffe et al. (2003) provide an
overview of both theoretical and empirical contributions to these questions. Empirically,
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the impact of regulation and price changes on innovation has found support for both au-
tonomous progress and induced innovation (Newell et al., 1999 and Popp, 2002). On the
theory side, the focus has been on comparing the effects of prescriptive regulation and dif-
ferent market-based policies on efcient innovation (e.g. Downing and White, 1986, Jung
et al., 1996). This area of research has focused on the effects on investment after the agree-
ment or policy has been implemented. However, Gersbach and Glazer (1999) invert the
timing and study how investment levels by rms ex ante affect the choice of policy in-
struments for reducing emissions at the national level. This is the timing we adopt in the
present chapter. Gersbach and Glazer identify a hold-up problem for a government seeking
to reduce emissions through regulation within the boundaries of its country. Marketable
emission permits are shown to solve the hold-up problem and induce rms to invest in a
Pareto efcient manner. By considering continuous rather than binary investment deci-
sions, I do not exactly replicate their result, except in the limit when the number of rms is
innite. I also extend their approach by considering rms' investments in the context of in-
ternational negotiations on emissions reductions and nd the result of over-investment thus
improving on the existing literature.
In the next section, I present the two period-two country model set up. It is then solved
by backward induction under different scenarios. Starting in section 1.2 with the rst-best
case, I show how it can only be approached by the second-best global welfare maximisation
cooperative outcome with emission permits. This is taken as my benchmark. Section
1.3 then demonstrates that with rms anticipating Nash bargaining, they will over-invest.
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.1 Set-up
The setting is that of two countries, Home and Foreign, which share a public good: green-
house gas abatement, where World, Home and Foreign reductions are respectively noted
MW ,M , andM andMW =M +M.(M  0;M  0).
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Reducing GHG emissions, reduces climate change and increases social welfare by a(M +
M) at Home and a(M +M) in Foreign. Apart from their different preferences for the
public good when a 6= a, the two countries are symmetric. Firms in each country bear the
cost of reducing emissions.
There are n identical rms in each country. For simplicity, the number of rms is assumed
to be xed, and there is no entry and exit. Even if the rm makes negative prots on the
emissions side of its activities in my setting, it does not exit: the model only considers the
abatement part of a rm's behaviour, and does not take into account its main production
activity. More than one rm is needed in each country in order to model emissions permits
markets. At time 0, each rm can choose to invest such as to reduce the long-term marginal
cost of abatement. This investment is denoted by ki and costsm(ki) to each rm i. Because
it does not reduce emissions at the time it is made, a good example of such an investment
would be R&D in ways to reduce a rm's emissions in the future. I do not consider invest-
ments whose effect on reductions is immediate, such as the building of a wind-turbine. It
is assumed that the investment is irreversible, and therefore sunk. At time 1, each country
decides on the level of emissions reductionsM orM it wants to achieve. It divides the bur-
den equally among all rms. At that point, the country can either enter into an international
agreement, or act on its own accord, i.e. selshly. It may also decide to implement an emis-
sions permit trading system within its borders, or even internationally. However, given the
assumptions made in this setting, national and international markets yield equivalent solu-
tions, as shown in Appendix 1.A. There are no additional welfare gains of implementing
an international market given that under cooperation, governments already internalise the
inter-country externality in their decisions on the national permits scenario. Alternatively,
a country may simply choose to impose a regulation or a tax. In this chapter, regulation is
ruled out, as it would lead rms to hold up their investment, as shown in Appendix 1.B.
This is a replication of the result by Gersbach and Glazer (1999). I also abstract from the
free-riding problem by assuming that a third party can verify and implement internationally
agreed abatement targets.
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At time 2, the rms need to ll the emissions permits quota they were allocated given the
agreed target, M
n
. They can either reduce the emissions themselves and/or trade permits
with other rms. I denote by vi the amount of reductions rm i decides to do itself at a
cost C(vi; ki): It is a function of ki, the investment made at time 0 to reduce the cost of
abatement. The more it invested in R&D in the past, the cheaper it is to abate. Payoffs are
then realised. There is no discounting. The timeline is represented in Figure (1.1).
Time 0 Time 1
Firms choose their
investment level
in anticipation of future
agreements or regulations.
ki
Emission reductions
and permits trading
by firms according to
the target
vi
Negotiation?
Governments
choose their
emission reduction
targets
M and M*
Time 2
Payoffs are realised
Fig. 1.1. Timeline
If investments were veriable and contractible, there could be an agreement between coun-
tries and rms specifying ex-ante the optimal level of R&D investment to be made in each
country. However, in an international context it is hard to imagine that a third party be able
to verify the amount of R&D made by rms in each country. Therefore, given investments
are irreversible, it is only once they have been made that countries negotiate and choose to-
gether their respective level of emissions reductions. With Nash bargaining, transfers can
be made between countries to encourage them to cooperate. These transfers could in prac-
tice also be replaced by the choice of international permit quotas. Ex ante, each rm will
choose investment to maximise its prot by anticipating which scenario will occur: full
cooperation or a Nash bargained agreement. I restrict my analysis to pure strategies.
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Social welfare depends positively on total world abatement, and negatively on the cost of
emission reductions and of investment by domestic rms. The rest of the economic activity
within each country is abstracted from and not included in the model. At Home social
welfare is dened byW , where a is the preference parameter for reductions:
W = a(M +M) 
nX
i=1
C(vi; ki) 
nX
i=1
m(ki) (1.1)
In Foreign, a is the preference parameter for world abatement:
W  = a(M +M) 
nX
i=1
C(vi ; k

i ) 
nX
i=1
m(ki ) (1.2)
The cost of reducing emissions is symmetric across all rms in both countries. It is increas-
ing in the level of reductions and I make the hypothesis of an increasing marginal cost of
reduction (@C(vi;ki)
@vi
> 0,@
2C(vi;ki)
@v2i
> 0). The cost of reducing emissions is decreasing in the
level of prior investment, but at a decreasing rate (@C(vi;ki)
@ki
< 0,@
2C(vi;ki)
@k2i
> 0). There is
no uncertainty as to how R&D investment will affect the cost of abatement. The following
functional form is chosen:
 C(vi; ki) = v
2
i
2ki
Finally, the cost of the investment is assumed to be quadratic.
 m(ki) = k2i
This multistage game can therefore dened as follows. There are 2n + 2 players: the
Governments in Home and Foreign, and n rms in each country. The Governments' strat-
egy spaces consist of the emissions targets, respectively M  0 and M  0, and their
decision to implement emission permits market (international or national), regulate the
rms or none of these. The strategy of a rm at Home is dened by the pair (vi; ki)
with emission reductions vi  0 and investment ki  0; for rms in Foreign, (vi ; ki )
with emission reductions vi  0 and investment ki  0. The Governments' payoffs are
respectively Home and Foreign welfare: W = a(M +M)  Pni=1 v2i2ki  Pni=1 k2i and
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W  = a(M+M) Pni=1 v2i2ki  Pni=1 k2i , while the rms' payoffs are negative and equal
to te cost of abatement plus the cost of investment:  =  C(vi; ki) m(ki) =   v
2
i
2ki
  k2i
and  =  C(vi ; ki )   m(ki ) =  
v2i
2ki
  k2i . Finally, the timing of the game consists
of three stages. At time 0, Firms in Home and Foreign choose their investment level ki and
ki . At time 1, Governments in Home and Foreign choose their emission reduction targets,
M and M and nally at time 2, rms in Home and Foreign reduce their emissions by vi
and vi .
The model is solved by backward induction for the cases of the rst-best social planner
choice, cooperative outcome and Nash bargaining. In each of these last two possibilities, I
focus on national permit trading schemes (Appendices 1.A and 1.B show how international
permits give equivalent results and regulation can be ruled out). This allows me to solve the
hold-up problem that would occur under regulation, and concentrate rather on the effect of
international bargaining on investment choices.
1.2 Cooperative outcome and rst-best
This section derives the rst-best emissions reductions and investment levels and then
shows how they can be approached using as policy instrument an emission permits market
when n, the number of rms increases.
1.2.1 First-best
The socially optimal solution is characterised by two elements the investment levels and
emission reductions by each rm in each country. By maximisingW +W given by equa-
tions 1.1 and 1.2, the rst-best levels of investment that would be chosen by a social planner
are:
kFBi = k
FB
i =
(a+ a)2
4
(1.3)
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and the optimal level of abatement by each rm is:
vFBi = v
FB
i =
(a+ a)3
4
(1.4)
These rst-best reductions and investments would not be affected by the timing. However,
the timing of the game introduces some inefciencies in the game: rms, maximising their
pay-off, and therefore minimising their cost, will have an incentive not to invest at time
0, such that the optimal choice of governments will be to choose a zero target (at time
1, once the investment is sunk, the rst-best abatement as a function of investment, is
vFBi = (a+ a
) ki). This is equivalent at the international level to the hold-up problem
identied by Gersbach and Glazer (1999) at the national level, described in appendix 1.A.
As shown in the following sub-section, the rst-best can be approached (and reached if
n!1) by using as an instrument emission permits.
1.2.2 Emission permit markets
This sub-section shows how national emission permit markets allow to overcome the hold-
up problem when n tends to innity. An international emission permit market is shown to
have the same property in appendix 1.B. With emission permits markets, the decisions of
rms at time 2 and time 0 will differ.
At time 2, rms take as given the investment they made at time 0 and the target that was
set at the intergovernmental negotiation at time 1. The possibility of a rm deciding to
exit and not abate is ruled out by assuming it makes sufcient prots in its main activity to
remain active, and compensate for the negative prot it makes on the emissions reductions.
It is assumed that the governments distributeM equally across rms: each rm receives a
fraction n of the total abatement target M xed by the government in time 1. This target
can be reached in two ways. Either the rm reduces its emissions, by vi, at a cost C(vi; ki)
dependent of its investment. Or it buys permits on the national market at price p. The rm
maximises its prot, which is composed of the revenue of sales of permits minus the cost
of reducing emissions, C(vi; ki). A rm may sell at price p any abatement it has made in
excess of its quota M
n
, which is [vi  Mn ]. If it reduces below its quota (vi < Mn ), it will have
1.2 Cooperative outcome and rst-best 26
to buy permits at price p and this will negatively affect its prots. Hence, the maximisation
problem for rm i at Home at time 2 is:
Maxvii = p[vi  
M
n
]  v
2
i
2ki
(1.5)
The cost m(ki) of the investment ki is not taken into account at this stage, as it is paid at
time 0 and therefore sunk at time 2. The rst-order condition of this maximisation problem
is:
vi = pki (1.6)
The higher the price of permits, the more a rm will reduce its own emissions. Investment
at time 1 reduces the cost of abatement, and therefore increases emission reductions. As
the emission permit market is national, the market clearing condition dictates that total
emission reductions within the country must be equal to the total amount of quotasMF (F
for rst-best), the target chosen by government at time 1.
nX
i=1
vi =M
F (1.7)
This allows us to derive the equilibrium price:
pFN =
MFPn
i=1 ki
(1.8)
The price is increasing in the target set by the government, as this boosts the supply of
permits. It is decreasing in total investment by national rms, as by reducing the cost of
self-abatement, investment reduces demand for permits.
Given the price and the prot function, total prots for rm i at time 2 are:
i =
MF
2
ki
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki)
2  
MF
2
n
Pn
i=1 ki
(1.9)
The prot is increasing in the number of rms, as this reduces the quota M
n
assigned to
the rm by the government and therefore increases, for a given realised reduction vi, the
amount of permits it has in surplus and can sell. The effect of MF on rm-level prot is
negative, as it is imposed by government as an extra cost on top of the company's usual
1.2 Cooperative outcome and rst-best 27
operations ( @
F
i
@MF
< 0 as in equilibrium, all rms within the country will act symmetrically
and ki = kj). The effect of investment ki on prots at time 2 is positive, as the cost of
investment is sunk and it reduces the cost of meeting the target, both through a lower price
of permits and a smaller cost of abatement.
In the aggregate, the revenue from permits sales and costs of permit purchases will cancel
out, so that the total cost for all n rms in Home to meet the government's targetMF is:
nX
i=1
C(vi; ki) =
M
F2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki)
(1.10)
The higher the national target, the higher the cost of reaching it. The cost is decreasing in
aggregate investment. The same expression applies in the other country, so that the total
cost for all n rms in Foreign to meet the government's targetMF  is:
nX
i=1
C(vi ; k

i ) =
MF
2
2 (
Pn
i=1 k

i )
(1.11)
At time 1, anticipating the rms' reactions at time 2 and therefore the aggregate cost equa-
tions in each country, governments decide on the targetsMF andMF they wish to set. In
the rst-best complete contract with full cooperation, the two countries act as one, internal-
ising the effect of their emissions on the other country. They choose the rst-best targets
by maximising joint total social welfare:
MaxMF ;MF(a+ a
)(MF +MF)  (M
F )2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki)
  (M
F)2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki)
(1.12)
The rst-order conditions conrm that each country takes into account the externality of
its emissions reductions on the other country's welfare. Each target is thus increasing in
both preference parameters a and a and in the aggregate investment of rms at time 0.
Governments, at time 1, act according to the rst-best. They will equate the marginal
benet of total reductions with the marginal cost of the reduction in each country. This
result is an application of the Coase theorem, leading to an efcient outcome. With the
specied functional forms, the rst-best national permits targets will thus be, as above:
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MF = (a+ a)
 
nX
i=1
ki
!
andMF = (a+ a)
 
nX
i=1
ki
!
(1.13)
The presence of a third party able to enforce the agreement allows the optimal provision of
the public good to be reached. The implied welfare levels, taking the investment as sunk,
are the following:
V F = a(a+ a)
nX
i=1
ki +
 
a2   a2
2
!
nX
i=1
ki (1.14)
V F = a(a+ a)
nX
i=1
ki +
 
a
2   a2
2
!
nX
i=1
ki (1.15)
Welfare is increasing in the aggregate investment of the other country, as it will allow a
higher target to be set at no extra cost. However, if Home's preference for abatement a
is lower than Foreign's, a, Home's social welfare will be decreasing in its own aggregate
investment. This is because, in a cooperative setting, the marginal cost of reductions is
equated to the marginal benet of reductions for both countries, and not the marginal benet
of Home which in this case would be lower. This is an important element for explaining
my results below.
In a full cooperative setting in which rms' investments can be veried and government tar-
gets enforced, and with national emission permit markets, I compute rm-level investment.
At time 0, rm i will maximise prots by anticipating that negotiations between govern-
ments at time 1 will yield the target set out in equations (1.13) and that its revenue at time
2, i, will be as in equation (1.9). It then solves the following maximisation problem:
Maxkii   k2i (1.16)
The rst-order conditions yield an efcient level of investment by equating the marginal
cost of investment at time 0 with its anticipated marginal benet. Given time 1's target
choice, this marginal benet is the decrease in Ci, the cost of reducing emissions, given the
expectation of the target. Firms at Home would therefore invest at time 0 an amount kSBi
while those in Foreign will invest kSBi .
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kSB =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
and kSBi =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
(1.17)
These investment levels show that the rst-best investment levels can only be reached using
as an instrument emission permits markets when n is innite. This differs slightly from
the Gersbach and Glazer (1999) result in which the investment and therefore abatement
decisions are binary and where the rst-best is therefore reached through permits for an
n above a certain nite threshold. In this model, investment by each rm is a continuous
choice. The incentive to invest when emission permits exist comes from the potential prots
from deviating from a non-investment situation and becoming a permit seller in the future.
The higher the number of rms, the higher the prots (as seen in equation 1.7), and hence
the higher the return on investment. In other words, the larger the number of rms, the
higher the costs of choosing to invest less and being a permit buyer from other rms relative
to being a permit seller. We also notice here that rms anticipate that, when there is full
cooperation, there will be no free riding. Countries will choose their targets by taking into
account the effect of their emissions on the other country's welfare (which explains why
both a and a are in equation (1.17)). Governments will choose higher targets, which in
turn imposes a greater responsibility on rms. This gives rms an incentive to invest more
than when countries do not cooperate as shown in section 1.3.1.
Given the symmetry of both countries and the fact that they act jointly, their rms in aggre-
gate will invest the same amount.
In this section, I have shown how the timing of the game modies the incentives of rms
and hence prevents the rst-best investments and reductions to be attained with no instru-
ment. It is then shown how they can be approached by cooperation, using emission permit
markets as instruments when the number of rms is innite. The levels reached with the
permits will be considered as our second-best cooperative benchmark for the remainder of
this chapter. I now consider the case of a Nash bargained agreement.
Having set-out the baseline case of full cooperation with national permits in which the rst
best investment and reductions are obtained, I now consider the case of a Nash bargained
agreement.
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1.3 Nash Bargaining
This section shows how rms anticipating a Nash bargained agreement will over-invest.
Targets in this setting cannot be set in advance nor be made contingent on investment
levels. Given that investments are assumed to be non-veriable, countries are bound to
negotiate at time 1 taking the investment levels of their rms as given. The investments are
assumed to be irreversible. If they were reversible, there would be no benet of negotiation.
Given the sunk investments, the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation will be shared
according to a Nash bargaining process. The behaviour of rms at time 2, given the agreed
target and/or transfer will be similar to the second-best case. The difference between the
two types of solutions stems from the way in which governments bargain at time 1. In
view of the public nature of the emission reductions, cooperation in xing the targets is
Pareto superior to non-cooperation. Given the results of the previous section, it is assumed
that there are national permits markets in place. It is also assumed that social welfare is
transferable in so far as the negotiation, based on the bargaining power of each country, will
devise a transfer which ensures that both countries participate in the agreement. In the case
of an international permits market, the transfer would not be made in this way, but through
a different allocation of national emission allowances, which is closer to reality. The two
cases are shown to be equivalent in Appendix 1.A. First, I present the non-cooperation
case, in order to measure thereafter the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation.
1.3.1 Non-cooperation
Anticipating the revenue functions of rms at time 2 as in the full cooperation case, one
can compute the social welfare in the event that the government xes the national emis-
sions reduction target without taking into account the externality on the other country. This
is called the non-cooperative case. As proved in Appendix 1.B, the government will not use
regulation but national permits. At Home, the government maximises social welfare. In-
vestments of time 0 are sunk and irreversible. The government maximises welfare achieved
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from the target, anticipating the cost of reaching that target, with national permits trading at
time 2 will be such as derived in equation (1.10). The maximisation problem is therefore:
MaxMa (M +M
)  M
2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki)
(1.18)
at Home and a parallel equation holds in Foreign. The rst-order condition thus dictates
the optimum choice of targets for the non-cooperative governments to be:
MNC = a
nX
i=1
ki andMNC = a
nX
i=1
ki (1.19)
Unlike the second-best case, each government only integrates its own preference parame-
ter, respectively a and a, in its choice of target. The more social welfare benets from
abatement, the higher the target. Aggregate investment positively affects the target, as it
reduces the cost of emission reductions. Given these targets, the social welfare levels for
each country implied by a non-cooperative outcome at time 1 are computed in equations
(1.20). The cost of investment at time 0 is not accounted for, given that it is sunk.
V NC =
a
Pn
i=1 ki
2
+ aa
 
nX
i=1
ki
!
and V NC =
a
Pn
i=1 k

i
2
+ aa
 
nX
i=1
ki
!
(1.20)
The Home social welfare functions in the non-cooperative case is increasing in Home in-
vestment, as this will reduce the cost of abatement and increase the agreed reductions. It is
also increasing in Foreign rms' aggregate investment and in a as these will raise the tar-
get chosen non-cooperatively by the foreign government, and hence the reductions. Given
these are a positive externality on Home, social welfare will be improved. The same applies
to Foreign. These levels of social welfare are used in the following two parts to compute
the surplus of the agreement.
At time 0, anticipating the target that would be imposed by governments in an non-cooperative
behaviour, rms in Home and Foreign will invest such as to maximise their payoff at time
2:
kNCi =
(n  2)a2
4n
and kNCi =
(n  2)a2
4n
(1.21)
This leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.1 Firms anticipating their country will act non-cooperatively in set-
ting the target for emission reductions will invest less than in the rst-best and second best,
kNCi  kSBi  kFBi : This level of investment is efcient when governments decide not to co-
operate and n is innite. Proof. Firms anticipate that the abatement targets will be lower
in the non-cooperative case, given that governments do not take into account the external-
ity caused by the country's emissions. Therefore, rms invest less as the marginal return to
their investment is lower. This can be seen by comparing equations 1.17 and 1.21. Given
the governments choose not to cooperate, the investment by rms is equal to the levels cho-
sen by the social planner, if the number of rms is innite. As in the cooperative outcome,
the permits markets can be used as an instrument to solve the inefciency introduced by
the timing. The efcient level of investment under non-cooperation is indeed given by:
ki =
a2
4
This proposition also conrms the results by Gersbach and Glazer (1999). As shown in Ap-
pendix 1.B, this efcient level of investment would not be chosen in the case governments
were to choose regulation rather than permits.
1.3.1 Nash-bargained agreement
In the case of national emissions permits markets, a Nash bargaining process allows for the
allocation of the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation through a transfer. The trans-
fer must be agreed upon in order to make each country at least as well off in the agreement
as in its outside option where it would act non-cooperatively and freeride. It gives gov-
ernments the incentives to participate in the agreement. The agreed targets, functions of
aggregate investment levels, will be similar to the Pareto efcient reductions agreed to in
the rst-best, given in equations (1.13).
For Home, I substract social welfare under non-cooperation, given in equation (1.20), from
social welfare with cooperation and national permits (equation (1.14)) and obtain the sur-
plus:
1.3 Nash Bargaining 33
S = a2
nX
i=1
ki  
a
2
2
nX
i=1
ki (1.22)
The effect of Home rms' investment on Home's social welfare is smaller under coopera-
tion than under non-cooperation due to the public good nature of abatement. This is a key
element of the model, and the results detailed below crucially depend on it. Part of the ben-
ets from investment are captured by Foreign when there is full cooperation as reductions
are higher when the Home government takes into account the positive effect of its abate-
ment on Foreign. For example, one can take the case in which investment is given and
Home does not benet from reductions (a = 0). In the non-cooperative case, its social wel-
fare is zero and it does not abate. In the cooperative case, it takes into account the fact that
its reductions positively affect Foreign, assuming Foreign does benet from global reduc-
tions (a > 0). It would then decide to reduce its emissions, and the higher the exogenous
investment, the higher the abatement, as it equates the global marginal benet of reduc-
tions to the national marginal cost which is increasing in investment. In this extreme case,
the cooperative social welfare for Home is negative, and therefore so is the surplus of co-
operation over non-cooperation. This explains why Home's surplus depends negatively on
Home's investment. Similarly, the surplus for Foreign is:
S = a
2
nX
i=1
ki   a
2
2
nX
i=1
ki (1.23)
Adding up equations (1.22) and (1.23) conrms that the total surplus is always positive or
zero, as shown in equation (1.24). In my example above with a = 0 and a > 0, although
Home's social welfare under cooperation and surplus would have both been negative, the
counterparts in Foreign would have been positive and higher in absolute value, so that the
total surplus is positive. This ensures there will always be gains from negotiation.
ST =
a
2
2
nX
i=1
ki +
a2
2
nX
i=1
ki  0 (1.24)
It reects the public good nature of emissions abatement. Home aggregate investment will
only have a positive effect on total surplus if Foreign cares about reductions and a > 0,
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because in that case, there will be a positive effect on Foreign's surplus of Home internal-
ising the externality of its emissions. The negative effect of a country's investment on its
own surplus that was explained above is smaller than the positive effect it has on the other
country's benet of cooperating.
Assuming equal bargaining power, the Nash maximand will be maximised in order to de-
rive the transfer needed from Home to Foreign to ensure participation in the agreement1.
Maxt(V
F   t  V NC) 12 (V F + t  V NC) 12 (1.25)
The rst-order condition of this maximisation problem yields the equilibrium transfer.
t =
S2   S2
2(S + S)
(1.26)
=
3
4
a2
nX
i=1
ki  
3
4
a
2
nX
i=1
ki (1.27)
Notice that if countries had the same preferences and the same amount of aggregate invest-
ment, the transfer would be zero. The transfer from Home to Foreign shares the surplus,
and ensures that both Home and Foreign agree to the agreement. The transfer from Home
to Foreign is increasing in Home's surplus: the more a country relatively benets from co-
operation versus non-cooperation, the more it will need to compensate the other country to
ensure it participates in the agreement.
As a result of this transfer, social welfare levels under a Nash bargaining agreement with
national permits markets (NB) will be:
V NB = V F   t = a
2 + 4aa
4
nX
i=1
ki +
2a2 + a
2
4
nX
i=1
ki (1.28)
V NB = V F + t =
a
2
+ 4aa
4
nX
i=1
ki +
"
2a
2
+ a2
4
#
nX
i=1
ki (1.29)
1 With equal bargaining power, the transfer is equivalent to sharing equally the surplus of the agree-
ment, such that V NB = V NC + 12

(V NB + V NB)  (V NC + V NC), where V NB is the welfare un-
der Nash-Bargaining. This is can be shown, as V NB = V F   t such that (V NB + V NB) = (V F  
t) + (V F + t) and therefore, t = (V F   V NC) + 12

(V NB + V NB)  (V NC + V NC) and SW =
(V NB + V NB)  (V NC + V NC).
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The resultant social welfare functions are increasing in the aggregate investment levels
of both countries and in both the preference parameters a and a. This is different from
the full cooperation case where a country's welfare function could be decreasing in its own
investment. In the Nash bargaining case, the transfer ensures participation in the agreement
and therefore, in all cases, social welfare will be increasing in aggregate investment.
Given there is no government budget, it is assumed that the rms in each country pay
the cost or receive the benet of the transfer. Firms anticipating that their government
will decide on targets at time 2 through Nash bargaining, with equal bargaining power,
assume they will have to have to meet an emissions reduction target or buy permits as
in the rst-best case for MF
n
, but also pay a share n of the transfer which is needed to
ensure participation in the agreement. Their maximisation problem in determining their
investment level at time 0 will therefore be the following:
Maxkii  
t
n
  k2i (1.30)
in which the revenue at time 2 is dened in equation (1.9) and k2i is the investment cost.
A comparable situation occurs in Foreign. This yields the following investment by rms
at time 0 in Home and Foreign respectively in the case of Nash bargaining with a national
permits market:
kNBi =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
+
3a2
8n
and kNBi =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
+
3a2
8n
(1.31)
The investment choices yield the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2 In the case of a global public good, rms anticipate their government
will agree on targets under a Nash bargained agreement with a national emission permit
market and will over-invest relative to the cooperative level of investment: kFBi  kNBi 
kSBi and kFBi  kNBi  kSBi . Investment is higher than the second-best level. It is lower
than the rst-best unless the number of rms is innite. Proof. The investment decisions
are derived in equations (1.17) in the cooperative outcome and equations (1.31) such that
the proposition follows.
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Due to the inefciency introduced by the timing of the game, the rst-best cannot be
reached per se. Using an emission permits market as policy instrument allows the rst-
best levels of investment to be approached in the second-best when the number of rms
is large. The investment under Nash-bargaining with emission permits markets is higher
than this level, and will approach the rst-best as the number of rms approaches innity:
@(kFBi  kNBi )
@n
 0 and limn!1 kNBi = kFBi . The over-investment can be explained in the
following way. Due to the public good nature of emission reductions, a rm's higher in-
vestment reduces the surplus of cooperation over non-cooperation, as detailed above. This
improves the government's bargaining position and reduces the transfer paid by its country
(or increases the transfer received). In order to participate in the agreement, the govern-
ment wants its country to be compensated for the higher investment its rms have realised
in R&D as it reduces the cost of abating world emissions if cooperative abatement levels
are chosen, whatever the preference of that country for reductions. The transfer is nega-
tively related to domestic rms' investment. As each rm pays a share n of the transfer,
it will then benet from a lower transfer. The return to investment differs from the coop-
erative outcome because of the negative effect of investment on the transfer from Home
to Foreign. Therefore, the anticipation of Nash bargaining increases a rm's return on
its investment with respect to the second-best. This yields over-investment. Although the
transfer would be zero if the countries were symmetric, there would still be over-investment
as rms do not integrate the effect of foreign rms on the transfer and only consider the ef-
fect of their own investment. The government needs to be compensated for the fact that by
cooperating, Foreign benets from its reductions and therefore from its investment. This
is reected in the over-investment component
3a2
8n
depending on a, Foreign's preference
for world reductions, and not a. Appendix 1.A proves that this result holds equivalently
in the case of international permits markets, in which case the transfers are replaced by a
different allocation of targets.
Given these investment levels, the equilibrium agreed targets will be higher than the second-
best, and the social welfare levels will be greater than the second-best for the country
with the lowest preference for emissions reductions (a), and lower for the country with
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the highest preference. If countries have an equal preference (a = a), then the so-
cial welfare levels will be equal under the second-best and Nash bargained agreement.
The over-investment result is of a completely different nature to the hold-up identied by
Gersbach and Glazer (1999), as it occurs through the bargaining-position effect of invest-
ment. It uses however these authors' result by introducing up front permits and not regu-
lation, as justied in Appendix 1.B. By operating in a one-country set-up, their paper does
not consider the same type of issue at all. This chapter's focus is rather on how investment
by rms affects international bargaining positions and how this feeds back into the level of
investment in R&D.
The results in Proposition 1.2 contradicts the results of McLaren (1997) andWallner (2003)
who demonstrated a hold-up problem whereas I here show there is over-investment by rms
who anticipate a negotiation. This is due to the global public good nature of the problem.
The benets from emission reductions in one country also affect the welfare of the other
country. As a result, at the point of negotiation, the rst best welfare, and the outside
option non cooperative welfare are both a function of the investment of both countries. So
is the surplus of the agreement where ki and ki are both in equations (1.22) and (1.23).
This means that for example, home's investment has an effect on the relative bargaining
position of both countries. Most importantly, and in contrast to the mechanism at play
in the previous papers of the literature, the surplus is reduced by rms' investment, thus
improving the bargaining position. Another important mechanism behind my result, is that
rms do not anticipate the fact that rms in the other country are investing. If they would
take the other country's investment into account (or if both countries were integrated), they
would invest at a second-best level.
The over-investment is caused by the Nash bargaining and is different from a classic
freerider problem. If the contract were fully cooperative, the possibility of verifying R&D
investment, and thus writing a full contract between rms and governments, would solve
the over-investment. In the Nash bargaining, the outcome is better than non cooperative
solution, however the unveriability creates the over-investment.
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The result presented above is obtained by isolating the rms' efforts in reducing GHG
emissions. Not taking into account their main activity abstracts from other determinants of
rms' investment in R&D, such as protability and competitiveness issues. Also, it con-
centrates only on the effect of the anticipation of future agreements, while it is certain that
past agreements will also be affecting investment choices. The result obtained in this partial
equilibrium could therefore be weighted in future research against other effects present in
a general equilibrium. However, the model does shed light on a particular mechanism and
yields the over-investment result, something that has not been pointed up in the literature
so far.
1.4 Conclusion
In the ongoing debate on climate change and how best to deal with it, the importance of
R&D into new technologies has often been stressed. Given the global character of the prob-
lem, it is bound to be dealt with in international negotiations. How R&D investment affects
these negotiations, and how the anticipation of such agreements affects rms' behaviour ex
ante is therefore a very relevant question.
This chapter has developed a model where international agreements on GHG emissions
reductions are viewed as Nash bargained outcomes. It seeks to understand the effect of
R&D investment by rms in a given country on the bargaining position of that country at the
international level. By considering the case of a global public good, it mainly contributes
to the literature that regards international agreements as incomplete contracts. It shows
that the end result of under-investment in the case of international negotiations depends
on the nature of the problem being negotiated and thus differs from previous results in the
literature. The novel nding is that, in the case of global public goods, there will be no
hold-up, but rather over-investment by rms that anticipate a Nash bargaining procedure.
As their investment reduces the surplus of the agreement by affecting social welfare to
a lesser extent under cooperation than under non-cooperation, it improves the bargaining
position of their country. The return on their sunk investment is higher and they invest
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more. Also, regulation is ruled out in the chapter in order to avoid another type of hold-
up problem previously identied in the literature when there are no permits markets. By
avoiding this hold-up, the model concentrates on the effect of investment on international
bargaining and isolates the novel over-investment result.
1.A National vs. International emissions permits markets
This appendix conrms that in the setting of this chapter, national and international emis-
sions permits markets are equivalent. Considering the case where countries would have
agreed at time 1 to allow for cross border permits trading, the maximisation problem for
rm i at Home is identical and leads to the same rst order condition as in equations (1.5)
and (1.6).
The international nature of the emission permits market implies that rms can now trade
across borders. The market clearing condition equates total world emission reductions and
total world targets by governments as denoted in equation (1.32) where FBI stands for
"First-best - International permits market".
nX
i=1
vi +
nX
i=1
vi =M
FBI +MFBI (1.32)
The international price for permits will thus be:
pFBI =
 
MFBI +MFBI

(
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
(1.33)
The international price is consequently a function of world total reduction targets and world
aggregate investment. In parallel with equation (1.9), the total revenue for rm i at Home
at time 2 when there is international permits trading, not accounting for investment at time
1 which is sunk, is then:
Ii =
 
MFBI +MFBI
2
ki
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
2  
 
MFBI +MFBI
2
m
n (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
(1.34)
The share of aggregate reductions that is committed to by the Home government is denoted
m. It affects rm level prots negatively. The effect of investment ki on prots at time 2 is
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positive, as the cost of investment is sunk and it reduces the cost of meeting the target, both
through a lower price of permits and a smaller cost of abatement. The effect of aggregate
reductions
 
MFBI +MFBI

on prots will be determined by relative investment by do-
mestic and foreign rms and the share of abatement m. Contrarily to the national permits
case, the revenue of permits sales and costs of permits purchase will not necessarily cancel
out, such that the total cost for all n rms in Home to meet the government's targetMFBI
when there are international permits is:
nX
i=1
C(vi; ki) =
 
MFBI +MFBI
2
m
(
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
 
 
MFBI +MFBI
2Pn
i=1 ki
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
2 (1.35)
The cost is increasing in the share of aggregate reductions agreed to by Home, as this will
shift an extra burden to rms in the country. In most cases, aggregate national cost will be
increasing in the aggregate international target, unless again m is small and Home rms
have invested more than Foreign. This expression is identical to equation (1.10) if the
countries are symmetric andMFBI =MFBI.
A similar equation holds in Foreign, such that the total cost for Foreign and Home rms is:
nX
i=1
C(vi; ki) +
nX
i=1
C(vi ; k

i ) =
 
MFBI +MFBI
2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
(1.36)
which is increasing in the aggregate target xed and decreasing in aggregate cost. An-
ticipating this cost function and selecting an international permits market structure, gov-
ernments will maximize joint social welfare when choosing the rst best targets at time
1:
MaxMFBI ;MFBI(a+ a
)
 
MFBI +MFBI
   MFBI +MFBI2
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
(1.37)
The rst order condition of this maximisation problem is expressed in equation (1.38).
 
MFBI +MFBI

= (a+ a)
 
nX
i=1
ki +
nX
i=1
ki
!
(1.38)
This equation does not pin down a particular value for each target, but rather an optimal
total value of targets. This is due to the presence of international permits implying that
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the rst best allocation of costs will occur naturally through the market and that only the
aggregate level of reductions affects welfare. As governments already internalise the inter-
country externality in their decisions on the national permits scenario, there is no addi-
tional welfare gain to an international trade in permits. The total emission reductions target
needed to reach rst best can be allocated to each country indifferently, given that permits
will ensure that this target is achieved at least cost by equating marginal costs across coun-
tries. The effect on social welfare however is affected by m, the share of total abatement
allocated to Home. The allocation of particular targets to each country is assumed to be the
result of a bargaining process between the two governments: although the total reductions
are chosen optimally, the burden of the cost does vary with this allocation. The solution
is thus indeterminate. For simplicity, I assume the outcome of these negotiations will be
such that social welfare levels are identical to the case where permits cannot be traded
across borders, as given in equations (1.14) and (1.15). This will ensure participation in the
agreement:
V FBI = V FN and V FBI = V FN (1.39)
Given this assumption, the targets xed in the international permits market case will be
equal to the national case:
MFBI = MFN = m (a+ a)
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The investment behaviour of rms at time 1 will not vary between the national and the inter-
national permits cases, as the Home target, cost functions (equations (1.10) and (1.35)) and
revenue function (equations (1.9) and (1.34)) they anticipate for time 2 are identical. With
the simplifying assumption on the determination ofm, equation (1.41) therefore holds.
kSBi = k
SBI
i and k
SB
i = k
SBI
i (1.41)
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These investment levels of rms constitute my benchmark of the second-best, whether with
national or international permits markets.
The international emissions permits market gives a more realistic outcome to the case of
Nash bargaining, as it will allow for another form of transfer between countries. Rather
than assuming a pure monetary transfer it could be envisaged as a different allocation of
targets MNBI and MNBI (NB for Nash Bargaining - International permits market), in
which the total reduction of emissions remains at its rst best level.
MNBI +MNBI =MFBI +MFBI = (a+ a)
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nX
i=1
ki
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(1.42)
If the transfer was positive, it corresponds to Home having a higher allocated targetMNBI
and Foreign a lower target MNBI and Home rms having to buy permits from Foreign
rms. The assumption that welfare levels under national and international permits would
not differ, as summarised in equation (1.39), carries over to the Nash bargained agree-
ment. The social welfare levels with international permits must then correspond to equa-
tions (1.28) and (1.29) dening the Nash bargaining and national markets outcome. The
only difference should be that instead of reaching it through a transfer, a different allocation
of the total reductions,mNB will be agreed to.
V NBI = a(MNBI+MNBI) 
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MNBI +MNBI

mNBI
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Pn
i=1 k

i )
+
 
MNBI +MNBI
2Pn
i=1 ki
2 (
Pn
i=1 ki +
Pn
i=1 k

i )
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The same applies in Foreign with V NBI = V NB. As a result, the agreed target for each
country can be dened and related to the transfer.
MNBI = MFI +
t
(a+ a)
(1.44)
=

4a2 + 2aa + a2
4(a+ a)
 nX
i=1
ki +
3a2
4(a+ a)
nX
i=1
ki
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MNBI = MFI   t
(a+ a)
(1.45)
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The aggregate target corresponds to the rst best level (MFI +MFI), and therefore to
the Nash bargained case with national permits. However, individual targets differ as they
replace the monetary transfer. As in the national markets case, if transfers are zero, the
only difference between the rst best with permits and the Nash bargained agreement, is
in the anticipation that rms make on the effect of their investment on the outcome of
negotiations. In the international permits market case, they would receive emission quotas
of MNBI
n
, but no transfer to contribute to . This corresponds to a prot at time 2 of NBIi .
The prot maximisation problem at time 0 will hence be :
Maxki
NBI
i   k2i (1.46)
in which NBIi , the anticipated revenue at time 2 will incorporate the agreed targetMNBI .
At time 0, rm iwill hence choose an investment level of kNBIi (Home) or kNBIi (Foreign):
kNBIi =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
+
3a2
8n
(1.47)
kNBIi =
(n  2)(a+ a)2
4n
+
3a2
8n
(1.48)
These are similar to the investment levels chosen under a national permits market, kNB and
kNB, given that governments will be shifting the cost of the agreement and of reductions
to rms, be it through the transfer or the emissions targets. By comparison with the second-
best cooperative outcome with international permits, it follow that:
kNBIi > k
SBI
i and k
NBI
i > k
SBI
i (1.49)
Proposition 1.2 therefore carries over to the case with international permits The intuition
behind this surprising result is similar to that of the national permits case. When choosing
their investment level, rms equate the marginal cost of investment at time 0 with the
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expected marginal benet of investment on the return or prot at time 2. In the international
permits market case, this return is a function of aggregate investment levels, aggregate
reductions agreed and the share of reductions negotiated by Home, such that the marginal
benet of investment depends on several elements, as presented in equation 1.50.
dNBIi
dki
=
@NBIi
@ki
+
@NBIi
@(MNBI +MNBI)
@(MNBI +MNBI)
@ki
+
@NBIi
@mNBI
@mNBI
@ki
(1.50)
Comparing to the second-best marginal benet with international permits, the rst two
terms of this expression will be identical, given that the aggregate reductions are equal in
both cases. The last term comprises two parts. The effect of the share of aggregate reduc-
tions for Home on rms' return at time two is equal in both cases too, @
NBI
i
@mNBI
=
@FIi
@mFI
< 0.
It is negative, as a higher share of abatement for the country means more of the cost being
borne by rms. The second part, @mNBI
@ki
, is where the over-investment result comes from, as
it is the only element that differs between the full cooperative and Nash bargaining cases.
In the case of a Nash bargained agreement, rms anticipate their investment will reduce
the surplus for Home government of cooperation over non-cooperation, thus improving its
bargaining position and decreasing mNBI . This is an effect of investment which does not
occur in the full cooperation case, such that @mNBI
@ki
< @m
FI
@ki
. As a consequence, given the
negative effect of mNBI on time 2 prots, the return to investment will be higher in the
bargained outcome, and hence investment will be greater.
Intuitively, as in the national permits case, the government's bargaining position is im-
proved when rms have invested more in R&D. For example, if it does not care much
about climate change, but enters a Nash bargained agreement, its rms investment will
reduce the cost of world aggregate reductions. The country will be compensated for its in-
vestment and the benet it brings to the other country, by being allocated a lower share of
the total abatement.
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1.B Ruling out regulation
In this appendix, the outcome of rms anticipating regulation by government is compared
to the national or international permits equilibrium. This justies why I did not consider
the alternative of regulation in this chapter. It replicates in a different set-up the result of
Gersbach and Glazer (1999).
If governments do not allow for trading, the problem of the rm at time 2 is different
to what has been set out so far. Each rm must abate by the amount it is assigned to by
regulation. In this case, the behaviour of rms at time 2 is determined by the target imposed
by government at time 1, MR. It is assumed that as rms are symmetric, the government
will assign equal amounts to each rm. Given the specied cost function, the cost for Home
rm i to meet the target will be:
C(vi; ki) =
MR2
2n2ki
(1.51)
The aggregate cost for each country to meet the target it has chosen will thus be increasing
in the chosen target and decreasing in the number of rms and the aggregate investment.
nX
i=1
C(vi; ki) =
MR2
2n2
nX
i=1
1
ki
(1.52)
A similar cost function can be derived for Foreign. If all rms are symmetric and invest
the same amount, this is equal to the total cost of reducing emissions as in the national
permits case, given in equation (1.10). Given the anticipation of costs in equation (1.52),
the government maximises social welfare, considering the cost of investment by rms at
time 0 as sunk:
MaxMa (M +M
)  M
2
2n2
nX
i=1
1
ki
(1.53)
The resultant rst-order conditions and the choice of target in the event of no cooperation
and regulation (NCR) will lead to the following targets for each country:
MNCR = an2
nX
i=1
ki andMNCR = an2
nX
i=1
ki (1.54)
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The targets are increasing in domestic aggregate investment and in the preference parameter
for emissions reductions. In the case of cooperation between countries in xing their target,
the maximisation problem of governments is:
MaxMFR;MFR(a+ a
)(MFR +MFR)
  M
FR2
2n2
nX
i=1
1
ki
  M
FR2
2n2
nX
i=1
1
ki
(1.55)
The resultant targets are increasing in the preference parameters of both countries:
MFR = (a+ a)n2
nX
i=1
ki andMFR = (a+ a)n2
nX
i=1
ki (1.56)
As can be seen in equations (1.54) and (1.56), both in the non-cooperative and cooperative
case, targets will be a function of the aggregate investment by rms. Hence, when rms
invest at time 0, they will anticipate that to minimize their future costs they should invest
nothing at all. This is the hold-up problem identied by Gersbach and Glazer (1999) in
a single-country setting. In that case, it would be extremely costly for the government to
remain committed to its regulation. The only way to induce rms to invest would be to
commit to a strong penalty for not meeting the regulation. However, these authors consider
that the government is unable to commit itself to the stringency of the regulation. By
making the same assumption, I here replicate their result.
As in their setting, the hold-up problem they have identied can be solved by assuming
that the government makes a commitment to issue marketable permits rather than opting
for regulation. If rms acted cooperatively, they could collude, invest nothing and make
sure that the government issues no permits, as shown in equations (1.13), (1.19) and (1.40),
in which the chosen target is always positively related to aggregate investment. Yet, there
will be an incentive for rms to deviate from such a collusion, by deciding to invest. If
one rm decides to invest, it will induce the government at time 1 to issue permits. In the
case of national permits, as can be seen from equation (1.8), if only rm j had invested,
pFN = M
FN
kj
such that it will be the only one to make the emission reductions and will sell
the other rms permits as vj = MFN . Given the revenue of equation (1.5), it would make
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a positive prot on the emissions market as long as there are at least two rms and that the
other has not invested and will therefore not abate:
FNj =
(2n  3)MFN2
2kj
(1.57)
Prots will attract other rms into investing, so that they, too, become permit sellers, and
in equilibrium, all rms will invest.
The same logic holds when considering international permits. Given the international price
of equation (1.33), if one rm in one of the two countries deviates and invests, pFI =
(MFI+MFI)
kj
. With the original denition of revenue in equation (1.34), rm j's return at
time 2 is then given by equation (1.58).
j =
(n  2) (a+ a)2 kj
2n
(1.58)
As long as there is a total of at least three rms in both countries, this anticipated revenue
will be positive and induce other rms to invest, too. In equilibrium, when rms anticipate
that governments will introduce an international permits market, all rms will invest. The
result differs slightly to that of Gersbach and Glazer (1999) given that the investment de-
cision is continuous and not binary, such that investment will be increasing in the number
of rms in the country. However the main mechanism at play remains equivalent to that in
their paper.
Chapter 2
A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in
the Electoral College
Joint authorship with Dimitra Petropoulou
Introduction
In this chapter we develop a multi-jurisdictional, innite horizon, elections model charac-
terised by asymmetric information between politicians and voters and an absence of policy
commitment with regards to trade policy. The political districts of the model, or states,
form an electoral college that elects the president from two candidates from rival parties.
The model is used to investigate how the distribution of voters with heterogeneous prefer-
ences across swing states gives rise to incentives for strategic trade protection by incumbent
politicians who wish to maximise their chances of re-election.
The chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the model presented extends
the trade policy literature by using a political agency methodology that has never been
used to address trade policy issues. The approach examines the electoral incentives for the
strategic choice of secondary policy issues in a framework characterised by asymmetric
information between politicians and voters regarding politicians' preferences over trade
policy and lack of pre-commitment to a particular trade policy prior to election. Electoral
incentives can cause political incumbents to alter their policy choice in early years in power
in order to inuence voter beliefs about the nature of future trade policy. By building
a reputation as a protectionist or free-trader, the incumbent attracts swing voters to his
platform.
The type of policy modelled in this type of framework is characterised by the inability
to tailor it to satisfy the preference of voters at the state level, making it a national pol-
icy. Trade policy is thus an excellent candidate for a policy with this feature. Hence, it is
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the ability to garner electoral college votes nationally that drives results, rather than `pork-
barrel' type state level politics. Moreover, it is assumed that the political incumbent has
discretion over the selection of trade policy. While this is a reduced form of a more gen-
eral notion of a cohesive government whose policy decisions are inuenced by the desire
to retain control of power, it is also the case that over the past few decades there have been
periods where the US President was granted trade promotion authority (formerly fast-track
authority) to determine trade policy. When granted such authority, the President is able to
negotiate trade agreements faster, and while Congress retains power to reject proposed leg-
islation, it has no power of amendment and room for limited debate. While discretion of
certain policy instruments is constrained by multilateral agreements, there is still consider-
able scope for erecting Non-Tariff Barriers, or implementing safeguards, granting relevance
to the assumptions of our framework.
Second, we contribute to the political agency literature by developing a tractable multi-
jurisdictional framework that extends the single-district political agency framework of re-
cent contributions to the literature by List and Sturm (2006) and Besley and Burgess (2002).
We model the electoral system as an electoral college, where electoral votes are attached
to political states. This innovation adds a spatial dimension that delivers additional results
on how the distribution of single-issue voters across swing states can inuence trade pol-
icy decisions. The framework delivers three new propositions that relate the location of
swing voters across swing states to the likelihood that incumbents engage in strategic trade
protection.
The third contribution of the chapter is that we provide empirical evidence using data for
the United States that lends support for the type of mechanisms present in the theoreti-
cal model. By augmenting the benchmark empirical specication used by Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000) we nd evidence in the data to support the theoretical hypothesis
that the concentration of a sector across states that are both swing and decisive for election
outcomes is a signicant determinant of the level of trade protection of that sector. This
provides formal support for the claims made in the popular press about the politics behind
the recent United States - European Union steel tariffs dispute, that steel tariffs were in-
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troduced for short-term political advantage ... in order to gain votes in key states like West
Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan where the steel industry is a major employer
(The Guardian, November 17th, 2003).
The literature with regards to the role of concentration on endogenous protection is, in
general, very different to the framework employed in this chapter. The rst strand of the
literature is the long-standing tradition that addresses the role of concentration for collec-
tive action. The effect of geographical concentration on facilitating lobby formation and
therefore positively affecting trade policy, was rst put forward in Olson (1971). The re-
lationship between the location of industry and import barriers has been debated at length
in this literature. The "close group" hypothesis that the concentration of rms allows them
to overcome free-rider problems and organise lobbying efciently is widely accepted and
Hansen (1990), among others, provides supporting empirical evidence. This contrasts with
the "dispersed group" argument which posits that geographically dispersed industries enjoy
broader political representation (depending on the electoral rules) as empirically supported
by Pincus's (1975) ndings, for instance. Busch and Reinhart (1999) explicitly distin-
guishing between geographical concentration, and `political concentration', dened as the
spread of industry across political districts, in order to reconcile the two hypotheses. Their
nding that geographically concentrated, but politically dispersed industries in the US are
more likely to be protected, suggests that the mechanisms linking location, concentration
and protection are more complex than simply those that can be captured through standard
measures of concentration. This chapter is not related to the collective action literature
on concentration, focusing instead on the effects of concentration for electoral outcomes
and thus electoral incentives to protect. Our framework suggests concentration might not
always matter as such, but rather it is the presence of industrial concentrations in pivotal
locations that has an impact on trade protection.
The second strand of the literature stems from the seminal contribution of Grossman and
Helpman (1994,1996) on "Protection for Sale" that analyses the effects of campaign con-
tributions for policy decision-making. Mitra (1999) considers endogenous lobby formation
in a theoretical extension of the Grossman and Helpman framework. A multitude of pa-
Introduction 51
pers have followed in this strand to explain the determinants of trade policy and are sur-
veyed in Helpman (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Recent contributions to the
lobbying literature for trade include Bombardini (2005) who introduces the decisions of
individual rms and hence the role of size distributions within industries in determining
protection. The relevance of lobbies has been widely tested, for example by Goldberg and
Maggi (1997), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Eicher and Osang (2002). While ge-
ographical concentration measures have also been included in empirical tests of the lobby
model, such as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), they have not been linked to loca-
tion in swing states. We augment their specication in the empirical section of this chapter
to show that political decisions also react to electoral incentives.
The most common electoral approach to the political economy of trade and secondary
policy issues is that of median voter models, such as Mayer (1984) and probabilistic voting
frameworks such as Yang (1995). These have been used, for example, to explain differences
in protectionism based on countries' constitutional set-up (Roelfsema, 2004) or to consider
how trade retaliation and liberalisation is affected by the ideological distribution of voters
in trading partners (Wiberg, 2005). Our framework is distinct from these approaches since
we examine the effects of swing voters in a model of the electoral college without policy
commitment. We show that a redistribution of voters between states in the electoral college,
holding the population of each voter type constant, can make trade protection more or less
likely. Such redistributions have no impact in frameworks in the spirit of Mayer (1984).
Strömberg (2007) builds a probabilistic-voting model of the Electoral College system with
political competition. The model is applied to presidential elections in which the proba-
bility of winning each state depends on the distribution of state visits during the election
campaign. However, this setting cannot be transposed directly to trade protection, since as
noted above, such policy cannot be differentially applied in the various states, as can the
number of campaign visits of Strömberg's model.
Willmann (2005) employs a median voter model to offer an explanation for the empirical
relationship between geographical concentration and protection by introducing regional
voters who anticipate that their representatives will internalise the costs of protection, once
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at the national level. The model cannot offer an explanation, however, as to why industries
with the same degree of geographical concentration, that are located in different political
states, may be systematically awarded different levels of protection.
Finally, a growing political agency literature has more recently addressed the issue of elec-
toral incentives for policy choices in secondary policy issues, such as trade policy or en-
vironmental policy, about which smaller groups of voters have very strong views. Recent
contributions to this literature include Coate and Morris (1998), Besley and Case (1995),
Besley and Burgess (2002) and List and Sturm (2006). Our basic modelling approach is
closest to Besley and Burgess (2002) and List and Sturm (2006), while extending to a
multi-jurisdictional framework.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 develops the theoretical
model of the electoral college and discuss the testable empirical implications of the model.
The theoretical predictions of the model are tested empirically with US data in section 2.2.
Section 2.3 concludes.
2.1 The Model
In this section we develop a multi-jurisdictional, innite horizon, elections model charac-
terised by asymmetric information between politicians and voters and an absence of policy
commitment with regards to trade policy. Political incumbents with private preferences
over trade policy may have an incentive to build a reputation through the strategic selec-
tion of trade policy, in order to swing single-issue voters to their platform in forthcoming
elections.
The model contributes to the political agency literature by extending the single-district
political agency framework of List and Sturm (2006) and Besley and Burgess (2002) to
include a continuum of political districts that form an electoral college. This innovation
adds a spatial dimension to the political agency framework that delivers results on how the
distribution of single-issue voters across swing states can inuence trade policy decisions.
Moreover, the model extends the trade policy literature by using a methodology from the
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political agency literature that has not been used before to examine the strategic incentives
for trade policy choice. The empirical implications that arise from the theoretical frame-
work are then tested in section 2.2.
2.1.1 Economic Environment
Consider a country with a continuum of political districts2, or states, s, over the inter-
val [0; 1], each with a unit mass of voters. These states form an electoral college, through
which electoral outcomes are determined. In particular, let each state contribute to the elec-
toral outcome through a single electoral college vote, so the aggregate measure of electoral
college votes over the continuum of unit interval is also 1.
Further suppose that in any presidential election in the innite-horizon game there are two
candidates from rival parties, Democrat (D) and Republican (R), competing for votes. An
election may be between two newcomers, or alternatively, between an incumbent politician
and a challenger. If a candidate wins a majority of votes in a state, then the electoral college
vote of that state is won by that candidate. The election is won by the candidate with the
majority of electoral college votes, which corresponds to gaining a majority in a measure
of states greater than 1
2
.
Politicians are assumed to face a binding term limit of two periods. After two terms of
holding ofce an incumbent leaves the political arena and a new candidate from within the
party competes with the rival candidate in the presidential elections.
A. Incumbents Policy Preferences
During each term of ofce the incumbent politician must choose the level of public spend-
ing, or `ideology', denoted by g, and a secondary policy, such as trade policy for a partic-
ular sector, denoted by r. Politicians of either party whose personal views are in favour
of free trade are referred to as `free-traders' (F ), while those in favour of trade protec-
tion are referred to as `protectionists' (P ). Suppose that a randomly selected candidate,
2 The assumption of a continuum of political districts allows us to appeal to the law of large number in the
calculation of electoral college votes won by each candidate. This facilitates the analysis greatly by making
the framework tractable. The role of this assumption is discussed in more detail in section 1.4.
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of either party, is a protectionist with probability . While politicians' preferences over
public spending are assumed to be public knowledge, their preferences over r are private.
Moreover, electoral candidates are unable to commit to a particular trade policy prior to
election.
The level of public spending is assumed to be continuous, or, equivalently, ideology is se-
lected from a continuous spectrum. In contrast, trade policy takes the form of a binary
choice, to be made by the incumbent politician, between trade protection (r = 1) and free
trade (r = 0). The trade policy is assumed to have negligible nancial impact on govern-
ment revenue, and so the model abstracts from any possible revenue-raising incentives for
trade protection.
Suppose politicians earn an `ego-rent',  , from holding a term in ofce and receive zero
payoff when out of ofce. In addition, a politician faces a utility cost c = fcL;cHg from
deviating from his own preferred trade policy, where cH > cL: Let the probability of any
politician having a low utility cost be Pr(c = cL) = p. Cost c can be interpreted as a
psychological cost of setting a policy in conict with personal views. Moreover, let 
denote the common discount factor, where  is assumed to satisfy the following restriction:
cH >  > cL > 0 (2.1)
Inequality (2.1) states that the ego-rent from holding one more term in ofce lies between
the high and low utility costs.
B. Voter Preferences
Voters are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences over the two policy issues. Suppose
four types of voters comprise the measure of voters in each state. A voter of type k in state
s, can be either a Democrat (D), a Republican (R), a free-trader (F ), or a protectionist
(P ). Let sk denote the proportion of voter type k in the unit measure of voters in state s,
such that: X
k
sk = 1, where k 2 fD;R; F; Pg and sk 2 [0; 1] (2.2)
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TheD and R voters are indifferent about the trade policy issue and vote purely on the basis
of their preferences over public policy. Politicians' choice of g may also be interpreted
as reecting their ideological position, so D and R voters cast their vote according to
their ideological preferences. Even though trade protection, e.g. a tariff, raises the relative
domestic price of the protected good, we assume this negative effect is negligible compared
to the intensity of their ideological preferences. That is, although a price increase in one
good in the consumption basket lowers consumer surplus, it is not a sufcient cost to cause
voters to shift their support to another platform. Hence, measure sD of voters always vote
Democrat, while sR always vote Republican, in any presidential election.
P and F voters are `single-issue voters' or `swing voters' with strong preferences over
the secondary policy issue, trade policy. Protectionists may be voters employed in import-
competing sectors, whose jobs may be at risk from foreign competition under free trade
e.g. Steel industry workers whose employment may be secured through a steel tariff. In
contrast, free-traders reect any voters with strong preferences against trade protection,
such as, perhaps, students of economics.
The intensity of swing voters' preferences is assumed to be such that the payoff received
from the implementation of their preferred trade policy dominates any ideological consid-
erations. Suppose protectionists receive a payoff of x > 0 if r = 1 and 0 otherwise, while
supporters of free trade receive x if r = 0 and 0 otherwise. Swing voters thus vote for the
candidate they believe has the highest probability of implementing their preferred policy.
Where candidates are perceived to be identical in this respect, swing voters are assumed to
cast their vote by ipping a coin.
Note that r, referred to as trade policy in this chapter, can be interpreted as any secondary
policy about which a subset of voters have strong views and which has two key characteris-
tics. The rst is that r represents a national policy decision that cannot be tailored to satisfy
the preferences of voters at the state level. While some voters may have strong preferences
regarding, say, the introduction or abolition of the death penalty, it is possible for a policy
decision to be made at the state-level, as is observed in the US. In contrast, a tariff on steel
imports, or any other trade policy, can only apply at the national level. Other national poli-
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cies include immigration policy, foreign policy, participation in a regional trade agreement
(e.g. European Union membership), membership in international organisation (e.g. WTO),
to mention a few.
The second key characteristic of policy r is that the political incumbent is assumed to
have discretion over its selection. Whilst we model the decision-maker as an incumbent
politician, the model is consistent with a broader interpretation, where decisions are made
by a group of government agents operating as a cohesive entity, whose decisions may be
inuenced by their desire to perpetuate their control of power.
C. Electoral Uncertainty
Uncertainty in the outcome of the election stems from uncertainty at both the state level
and the national level. Each state is assumed to be subject to an idiosyncratic pro-D shock,
s, that can be interpreted as a shock to voter turnout. Since a vote gained by the D candi-
date, is also a vote lost by theR candidate, a positive (or negative) s gives theD candidate
an advantage (or disadvantage) of 2s. For convenience, we redene 2s as "s. Assume
"s is distributed identically and independently according to a symmetric, single-peaked
probability density function h ("s), with support [  ;  ], and a continuous cumulative dis-
tribution functionH("s). The value of  is important to the extent that it affects the degree
of uncertainty over the outcome of elections in each state. We assume a sufciently wide
support so that all states are `swing states'. That is, no candidate can be certain of win-
ning a majority in any state, but the probability of each candidate winning a majority can
be computed for any state with a distribution of voter types, sk, where k 2 fD;R; F; Pg,
given the incumbent's policy choice r and the cumulative distribution function H("s).
In addition to uncertainty at the state level, we introduce aggregate uncertainty3 in the
form of a `pro-incumbent shock', u, in electoral college votes. In an election between two
untested politicians, the shock can be in favour of either. Shock u widens (or narrows)
the difference in electoral college votes between candidates by 2u. For convenience, we
3 The uncertainty reected in the state-specic shocks is insufcient to give rise to aggregate uncertainty,
as a result of the innite nature of states along the continuum. We thus introduce aggregate uncertainty in the
form of a shock to electoral college votes at the national level. The importance of this assumption is made
clear in section 1.4.
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redene 2u as , where  is distributed according to a symmetric, single-peaked probability
density function, f () and a continuous cumulative distribution function F (). Again, we
assume a sufciently wide support so that no candidate can secure a majority of electoral
college votes. In combination, the state-level and national shocks ensure that no candidate
can guarantee to win any state s, or the electoral college overall.
In the US, the president is elected indirectly through the Electoral College. Voters vote
for state electors who pledge to vote for a particular candidate. These electors cast their
electoral vote and the candidate with a majority of electoral votes wins the presidency. In
our model, voters are assumed to vote for the candidates directly, while the electoral college
system is embodied by the fact that candidates need to win a majority in a majority of states
to win the election, rather than a direct majority. The assumptions we make are equivalent
to assuming that state-level elections are between two honest electors that have pledged
to vote for the D or R candidate, respectively, if elected. A state-level majority won by
a D elector corresponds to an electoral college vote won by the D presidential candidate,
and similarly for states where the R elector wins a majority. Interpreting our model in this
way allows shock  to be interpreted as mistakes made by electors when voting, or the
presence of a random measure of `faithless electors' who vote for a candidate other than
the candidate pledged. Assuming f () is symmetric around 0 and single-peaked implies
that large measures of mistakes in electoral votes cast or large measures of faithless electors
are increasingly unlikely.
D. Timing of the Elections Game
Events in the innitely repeated elections model with innitely-lived voters occur in the
following order.
1. The incumbent politician draws a period one utility cost c = fcL;cHg, observed only
by the incumbent.
2. The incumbent makes policy decisions g and r.
2.1 The Model 58
3. Policy choices are observed by voters and the election for the presidency in period two
takes place.
(a) If the term limit is non-binding, then the election is between the incumbent and a
randomly selected rival from the other party.
(b) If the term limit is binding, the election is between two randomly selected
candidates from either party.
4. The winner of the presidential election is in ofce in the next period.
The game is then repeated innitely through stages (1) to (4). In the next few sections we
solve the game by backwards induction and characterise the unique equilibrium strategies
of voters and politicians, for a given distribution of voters. The strategic incentives for
trade policy choice are examined and the role that the distribution of swing voters plays in
shaping these incentives is analysed.
2.1.2 Political Equilibrium
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the game between politicians and voters can be charac-
terised by restricting attention to strategies that depend only on payoff-relevant past events,
rather than the entire history of the game. Markov strategies for the incumbent politician,
Cij , where i 2 fD;Rg and j 2 fF; Pg and for type ks voters, where ks 2 fD;R; F; Pg,
can be said to form an equilibrium if they maximise the value functions of voters and the
incumbent politician, given the strategies of the other players.
For the incumbent politician choosing trade policy, the payoff-relevant history of the game
is fully described by (a) his utility cost draw, and (b) the number of terms he has already
spent in ofce. Hence, we dene a strategy for an incumbent politician as a rule that
describes the probability with which he implements trade protection as a function of para-
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meters describing the distribution of voters4 across the electoral college, his realised utility
cost c and whether he is in his rst or second term of ofce.
For type ks voters, the payoff-relevant history of the game is, where applicable, the rst
term trade policy decision of an incumbent who is up for reelection against a randomly
selected challenger. In elections between two new candidates, there is no payoff-relevant
history on which voters can condition their behaviour. For voter types ks = fD;Rg a
strategy is a rule that species the probability with which they vote for the Democrat or
Republican candidate. For voter types ks = fP; Fg, a strategy is a re-election rule that
species the probability with which they vote for the incumbent in elections between an
incumbent and a challenger, where this probability depends on the updated beliefs regard-
ing the incumbent's private preferences regarding r, conditional on the incumbent's trade
policy decision in his rst term of ofce.
Let g(D) and g(R) be the unique preferred levels of public spending forD and R voters,
respectively, where g(D) > g(R). It follows directly that D and R candidates always
nd it optimal to select public spending accordingly5 and measure sD of voters always
vote Democrat, while sR always vote Republican, in any presidential election.
The game between incumbents and swing voters6 has two symmetric reputation-building
equilibria, where incumbents choose r strategically in order to swing either P or F voters
to their platform. Which of the two applies depends on the distribution of swing voters in
the electoral college, as is discussed in more detail in section 2.1.5. If the incumbent stands
to gain from choosing free trade relative to trade protection, then a protectionist incumbent
may have an incentive to deviate from his preferred policy choice and choose free trade.
The focus of our analysis is the converse case where the distribution of swing voters is such
that the Free-trader incumbent may nd it optimal to build a reputation as a protectionist.
Note that the incentives for Republican and Democrat incumbents are symmetric, since
the incentives for trade policy choice hinge on the extent to which free-trader incumbents
4 These are dened fully in the next sections.
5 For simplicity, we abstract from strategic incentives in public spending
6 The focus of the chapter is the strategic interaction between incumbents and swing voters. For complete-
ness, a discussion of elections between two untested politicians is included in Appendix C.
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of either party can improve their re-election probability through trade protection. Since
ideology plays no part in the voting decisions of swing voters, the effects are symmetric for
D and R incumbents.
The trade policy game is solved by backward induction, starting from the incentives of any
politician facing a binding term limit. For any distribution of ideologists and single-issue
voters across the electoral college, an incumbent politician in his second term of ofce has
no incentive to choose a trade policy that conicts with his personal views, since he can
never be re-elected. Hence, incumbents always nd it optimal to implement their preferred
trade policy in their nal term of ofce.
Over the next sections we derive the conditions under which the following strategies consti-
tute an equilibrium of the trade policy game in incumbents' rst term of ofce: free-trader
incumbents deviate from their preferred policy and implement trade protection in the rst
term of ofce following a low utility cost draw; protectionist incumbents always implement
their preferred policy in the rst term of ofce. Furthermore, protectionist voters vote for
the incumbent if trade protection has been implemented in the rst term of ofce, and for
the challenger otherwise, while free-trader voters vote for the incumbent if trade protection
has not been implemented, and for the challenger otherwise. Moreover, this `reputation-
building' equilibrium is unique for distributions7 of swing voters under which incumbents
can expect to improve their re-election chances through trade protection.
The strategy of a protectionist incumbent is clearly optimal since by implementing trade
protection he improves his reelection probability while simultaneously setting his preferred
policy. Moreover, if a free-trader incumbent draws a high utility cost c = cH , then he
always follows his preferred policy choice, since cH > . The benets in re-election
probability can never outweigh the costs of a policy deviation.
In contrast, a draw of cL may induce a free-trader to set r = 1 if protectionism sufciently
increases the proportion of electoral college votes won so as to alter the election outcome.
7 Appendix B shows this reputation building equilibrium to be unique for distributions of swing voters
where the measure of protectionists versus free-trader voters, and their distribution across the electoral college
is such that incumbents stand to gain from implementing trade protection in the rst term. A symmetric
unique equilibrium exists in the case where incumbents stand to gain through free trade.
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Since the incumbent's personal preference over r is hidden from voters, a free trade in-
cumbent in his rst term may have an incentive to build a reputation8 as a protectionist in
order to attract protectionist voters to his platform in the next election. The lack of a cred-
ible commitment to a choice of r implies that pre-election promises carry no weight with
single-issue voters, who recognise that politicians can deviate ex post. The only opportu-
nity for candidates to convey information to voters regarding their preferences over trade
policy, is through policy decisions made when in power. Voters can update their beliefs on
the basis of the incumbent's historical trade policy decisions and thus condition their vote
on the history of the elections game. It is this feature of the political agency model that can
give rise to strategic behaviour by political incumbents.
Consider the incentives of swing voters in the election for the period two presidency, given
the policy deviation strategy of free-trader incumbents described above. Protectionist and
free trade voters maximise their expected payoff by supporting the candidate with the high-
est probability of implementing r = 1 and r = 0, respectively, in their second term.
Consider a free-trader incumbent who can improve the probability of winning a majority
of electoral college votes if protectionists support his platform (and free traders support the
challenger). If nature draws cH , the incumbent sets r = 0, thus revealing himself as a free
trader and gaining the support of sF voters in all states over the continuum. Protectionists
support the challenger who is a free-trader with probability 1   . If cL is drawn, the D
free-trader incumbent strategically sets r = 1 to build a reputation as a protectionist.
The observed rst-term trade policy choice provides voters with information with which
they update their beliefs about the preferences of the incumbent. Let e denote the updated
8 Besley and Case (1995) as well as List and Sturm (2006) examine how term limits change the incentives
of politicians to build a reputation, with signicant effects on policy choice. In this chapter, the optimality of
a reputation-building strategy depends on both the measure and distribution of P voters relative to F voters
across states in the electoral college.
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probability, derived from Bayes' rule, where:
e = Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term j r = 1 in 1st term)
=
Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term) Pr(r = 1 in 1st term j r = 1 in 2nd term)
Pr(r = 1 in 1st term)
=

 + (1  )p (2.3)
Since politicians set their preferred trade policy when the term limit is binding, the prob-
ability that trade protection is set in the second term is the probability that any randomly
selected politician is a protectionist, i.e. . Moreover, if the incumbent protects in his
second term, he is revealed to be a protectionist and thus protects in the rst term with
probability 1. The probability that the industry in question is protected in the incumbent's
rst term in ofce is the composite probability of being a protectionist, , or being a free
trader who had low cost draw, (1  )p.
Swing voters contrast e, the updated probability of the incumbent being a protectionist,
with the probability that a randomly selected challenger sets r = 1 in his rst term of
ofce. For a sufciently small value9 for p, rst term protectionism is a sufciently strong
signal of protectionist preferences, so that:
e >  + (1  )p (2.4)
For the rest of the chapter we assume p is sufciently small to satisfy condition (2.4) so as to
ensure that sP support the incumbent government if trade protection is implemented in the
rst term, while sF voters support the challenger, given politicians' strategies in equilib-
rium. The optimality of swing voters' re-election strategies is conrmed in Appendix 2.A,
where these are shown to maximise voters' value functions, given politicians' strategies.
The next section examines how a deviation from free trade in the rst term of ofce affects
the incumbent's probability of winning a majority in any state s, given its characteristics.
State level probability changes are translated into electoral college votes that in turn allow
9 List and Sturm (2006) identify two conicting effects. Applied to our trade policy game, these are: rst, an
incentive effect that follows from the term limit assumption that lowers the probability of r = 1 in the second
term, since a free-trader will set r = 0 with certainty; and second, a selection effect that raises the likelihood
of r = 1, since re-elected politicians in their second term of ofce are more likely to be protectionist. The
size of p determines which of the two effects dominates:
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the change in probability of re-election to be derived. We examine incentives for trade
protection and conrm that politicians' and voters' strategies constitute a Markov Perfect
equilibrium of the game.
2.1.3 Trade Policy and State-Level Majority
Recall that in each state s,
P
k
sk = 1. Let !sp = (sD   sR) represent the lead of the D
candidate in state s, referred to as the `political lead', and !st = (sP   sF ) represent the
excess of P voters relative to F voters, referred to as the `trade policy lead'. A state with a
larger proportion of Republican voters than Democrat voters has a negative political lead,
while a state with a larger proportion of free trade supporters relative to protectionists has
a negative trade policy lead.
Let sjr=0 denote the probability that the incumbent wins a majority in state s given free
trade in the rst term, and sjr=1 if trade protection is implemented. Given voters' strategies,
protectionists vote for the incumbent if trade protection is implemented in the rst term of
ofce and for the challenger otherwise, and vice versa for free-trader voters.
Consider a Democrat incumbent in his rst term of ofce. Consider the implications of
switching from free-trade to trade protection in his rst term of ofce on the probability
of winning a majority in state s. The D incumbent gains sD + sF + s by setting r = 0
in his rst term, while the R challenger gains the remaining votes. The incumbent wins a
majority of votes in state s, given r = 0, if sD + sF + s > sR + sP   s, that implies
"s must exceed !st   !sp. If the D incumbent sets r = 1, he gains sD + sP + s and the
remaining sR + sF  sare gained by the R challenger. Hence, a majority in state s is won
if "s exceeds  !st   !sp. It follows from the distribution10 of "s that:
10 Voter turnout across US states has been repeatedly found to be positively correlated with the closeness of
electoral competition (Geys, 2006, Matsusaka, 1993, Cox and Munger, 1989). This suggests that the state-
specic turnout shock may plausibly depend on !s. For simplicity and so as to be able to characterise the
political equilibrium, we abstract from this and maintain the assumption of independently and identically
distributed state-specic shocks.
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sjr=0 = Pr
 
"s > !st   !sp

= H
 
!sp   !st

(2.5)
sjr=1 = Pr
 
"s >  !st   !sp

= H
 
!sp + !
s
t

(2.6)
Now consider the probabilities sjr=0 and 
s
jr=1 for a Republican incumbent. The R incum-
bent gains sR+ sF   s by setting r = 0 in his rst term, while theD challenger gains the
remaining votes. A majority is won by R in state s if sR+sF  s > sD+sP +s, that is,
if "s <    !st + !sp : If the Republican sets r = 1 in his rst term, he gains sR + sP   s
and the remaining sD + sF +sare gained by the D challenger. A majority in state s is
won if "s < !st   !sp: An R incumbent's probability of majority can thus be expressed by
as:
sjr=0 = Pr
 
"s <  !st   !sp

= 1 H  !sp + !st (2.7)
sjr=1 = Pr
 
"s < !st   !sp

= 1 H  !sp   !st (2.8)
Let s = sjr=1   sjr=0 denote the change in the probability of winning a majority in
s through trade protection. Combining (2.5) and (2.6), as well as (2.7) and (2.8), yields
that s = H
 
!sp + !
s
t
   H  !sp   !st for both a Democrat incumbent and a Repub-
lican incumbent. The incentives for trade policy implementation are thus symmetric for
incumbents of either party. Furthermore, symmetry of h("s) allows s to be summarised
by:
s = H
 !sp+ !st H  !sp  !st (2.9)
Equation (2.9) shows that the impact of the implementation of rst term trade protection
by an incumbent, of either party, on the probability of that incumbent winning a majority
in state s depends on two factors. First, the absolute value of the political lead,
!sp, that
reects the degree of electoral competition in state s, and second, the trade policy lead, !st ,
the reects the `swingness' of state s, as measured by the difference between protectionist
voters and free-trader voters.
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For any given level of electoral competition, the magnitude and sign of !st determine the
extent to which trade policy can `swing' the state in the incumbent's favour. If sP > sF ,
then deviating from free-trade to trade protection improves the incumbent's probability of
a majority, so s > 0. Conversely, if sP < sF then an incumbent of either party worsens
the probability of winning a majority of votes in s, so s < 0. Finally, if P and F
voters have equal measure in state s, then !st = 0 and trade policy has no power in altering
electoral outcomes for state s. Moreover, the greater the trade policy lead (lag), the greater
the impact on the probability of a majority in s.
For a given trade policy lead, !st , the closer is electoral competition between the candidates,
the larger the impact of the existing swing voters on s. To see why this is the case,
consider that distribution h ("s) is symmetric around 0 and single-peaked. For a given !st ,
as
!sp ! 0, the probability gain is from the centre of the distribution, implying a larger
s.
The pair of leads,
 
!sp; !
s
t

, therefore provides a complete description of state s, in terms
of assessing the probability of it being won by either candidate. The discussion has shown
that in states where sP > sF the incumbent stands to improve the probability of winning
a majority, while chances are worsened in states where sP < sF . States where sP = sF
are neutral to the trade policy decision. In a multi-jurisdictional setting, the implications of
the trade policy decision for incumbents' overall re-election probability depends crucially
on the distribution of trade policy and political leads across states in the electoral college.
If some states have more P than F voters, and others the converse, the incumbent stands to
worsen his chances of winning certain electoral college votes and improve the probability
of winning others. The next section turns to the question of aggregation of these effects
and characterises the probability of the incumbent winning the election overall.
2.1.4 Trade Policy in the Electoral College
Section 2.1.3 establishes how the trade policy lead and degree of electoral competition
in a state determine how the incumbent's rst term policy decision alters his subsequent
probability of winning the electoral college vote of that state. This section examines how
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the distribution of state probability changes, s, arising from pairs of leads
 
!sp; !
s
t

,
can be translated into a measure of electoral college votes. The conditions under which
reputation-building occurs in the political equilibrium are then characterised.
The law of large numbers implies that if each state along a continuum is subject to an iden-
tically distributed and independent shock "s described by a particular distribution, h ("s),
then the distribution of realised shocks over the innite number of states along the contin-
uum is exactly described by h ("s). This implies that if all states over a continuum have
identical
!sp and !st , then s = H  !sp+ !st  H  !sp  !st not only describes the
change in the incumbent's probability of winning the electoral college vote of each state s,
but also describes the change in electoral college votes actually won over the continuum of
unit length.
There is no aggregate uncertainty, despite the individual uncertainty reected in the state-
specic shocks, as a result of the innite nature of states along the continuum. It follows
that in the absence of an additional national shock, there is no aggregate uncertainty over
the continuum and election outcomes can be predicted deterministically for different policy
choices. To add smoothness to our results, and capture the uncertainty of election outcomes,
we introduce aggregate uncertainty in the model through the national pro-incumbent shock
, distributed by f () : The distribution of shock  is assumed to be symmetric around 0
and single-peaked, and distributed over a sufciently wide support so that no candidate can
be certain of a majority of electoral college votes.
To apply the law of large numbers and be able to convert changes in probability into
changes in electoral college votes won, it must be the case that
!sp and !st are identi-
cal for all states over the continuum. Assuming all states are identical, however, removes
all interesting effects that can arise from having a non-uniform distribution of
!sp and !st .
We thus choose to `discretise' the continuum into N state `types', each forming a sub-
continuum of the overall continuum of states. States of a given type have identical
!sp
and !st , but states from different types may differ in their characteristics. Since there are
innitely many states in a continuum of small measure and a continuum of large measure,
it follows that we can apply the law of large numbers on a type-by-type basis. Hence the
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Fig. 2.1. Representation of N state types in the continuum.
analysis is facilitated greatly through the assumption of a continuum of states, while the dis-
cretization of the continuum into types allows us to investigate the role of voter distribution
in a tractable way.
Let there beN state types, denoted by n, where n = f1; 2; :::; Ng. All states of a given type
are assumed to be identical in terms of their degree of electoral competition
!np  and the
trade policy lead !nt . Let n  0 denote the proportion of states s that are of type n, such
that
PN
n=1 n = 1. Moreover, suppose state types are ranked in declining
!np  such that!jp !kp, where k > j and k; j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng. Further assume !1p  1 and !Np   0.
The ranking of discrete state types over the continuum implies that the distribution of j!pj
across the electoral college is a step function, as illustrated in gure (2.1). The distribution
of states across the electoral college can be changed through (i) the relative weight of state
types in the electoral college through n, (ii) the nite number of types N , and (iii) the
distribution of
!np .
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Let vn denote the change in electoral college votes of type n won by the incumbent as a
result of implementing trade protection in his rst term. Moreover, let v =
PN
n=1 v
n
denote the total change in electoral college votes over the whole continuum of states from
a deviation from preferred trade policy in the rst term. For any state of type n, the change
in the incumbent's probability of winning a majority by deviating from free trade is n,
where n = H
 !np + !nt  H  !np   !nt . It follows from the law of large numbers
that nn gives the change in electoral college votes of type n won by the incumbent.
Aggregating over all state types yields:
v =
NX
n=1
vn =
NX
n=1
n
n (2.10)
It follows from (2.10) thatv is a weighted sum of the state type probability changes. The
incumbent may gain or lose electoral college votes from setting r = 1 depending on sign
and magnitude of n for each state type, and the weight of that state type in the electoral
college, given by n. If the characteristics and distribution of state types are such that
v < 0 overall, then the free-trader incumbent cannot improve his chances of re-election
through the implementation of trade policy and always selects r = 0 in his rst term. The
reputation building equilibrium described in section 2.1.2 requires that v > 0, so that
free-trader incumbents gain from the deviation from free trade. As discussed, there are two
symmetric reputation-building equilibria, where v > 0 and where v < 0, respectively.
We focus on the former, where free-trader incumbents may have an incentive to implement
trade protection. In the latter, a protectionist incumbent may choose to build a reputation
as a free-trader by abstaining from trade protection in his rst term. We return to this issue
in the next section where we examine how a redistribution of swing voters gives results in
a shift from one equilibrium to another.
It is appealing to interpret v in (2.10) as the change in electoral college votes when there
areN states (rather thanN measures of states), each with n electoral college votes, where
n represents the change in the probability of winning the electoral college votes of state
n. This interpretation is intuitive but important conceptual differences exist between the
discrete state interpretation and the continuous measures of states assumed in the model.
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Under a discrete state interpretation, the electoral votes of a state n, are won or lost as a
block n, while in the continuous measures of state types imply that proportions of votes
n are won or lost. Hence, with a continuum of states, v reects the actual change in
electoral college votes won by the incumbent, not the expected change in electoral college
votes.
Recall that u is the pro-incumbent shock in electoral college votes won. Moreover, let vrI
denote the electoral college votes won by the incumbent when he sets trade policy r in
his rst term of ofce. Similarly, vrC denote those won by the challenger, given r. Let
!rv = (v
r
I   vrC) denote the incumbent's lead over the challenger in the electoral college,
given r, where !rv can take values between  1 and 1 and reects the degree of electoral
competition at the national level.
For the incumbent to be re-elected, given r, it must be the case that vrI + u > vrC   u.
Hence, 2u =  must exceed vrC   vrI . Finally, let r denote the incumbent's probability of
re-election, given trade policy selection r in the rst term of ofce. Given distribution F ()
probabilities 0 and 1 can be expressed as:
0 = Pr
 
 > v0C   v0I

= 1  F  v0C   v0I = F  !0v (2.11)
1 = Pr
 
 > v1C   v1I

= 1  F  v1C   v1I = F  !1v (2.12)
Sincev reects the change in electoral college votes won by the incumbent from a policy
deviation, it follows that v1I = v0I + v and v1C = v0C   v. Hence, !1v = v1I   v1C =
v0I   v0C + 2v = !0v + 2v. The re-election probabilities can thus be re-written as:
0 = F
 
!0v

(2.13)
1 = F
 
!0v + 2v

(2.14)
Dening  as the change in re-election probability from a policy deviation, it follows
directly from (2.13) and (2.14) that = 1 0 = F (!0v + 2v) F (!0v). Furthermore,
symmetry of f() allows  to be summarised by:
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 = F
 !0v+ 2v  F  !0v (2.15)
It follows from (2.15) that the incumbent enjoys an improvement in reelection probability
( > 0) from the implementation of trade protection provided there is an overall gain in
electoral college votes from the policy (v > 0). If v > 0, then the expected payoff
from implementing trade protection in the rst term is ()  for a free-trader incumbent
of either party. For r = 1 to be an optimal strategy, the expected payoff must exceed the
incumbent's utility cost draw. Since ()  <  and cH >  , the analysis conrms
that a free-trader incumbent with a high utility cost draw never nds it optimal to deviate
from free trade. If a low utility cost cL is drawn, then ()  must be larger than cL for
the reputation-building strategy to be optimal.
In the symmetric equilibrium where v < 0, a protectionist incumbent improves his re-
election probability by setting r = 0 in his rst term. Since  is dened as the change
in re-election probability from a policy deviation, then  = 0   1 > 0. If the expected
payoff exceeds cL then his reputation-building strategy is optimal.
Proposition 2.1 If ()  > cL, then there is a unique equilibrium in which in-
cumbent politicians with a low utility cost draw (cL) deviate from their preferred trade
policy in their rst term of ofce if this increases their re-election probability and fol-
low their private preferences otherwise. Proof. It follows from (2.9) that n =
H
 !np + !nt    H  !np   !nt  is the change in the probability of winning the electoral
college vote of a state of type n. The resulting change in type n electoral college votes won
is nn. Aggregating over state types gives the total change in electoral college votes
from a policy deviation, v =
PN
n=1 n
n. If v > 0, then a free-trader incumbent
of either party enjoys a gain in re-election probability  from setting r = 1 in his rst
term of ofce. Provided a low cost is drawn and ()  > cL, the F incumbent enjoys
a positive net expected payoff from setting r = 1, so nds it optimal to deviate from his
preferred private policy. If a high utility cost cH is drawn by an F incumbent or the gain
in re-election probability  is not sufciently large for ()  > cL to be satised, then
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the incumbent sets his preferred policy, free trade. In this equilibrium, a protectionist in-
cumbent cannot increase his re-election probability through a policy deviation, so always
nds it optimal to follow his private preferences and set r = 1.
Conversely, if v < 0, then a protectionist incumbent of either party enjoys a gain in re-
election probability  from setting r = 0 in his rst term of ofce. Provided a low cost
is drawn and ()  > cL, the P incumbent enjoys a positive net expected payoff from
setting r = 0, so nds it optimal to deviate from his preferred private policy. If a high
utility cost cH is drawn by a P incumbent or the gain in re-election probability  is not
sufciently large for ()  > cL to be satised, then the incumbent sets his preferred
policy, trade protection. In this equilibrium, a free-trader incumbent cannot increase his
re-election probability through a policy deviation, so always nds it optimal to follow his
private preferences and set r = 1.
For a given distribution of voters in the electoral college, and thus givenv, the equilibrium
in which reputation-building forms part of incumbent's optimal strategies is the unique
equilibrium. A proof of uniqueness can be found in Appendix 2.B.
Inspection of (2.15) reveals that the reputation-building equilibrium depends on two key
national-level parameters of the model. First, the closeness of electoral competition at
the national level, as measured by j!0vj and second, the gain in electoral college votes v
from a policy deviation. The characteristics of f() imply that a closer degree of electoral
competition between candidates at the national level, the greater the probability gain from
an increase in electoral college votes from a policy deviation.
Intuitively, the closer the competition between the two candidates, that is the smaller is
j!0vj, then the more likely it is that the pro-incumbent shock perturbs the election outcome.
Since the pro-incumbent shock is more likely to be near 0, a given gain in electoral college
votes through a strategic trade policy decision is more benecial the closer j!0vj is to 0.
Conversely, relatively weak electoral competition, reected by high j!0vj, implies that one
of the candidates has a large lead in electoral college votes over the other. The probability
that a sufciently large shock is realised to change the election outcome is relatively low.
A gainv implies a smaller shock is sufcient to change the election result, but the further
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from 0 is the initial difference in electoral college votes, the smaller the associated gain in
probability.
Furthermore, for any given degree of national electoral competition, the greater the increase
in electoral college votes v that can be won through a policy deviation, the greater is the
incumbent's gain in re-election probability. Intuitively, the more votes that can be `swung'
at the national level from trade policy, the larger the impact of the trade policy decision on
re-election probability.
A change in either j!0vj or v has an impact on re-election probability  and thus on
the likelihood that condition11 ()  > cL is satised. These results are summarised in
proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2 An increase in the number of electoral college votes that can be won
by deviating from preferred trade policy (v) or an increase in electoral competition at
the national level (lower j!0vj) make reputation-building through the strategic selection of
trade policy more likely.
Proof. Consider a distribution of voters such that v > 0: It follows directly from  =
F (j!0vj+ 2v)   F (j!0vj) that an increase in v, ceteris paribus, increases the change
in the incumbent's re-election probability from the implementation of trade protection.
Moreover, since f() is symmetric around 0 and single-peaked,  increases as j!0vj ! 0.
A higher  from either increase makes it more likely that condition ()  > cL is
satised, and thus that reputation building takes place.
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 conrm the same properties apply in the multi-jurisdictional frame-
work as in the related literature with one jurisdiction. Namely, that there exists a unique
reputation-building equilibrium that is more likely the larger the number of votes that can
be swung through a policy decision, and the closer is electoral competition between candi-
dates.
The multi-jurisdictional framework extends the literature in two ways. First, the electoral
college structure provides new insights into how state-level characteristics in the electoral
11 An increase in the discounted ego-rent, , or decrease in cL also increase the likelihood of there being a
reputation-building equilibrium.
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college combine to inuence the incentives for strategic trade protection at the national
level. This provides for a more nuanced analysis of how swing-voters affect policy deci-
sions. Second, the framework adds a spatial dimension that allows distributional effects
to be examined in a highly tractable way. The analysis delivers three new propositions
that describe how the distribution of voters in the electoral college inuence trade policy
decisions. These effects are analysed in the next section.
2.1.1 Distribution of Voters and Electoral Incentives
Section 2.1.4 establishes that the reputation building equilibrium depends on parameters,
j!0vj and v, that contribute to the change in the incumbent's re-election probability aris-
ing from a rst term policy deviation. While these national-level parameters conrm the
importance of electoral competition and the change in electoral college votes won as key
determinants, they represent summary statistics of the underlying state-level characteris-
tics in the electoral college. Expressing  in terms of state-level parameters gives rise to
proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3 The likelihood of strategic trade policy implementation depends on
the distribution of swing voters and ideologists within states of a given type (
!np  ; !nt ), the
distribution of state types in the electoral college (n) and the probability distributions of
state-level (H("s)) and national shocks (F ()).
Proof. Consider the change in re-election probability summarised by (2.15). Recall
that v =
PN
n=1 n
n. This can be expressed in terms of state-level characteristics by
substituting for n. This yields:
v =
NP
n=1
n
n =
NP
n=1
n
 
H
 !np + !nt  H  !np   !nt  (2.16)
Moreover, electoral competition at the national level j!0vj = jv0I   v0C j, where v0I and v0C are
the electoral college votes won by the incumbent and challenger, respectively, under free
trade in the rst term. v0I is the weighted sum of electoral college votes won by state type,
when r = 0. Thus v0I =
PN
n=1 n
n
jr=0. Moreover, since v
0
I + v
0
C = 1, it is straightforward
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to express the challenger's electoral college votes as v0C = 1  
PN
n=1 n
n
jr=0. Combining
these allows national-level electoral competition to be expressed in terms of state-level
characteristics:
!0v = 2
NP
n=1
n
n
jr=0   1 = 2
NP
n=1
nH
 !np   !nt   1 (2.17)
Substituting (2.16) and (2.17) into (2.15) allows the incumbents re-election probability to
be expressed in terms of state-level variables and distributional parameters:
 = F
 !1v  F  !0v
= F

2
NP
n=1
nH
 !np + !nt   1  F 2 NP
n=1
nH
 !np   !nt   1(2.18)
Inspection of (2.18) shows that the change in re-election probability, and thus the likelihood
of strategic trade policy implementation, hinges on (i) the distribution of swing voters and
ideologists within states of a given type, summarised by
 !np  ; !nt , (ii) the distribution of
state types in the electoral college, reected by proportions n and (iii) the distributions of
state-level and national-level shocks, H("s) and F ().
To show how the spatial position of swing voters can inuence policy decisions, we con-
sider two redistribution experiments that satisfy the following conditions:
1. The aggregate population of each voter type in the electoral college is kept constant.
In particular, if we let  k denote the total measure of k voters in the electoral college,
then the distribution of k voters across n state types, as reected by nk , must satisfy
the following condition:
 k =
NP
n=1
n
n
k , where k 2 fD;R; F; Pg (2.19)
2. All states always have a unit measure of voters, so
P
k 
n
k = 1. This implies that an
increase in the measure of voters of a particular type in a state, must be accompanied
by a decrease in voters of some other type. Denoting the total measure of voters by  ,
conditions 1 and 2 imply that the total measure of voters in the electoral college must
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be 1:
  =
P
k
 k =
P
k
P
n
n
n
k =
P
n
n
P
k
nk = 1 (2.20)
3. Feasibility constraints regarding pairs of values
 
!np ; !
n
t

for all state types n are
adhered to. To see how these apply, consider pair
 !np  ; !nt  that describes states of
type n. Since the sum of all voter types is 1 in each state, there is a nite range of
values that leads !np and !nt may feasibly take. In particular, the larger is the lead
in any one dimension, the smaller the scope for variability in the lead in the other
dimension. For example, if !np = 1 (or  1), then a state of type n is made up entirely
of D voters (or R voters) so !nt = 0. At the other extreme, !nt = 1 (or  1) implies!sp = 0. Figure (2.2) illustrates the set of all feasible combinations of  !np ; !nt ,
given
P
k
nk = 1. Consider
!np  = . This implies that D voters exceed R voters
by , or vice versa. For example, suppose nD = 0:4 and nR = 0:2, in states of
type n, implying a Democratic lead !np = 0:2. The sum of ideologists is 0:6, so the
swing voters represent 0:4 of each state. If all swing voters are protectionist, then
!nt = 0:4, while if all are free-traders, then !nt =  0:4. Suppose instead that !np = 0:2
arises from nD = 0:3 and nR = 0:1. In this case, !nt ranges from  0:5 to 0:5. It is
straightforward to see that if there are no R voters at all, then !nt ranges from  0:8
to 0:8. This gives the largest possible range consistent with !np = nD = 0:2. Similar
reasoning applies for a state where !np =  0:2.
In general, the maximum measure of single-issue voters consistent with
!np  = 
is thus 1   . Hence, the maximum trade policy lead is !nt = 1   , where all
swing voters are protectionists. Conversely, the minimum trade policy lead consistent
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with
!np  =  is !st =    1, where all single-issue voters are free-traders. These
maximum and minimum leads form the rhombus in gure (2.2). States with positive
measures of all voter types are described by
 
!np ; !
n
t

that lie inside the rhombus. The
discussion can be summarised by the following range for !nt , given
!np :
!nt 2 [  1; 1  ] ; if
!np  = ;where  2 [0; 1] (2.21)
Any redistribution of voters across state types must be consistent with the (2.21).
The analysis in the chapter up to this point has been concerned with politicians' optimal
strategies for a given distribution of voters. The two redistribution experiments in this sec-
tion address a different set of questions. In particular, how a change in the spatial location
of a measure of swing voters can alter the electoral incentives for trade protection of a given
industry, whether through variation in the degree of state-level competition across the elec-
toral college, or through institutional parameters, such as variation in the contribution of
electoral votes of different state types in the electoral college. While we model the redis-
tribution as a physical migration of voters with xed preferences, this need not be the case.
Preferences of voters may change in a given location, without migration, through changes
in the pattern of industrial concentration and employment. The experiments reveal two key
distributional determinants of electoral incentives. First, state `swingness', as measured
by the closeness of state-level electoral competition, and second, state `decisiveness', as
measured by the proportion of electoral college votes represented by states of a given type.
Let us dene the initial distribution of swing voters prior to any redistribution. This is
referred to as the `benchmark distribution' in the rest of the section. Suppose the N state
types are ranked such that 1 >
!1p > :: > !np  > :: > !Np  > 0. Condition (2.21)
implies that the maximum measure of single-issue voters in states of type n consistent with!np  is 1  !np . Assume the maximum feasible measure of single-issue voters is present in
all states of types n. It follows that the measure of swing voters is increasing with n since!np  is decreasing with n. Further assume that in the benchmark distribution, the swing
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Fig. 2.2. Feasible pairs of political and trade leads.
voters of each state of type n are split evenly between P and F voters, such that nP =
nF =
1
2

1  !np . This implies that for each state of type n, !nt = 0, thereby placing
the distribution of state types along the !p axis in Figure (2.2). Hence, by construction, the
benchmark distribution is characterised by n = vn = 0, 8n, and thus v =  = 0,
so trade policy has no impact on re-election probability. The conditions for a reputation-
building equilibrium are not satised under the benchmark distribution so all incumbents
set their preferred trade policy in their rst term of ofce.
A. Redistribution A - `Swingness'
From the benchmark distribution, consider a redistribution of P and F voters that increases
the concentration of protectionist voters in states with relatively low
!np , and vice versa
for free-traders. The additional assumption is made that all state types contribute equally
to the electoral college12, such that n = , 8n. Under these assumptions and provided the
redistribution satises conditions (1) to (3), the following proposition holds.
12 This simplifying assumption controls for the effects on reputation-building incentives arising from differ-
ent state-type contributions of electoral college votes.
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Proposition 2.4 A redistribution of protectionist voters from states with weaker elec-
toral competition (higher
!np ) to states with stronger electoral competition (lower !np )
makes it more likely that incumbents engage in strategic trade protection.
Proof. Starting from the initial distribution where there are 1
2

1  !np  protectionists
and free traders in each state of type n, and state types are ranked in decreasing
!np , it fol-
lows by construction that if a positive measure k  1
2

1  !ip of protectionist voters is
redistributed from each state of type i to each state of type j, where i < j, then:
(i) there are sufcient free-trader voters in each state of type j to replace the k voters redis-
tributed to j from state i, since 1
2

1  !ip < 12 1  !jp.
(ii) this exchange of swing voters redistributes P voters towards a measure of states with
closer electoral competition and F voters towards states with a weaker electoral competi-
tion.
In each j state, the measure of protectionists rises by k and the measure of free traders falls
by k, hence !jt = 
j
P jF = 2k > 0. Conversely, in each state i, !it = iP iF =  2k < 0.
For all states of type n, where n 6= fi; jg, !nt = 0. Consider the effects of a deviation from
free trade by an incumbent in his rst term of ofce post-redistribution. For states of type
i and j, the change in a free-trader incumbent's probability of winning a majority from
setting r = 1 in his rst term are:
j = H
 !jp+ 2k H  !jp  2k > 0 (2.22)
i = H
 !ip  2k H  !ip+ 2k < 0 (2.23)
It follows from (2.22) and (2.23) that setting r = 1 improves the incumbent's probability of
winning j state electoral college votes, where P voters exceed F , but worsens his chances
of winning i state electoral votes where the opposite is the case. The overall change in
electoral college votes is given by:
v = i + j + 
P
n6=i;j
n = 
 
i +j

(2.24)
= 

H
 !jp+ 2k H  !jp  2k   H  !ip+ 2k H  !ip  2k > 0
Since
!ip > !jp, it follows from the characteristics of h ("n) that the change in elec-
toral college votes won by the incumbent from r = 1 increases, from 0 in the benchmark
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distribution, to v > 0. It follows that from having no effect on re-election probability
under the benchmark distribution, the redistribution of protectionists to states with closer
electoral competition increases their relative importance in the electoral college, giving rise
to an improvement in re-election probability through rst term trade protection. Thus an
increase in the concentration of protectionists in states with closer electoral competition
makes strategic trade protection by incumbents more likely.
The redistribution considered has the dual effect of giving protectionists a lead in one group
of states, and free-traders a lead in another group of states, where both groups have equal
measure. It is the closeness of electoral competition in the former group of states that gives
protectionists a greater weight in the overall assessment of the change in electoral college
votes and thus in re-election probability. If the degree of electoral competition were the
same in the two state types, then these probability changes would entirely offset each other.
It is the difference in the `swingness' of states across which redistribution takes place that
drives the electoral incentives to implement trade protection after the redistribution.
A symmetric redistribution that gives free-traders a lead in groups of states that are more
competitive has the opposite effect, such that v < 0 holds post-redistribution. This cor-
responds to the symmetric reputation-building equilibrium where protectionist incumbents
override their protectionist views and choose free-trade in their rst term following a low
cost draw. Thus a population-preserving redistribution of swing voters can generate either
of the two symmetric reputation-building equilibria.
Intuitively, the preferences of concentrations of swing voters that contribute most in proba-
bility terms to election outcomes are given more weight by incumbents when making pol-
icy decisions. Moreover, the concentrations that contribute most are those in swing states
whose electoral outcome is most uncertain.
B. Redistribution B - `Decisiveness'
From the benchmark distribution, consider a redistribution of protectionists from states of
type i to states of type j, where both states types are characterised by the same degree of
electoral competition, but where j states represent a larger proportion of electoral college
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votes than do i states. The assumption that
!ip = !jp = j!pj controls for the `swingness'
effect, while j > i isolates the effect of distributing swing voters across larger or smaller
measures of swing states. Suppose that all states of type n, where n 6= fi; jg remain
unchanged.
Starting from !it = !
j
t = 0, the redistribution described has the effect of concentrating a
measure of F voters over a smaller measure of swing states, i, while the same volume of P
voters is spread evenly over a larger measure of states, j, with an identical degree of elec-
toral competitiveness. This gives rise to two conicting effects on the electoral incentives
for trade protection. On the one hand, the relatively large concentration of free-traders in
i states implies that a rst term protectionist policy reduces the incumbent's probability of
winning a majority in each state i by more than the probability gain in winning a major-
ity in each state j, where protectionists are less concentrated. On the other hand, j states
represent a larger measure of electoral college votes than i states.
Whether the former `concentration effect' or the latter `decisiveness effect' dominates de-
termines whether the redistribution increases or decreases the electoral college votes won
overall by setting r = 1 in the rst term of ofce. If v > 0 overall, then trade protection
is more likely than under the benchmark distribution of swing voters. Otherwise, v < 0
and the symmetric reputation-building equilibrium is more likely.
The decisiveness effect dominates the concentration effect when the degree of electoral
competition is strong in states i and j. Intuitively, the greater the swingness of states, the
greater the impact in probability terms of even a small lead in protectionist swing voters.
Thus the gain in electoral college votes from trade protection is larger, ceteris paribus, when
a given measure of protectionist voters is spread over a large measure of highly swing states,
than when concentrated over a smaller measure of identical states. Conversely, a small
protectionist lead has less potency when electoral competition is weak than when electoral
competition is strong, causing the concentration effect to outweigh the decisiveness effect
such that the more concentrated F voters in states of type i have a larger impact on electoral
college votes won than the less concentrated P voters in type j states, under rst term
strategic trade protection.
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Proposition 2.5 A redistribution of protectionist voters from swing states that consti-
tute a smaller proportion of electoral college votes (lower ) to swing states that constitute
a larger proportion of electoral college votes (higher ) makes it more likely that incum-
bents engage in strategic trade protection.
Proof. Consider state types i and j where
!ip = !jp = j!pj and j > i. The
total population of swing voters over states of type i is i [1  j!pj], which is less than
the total population of swing voters over j states, given by j [1  j!pj]. Recall that P
and F voters are assumed to have equal measure in the benchmark distribution, such that
 iP =  
i
F =
i
2
[1  j!pj] and  jP =  jF = j2 [1  j!pj]. Since, by construction,  iP <  jF ,
any redistribution of protectionist voters from i to j states is feasible up to  iP . Suppose k
protectionist voters from each state i are redistributed evenly across states j. It follows that
ik voters are distributed evenly over j states. Let  denote the additional protectionist
voters in each state j , where  = i
j
k. Moreover, j free-traders are redistributed evenly
across i states. Thus ik = j. Since j > i, it follows that  < k.
In each j state, the measure of protectionist rises and free traders falls by i
j
k. Hence,
!jt = 
j
P   jF = 2k ij > 0. Conversely, in each state i, !
i
t = 
i
P   iF =  2k < 0. For all
states of type n, where n 6= fi; jg, !nt = 0. Consider the effects of a deviation from free
trade by an incumbent in his rst term of ofce post-redistribution. For states of type i and
j, the change in a free-trader incumbent's probability of winning a majority from setting
r = 1 in his rst term are:
j = H

j!pj+ 2k i
j

 H

j!pj   2k i
j

> 0 (2.25)
i = H (j!pj   2k) H (j!pj+ 2k) < 0 (2.26)
Since j > i, it follows that 2k
i
j
< 2k so the protectionist lead in j states is smaller
than the free-trader lead in i states. Inspection of (2.25) and (2.26) reveal that setting
r = 1 improves the incumbent's probability of winning each j state electoral college vote
but worsens his chances of winning each i state electoral college vote. Moreover, since
the degree of electoral competition is the same across the two state types, it follows that
j <  i. This reects the `concentration effect' of the redistribution of swing voters
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across state types of different measure. However, j > i, so there is also a `decisiveness
effect' since there are more j state than i state electoral college votes. Using  = k i
j
< k
and j = i k > i for simplication allows the overall change in electoral college votes
won by the incumbent as a result of rst term protectionist to be expressed as
v = i
i + j
j +
P
n6=i;j
n
n = i
i + j
j (2.27)
= i
k

[H (j!pj+ 2) H (j!pj   2)]  i [H (j!pj+ 2k) H (j!pj   2k)]
Inspection of (2.27) reveals the trade-off between the two conicting effects. The rst term
shows a smaller probability change per j state, with weight i magnied by k as a result
of the larger scale of electoral college votes. The second term shows the larger probabil-
ity change for i states weighted only by i. The characteristics of H () imply that v > 0
when electoral competition is sufciently close. Hence, when states i and j are charac-
terised by low j!pj and thus a high degree of swingness, the redistribution of protectionist
voters across a measure of more decisive states makes strategic trade protection more likely.
Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 provide new insights concerning how the distribution of voters
can inuence the decisions of policy makers driven by electoral incentives. The model em-
phasizes the differences between direct and indirect voting for a presidential candidate by
showing how the electoral college system places different weights on the preferences of
swing voters, depending on their location. The propositions show analytically that incre-
mental distributional changes between states that alter the distribution of leads within states
can have a signicant effect on the incentives for policy implementation.
The propositions show that concentrations of swing voters with a particular trade policy
stance have a larger impact on electoral outcomes when located in swing states. Moreover,
their overall impact on the re-election probability of incumbents increases if their inuence
is spread over swing states that constitute a larger proportion of electoral college votes and
are thus more decisive for the election.
The propositions thus combine to give the overall prediction that the trade policy prefer-
ences of a measure of swing voters are more likely to be satised if these swing voters are
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concentrated in states that are both swing and decisive for the election outcome. Since vot-
ers with strong views over the protection of a particular industry are likely to be stakehold-
ers in that industry, whether employees, entrepreneurs, shareholders etc., the main testable
empirical implication of the model is that industries that are concentrated in swing and de-
cisive states are more likely to be protected. The next section describes the results of our
empirical investigation using US data that tests for the empirical implication of the model.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
This section provides evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that industries with
large concentrations in swing and decisive states are more likely to be protected. The em-
pirical analysis employs a benchmark test of the Protection for Sale mechanism of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) using the empirical model and data of Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000). This baseline constitutes the state-of-the-art in empirical political economy
of trade. We augment it with the data necessary to test our hypothesis that industrial con-
centration in key political districts is a signicant determinant of trade policy. While the
empirical specication does not form a direct test of our model, we present reduced form
evidence that suggests previous empirical studies of the Grossman and Helpman (1994)
model have omitted variables from their analysis that our theoretical analysis puts forward
as being relevant.
The rest of the section proceeds as follows. First we outline the model and data of Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Second, we present the data and method of construction for
the measure used to capture the swingness and decisiveness elements of the model. Finally,
our results are described.
2.2.1 Data and Empirical Specication
The theoretical model developed in section 2.1 considers how electoral incentives inuence
a binary trade policy decision that reects either free trade or trade protection. The precise
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nature of this trade protection instrument is unspecied in the model, but is distinguished
by the discretion the political incumbent is assumed to have over it.
In practice, unilateral political discretion over trade policy, in particular import tariffs, is
constrained by multilateral agreements. Import tariffs are thus jointly determined through
multilateral trade negotiations rather than the sole result of a government's political agenda.
Moreover, tariff levels for manufacturing products are very low since they have been greatly
reduced over last few decades under the GATT and WTO. In contrast, Non-Tariff Barriers
(NTBs) allow governments to exercise more discretion in trade protection since these are
not regulated to the extent of tariffs. For this reason, the literature has mainly employed
coverage ratios for non-tariff barriers as a measure of trade protection, where these repre-
sent the share of products within an industry that benet from one or more quantitative or
qualitative trade restrictions: quantity-oriented barriers such as voluntary export restraints
and quotas, price-oriented measures such as antidumping and countervailing duties, and
threats of quantity and quality monitoring. We therefore adopt the same approach as in the
related literature13 in considering NTB coverage ratios as our measure of trade protection.
Data on Non-Tariff Barriers for 198314 has been collected by the UNCTAD15 and combined
with data from World Bank tapes16.
The benchmark specication by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) tests the original
Protection for Sale equation of Grossman and Helpman (1994), reproduced in (2.28).
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii   L
+ L
zi
ei
(2.28)
They demonstrate that lobbying competition and lobbying spending have an inuence on
protection in the US by estimating a system of three equations, of which only one is relevant
to our chapter. This equation is reproduced in (2.29), where ti is the coverage ratio for
13 Leamer (1990) details the construction of NTB coverage ratios. These have been widely used, for exam-
ple, in Leamer (1990), Treer (1993), Gawande (1998), Lee and Swagel (1997), Goldberg and Maggi (1997),
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Bombardini (2005).
14 Since 1983 is the only year for which NTB data is available, it is not possible to test the term limit effects
predicted by the model.
15 UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
16 This dataset has been kindly provided by Kishore Gawande.
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industry i, zi is the inverse of the import penetration ratio, the share of imports to total
production in sector i, ei is the price elasticity of imports and Ii is a dummy variable that
describes whether the sector is politically organised and represented by a lobby. Moreover,
Z1i includes tariffs on intermediate goods and Z2i includes NTBs on intermediate goods as
controls. The error term is denoted by si.
ti
1 + ti
= 0 + 1Ii
zi
ei
+ 2
zi
ei
+ Z1i + Z2i + si (2.29)
A simultaneity problem was raised by Treer (1993). Higher trade protection is likely to
reduce import penetration , as reected in the following equation, in which "i is the error
term.
1
zi
= 
ti
1 + ti
+ "i (2.30)
Import penetration and trade protection are therefore determined simultaneously. In order
to correct for the simultaneity bias implied by the system of equations (2.29) and (2.30),
an instrumental variables approach is adopted. The capital-labour ratio interacted with in-
dustry dummies and comparative advantage variables (fractions of managers, scientists and
unskilled labour per industry) are used as instruments, as in Treer (1993). A complete list
of the instruments used is reported in Appendix 2.D. As in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), we use a two-stage least-squares estimator, and include for each of the instruments
a linear term, a squared term, and the interactions of the linear term with, ei ,the price
elasticity of imports. While the use of the exhaustive list of instruments introduces some
difculties in our regression analysis, we use the same set of instruments as Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), as our aim is to keep their benchmark specication, only adding
our variable.
The data used for import penetration ratios for the US are identical to those used by Treer
(1993). Considered as the most accurate estimate of sector-level price elasticity of imports,
the data was taken originally from Shiells et al. (1986). The dummy variable, Ii, indicates
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whether a sector is politically organised and is constructed by Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000) based on US data from the Federal Election Commission17.
2.2.2 Measuring Concentration
To test the hypothesis that sectors whose activity is concentrated in US states with strong
electoral competition (`swingness') and with the electoral votes to inuence electoral out-
comes (`decisiveness') are more likely to be protected, we require a measure to capture this
form of geopolitical concentration. We therefore construct a measure of this concentration
by combining two datasets. The rst dataset allows us to construct the geographical con-
centration of industries across US states, based on employment. We use the 1987 Standard
Industrial Classication (SIC) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) for the year 1983, which gives us state-level
employment at the four digit SIC.
The second dataset measures the swingness and decisiveness of electoral states in the pres-
idential election18 of 1984. Strömberg (2005) develops a probabilistic voting approach
to presidential election campaigns and estimates an approximate measure Qs of the joint
probability of a state s being both decisive in the Electoral College and a swing state with
a very close state-level election. It therefore encompasses the two factors put forward by
Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 as being important in determining trade policy. He shows how
measure Qs depends on several factors, such as the variance of national popularity-swings
or the variance of electoral vote distribution, which could be interpreted as the state level
and aggregate level uncertainties in the model of Section 2.1.
The Q-values are estimated for each presidential election using national and state-level
measures. We use measure Qs, estimated by David Strömberg for the 1984 presidential
election for each state, whose mean and median are respectively 0:02 and 0:012, and that
ranges between a value close to zero and 0:07. Table 2.1 presents the states with the highest
and lowest measures of Qs for the 1984 presidential election. Larger states with higher
17 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) give a detailed desription of the derivation of this dummy.
18 This data was kindly provided by David Strömberg.
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Table 2.1. Qs measure for 1984 presidential election
States Electoral college votes Qs
Texas 29 0.0719
Pennsylvania 25 0.0704
California 47 0.0691
Illinois 24 0.0685
Ohio 23 0.0653
Michigan 20 0.0542
Florida 21 0.0524
… … … …
Arizona 7 0.0015
Nevada 4 0.0011
Rhode Island 4 0.0008
Nebraska 5 0.0003
Wyoming 3 0.0002
Idaho 4 0.0000
Utah 5 0.0000
numbers of electoral college votes tend to have a higher value of Qs. The most swing
and decisive state is Texas, and states such as Ohio and Florida also exhibit higher than
average values in 1984. States that are least swing and decisive are smaller states and
strong political orientation such Utah (Republican). The probability of being swing and
decisive is never 0 or 1, reecting, as in our model, that no state is expected to be won
with certainty. The NTBs in place in 1983 would, according to our model, be related to the
expected swingness and decisiveness for the forthcoming election. This is exactly what the
Q1984s measure. At the national level, the Democrat proportion of the two-party vote share
in trial-heat polls, economic growth, incumbency and incumbent president running for re-
election are used. Moreover, at the state level, the difference from the national mean of the
Democrat proportion of the two-party vote share in the 1980 election, the average ADA-
scores19 of each state's Congress members the year prior to the election and the difference
between state and national polls are included. Appendix 2.E describes the construction of
this measure by Strömberg in detail.
19 ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores , ranging from 0 to 100, are used as a measure of legis-
lator ideology.
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The well-established Qs measure of Strömberg (2005) constitutes a convenient measure
for the reduced form specication as it combines the `swingness' of states, reecting the
electoral competitiveness, with `decisiveness', reecting the size of states and the necessity
of winning a certain number of states to win the overall election. To check the suitability of
this measure, we calculate the correlation between theQs for the 1984 presidential election
and a state-industry Herndahl index in 1983. This is found to be -0.4 (signicant at the 1%
level), showing that industrial concentration is not directly correlated with the probability
of being swing and decisive.
Since the political data, encapsulated by measureQs, is constructed at the state level, while
trade protection is measured at the industry level, we use the BLS dataset to link the two
dimensions by creating an industry-specic measure of swingness and decisiveness. Be-
sides being necessary for the empirical analysis, it also corresponds to the assumption of
our model that employees of a sector in a state are protectionist swing voters in that state.
In order to abstract from any size effects, we measure the state specialisation of each in-
dustry as the deviation in each state from its mean share of national employment. We can
then compute a 4-digit SIC `Qs' measure, denoted by qi using:
qi = 1000
SX
s=1

Qs 

Lis
Ls
  Li
L

(2.31)
where i 2 I denotes each of the 242 4-digit SIC industries used by Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000) and s 2 S denotes each of the 48 continental states20. Total US employ-
ment is represented by L, while aggregate industry and state employment are respectively
Li and Ls. Industries that constitute a higher proportion of a state's employment than their
proportion of national employment, for a given Qs, have a higher qi. Conversely, if an
industry constitutes a lower proportion of a state's employment than it does of national em-
ployment, then qi is lower. Moreover, for a given proportion of a state's employment, if the
state has a low joint probability of being both swing and decisive, then qi is low. Taking the
deviation from the mean rather than a pure state level measure of concentration allows us
to abstract from the possibility that nationally important industries will be important in all
20 Excluding the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawai, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
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Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics of q
Descriptive statistics of qi Correlation of qi with
Mean Min Labour intensity
0.07 -0.49 0.14
Median Max Proportion of unskilled workers
0.03 1.45 -0.04
sd Range Total employment
0.17 1.94 0.49
Notes: Industry- specific measure of swingness and decisiveness, qi, computed
from data for 242 four-digit SIC industries using Strömberg’s (2005) measure
of the probability of being swing and decisive and the Bureau of Labour
Statistics employment dataset. Summary statistics are provided in the first two
columns of the table. The third column reports the correlation of the measure
with three other industry characteristics: Labour intensity, as the fraction of
payroll in value added in 1982, Proportion of unskilled workers as the share of
employees in an industry classified as unskilled in 1982, and total employment
measured in millions of persons for 1982. Source: BLS (1983), 1982 Census of
Manufacturing, Strömberg (2005).
states. The sum is multiplied by 1000 as multiplying the probability Qs by a share yields
very small numbers.
Table (2.2) presents the descriptive statistics of this constructed measure, which show that
it varies widely across industries. This conrms that industrial concentration through space
and in specic swing and decisive states is not uniform. We check that our results are
robust to excluding outlying observations of qi. The correlations with other industry char-
acteristics are reported in the third column of the table. Total employment, labour and skill
intensity are not correlated with qi, demonstrating that larger, or more skill or labour inten-
sive industries do not systematically concentrate more in states that are more likely to be
swing and decisive.
Augmenting the specication of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) to include the con-
structed industry level swingness and decisiveness variable, qi, gives the following speci-
cation:
ti
1 + ti
= 0 + 1Ii
zi
ei
+ 2
zi
ei
+ 3qi + Z1i + Z2i + si (2.32)
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which is also corrected for the simultaneity bias by using IV. The campaign contributions
literature does not suggest the concentration of industries in swing and decisive states as a
determinant for trade policy decision-making, implying that 3 is zero. The next section
provides evidence that qi is a signicant determinant of NTB protection of an industry, thus
lending support to our theoretical results.
2.2.3 Empirical Results
Our ndings are reported in table (2.3). The rst column reports the results of the bench-
mark specication given by (2.29). It is consistent with the coefcients reported21 in
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and qualitatively close to those obtained by Gold-
berg and Maggi (1999). As predicted by Grossman and Helpman (1995), in politically
organised sectors, higher industry output relative to imports and a lower price elasticity of
imports increases the level of protection (1 > 0). In politically disorganised sectors, the
coefcient has the opposite sign (2 < 0). As mentioned above, there is a slight concern
about the number of instruments used by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay and Treer. The
J-test of overidentication, or Hansen test reports low p-values thus rejecting the validity
of the instruments. By including our variable of swingness and in our willingness to keep
the same instruments as those used in our benchmark, the problem remains although the
p-value improves slightly. In future work, it would be necessary to improve the choice of
instruments so as to solve this problem.
The results from specication (2.32) appear in column (2). Our measure of industry
swingness and decisiveness does not affect the sign, magnitude of the coefcients on
Ii(zi=ei) and zi=ei. Their signicance is only slightly reduced, indicating a relative robust-
ness of the Grossman Helpman model. The point estimate of 3 is 0:192 (signicant at the
1%, with a robust standard error of 0:038). Thus sectors that concentrate more than their na-
tional average in swing and decisive states receive more protection. This estimate translates
21 The signicance levels of the coefcients are smaller than those reported in their paper due to our use of
robust standard errors.
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Table 2.3. Reduced form regression results
Dependent Variable: NTBi /(1+NTBi)
(1) (2)
Beta Beta
qi 0.192** 0.233
(0.038)
Ii (zi/ei) 4.761+ 1.383 3.330 0.967
(2.781) (2.532)
zi/ei -4.704+ -1.384 -3.319 -0.977
(2.664) (2.402)
Intermediates’ tariffs 0.734* 0.190 0.809** 0.209
(0.319) (0.312)
Intermediates’ NTBs 0.378** 0.388 0.337** 0.345
(0.090) (0.086)
Observations 242 242 242 242
F-test model (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test overidentification (p-value) 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
Centered R2 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.28
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions, instruments reported  in appendix D. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes
statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. Includes constant not reported. The dependent variable is the Non Tariff Barriers
coverage ratio. In both specifications, (zi/ei) is the ratio of inverse import penetration to import elasticity. Ii (zi/ei)
is the same ratio multiplied by a dummy Ii that indicates whether a sector is politically organized or not.
Intermediates tariff is computed as the average tariff on intermediate goods used by industry I and Intermediates
Ntb’s the average Non Tariff Barriers coverage of these intermediates. In the second specification, an additional
explanatory variable is added. Industry- specific measure of swingness and decisiveness, qi, computed from data for
242 four-digit SIC industries using Strömberg’s (2005) measure of the probability of being swing and decisive and
the Bureau of Labour Statistics employment dataset. The beta coefficients are reported for both specifications. The
p-values of the F-test model and J-test overidentification are reported. Data source: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), Strömberg (2005), BLS (1983) and authors own calculations.
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into a normalised beta coefcient of 0:233, such that a one standard deviation increase in
the industry's swingness and decisiveness will increase the US NTB coverage ratio for that
sector by approximately 0:233 standard deviations. Although this beta is smaller than that
of the Grossman-Helpman variables, it is more signicant, and as important as the trade
protection measures on intermediates. Moreover, including our measure of swingness and
decisiveness explains a larger proportion of the variation of protection levels across sectors,
as it increases the centered R2 by 30 per cent relative to the Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000) benchmark specication.
These ndings provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that industrial concentration
in swing and decisive states is an important determinant of trade protection of that industry,
highlighting geographical concentration of industries in politically key states an important,
and previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection in the US Electoral College.
2.3 Conclusion
The political agency model developed in this chapter offers a multi-jurisdictional frame-
work for analysing electoral incentives for trade protection. For distributions of voters
where support by swing voters increases re-election probability, a unique equilibrium is
shown to exist where political incumbents build a reputation of protectionism through their
policy decisions in their rst term of ofce. The extension to a multi-state framework
modelled as an electoral college introduces a spatial dimension that shows how the incen-
tives driving trade policy hinge on the distribution of swing voters across swing states. We
show that strategic trade protection is more likely when protectionist swing voters have a
lead over free-trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition, swing
states, that also represent a larger proportion of electoral votes, thus being more decisive in
the overall election. The analytical results offer a theoretical explanation for why govern-
ments may sometimes push for the protection of industries with concentrations in pivotal
locations, such as the US steel production industry. Moreover, our empirical strategy aims
at augmenting the benchmark test of the lobbying political economy of trade literature to
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include a measure of how industries specialise geographically in these swing and decisive
states. The reduced form evidence is that the concentration of industries in politically im-
portant states is a signicant element in explaining trade policy. These ndings provide
support for the theory highlighting an important, and previously overlooked, determinant
of trade protection.
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2.A Voter Value Functions
Section 2.1 establishes the optimality of the incumbents' strategies, given voters' strategies,
for the equilibrium where v > 0. This appendix shows that the re-election rule of the
innitely-lived F and P swing voters is also optimal, given politicians' strategies. This
conrms that the politicians' and voters' strategies constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium
of the game.
Let VP denote the value function for a protectionist voter. Further, let rP denote the prob-
ability that a P voter votes for the incumbent, given policy r in his rst term of ofce. rP
contributes to the incumbent's re-election probability by a tiny amount, thus marginally
affecting his prospective payoffs. rP is thus introduced in VP as an argument of the incum-
bent's re-election probability, f (), which is smooth and continuous from the assumptions
of the model. Further, let u1P () denote the utility of P voters in the incumbent's rst term
of ofce, where  is the probability of the incumbent having protectionist views. Similarly,
denote P voters' second term utility as u2P (er), where this is a function of update beliefs
after observing r in the rst term. Finally,  is the common discount factor. Combining
these allows the value function, VP ; to be expressed as follows:
VP = u
1
P () + 
X
r

f (rP )
 
u2P (er) + VP + (1  f (rP ))VP  (2.33)
The following proof uses (2.33) to show that given incumbents' strategies, 0P = 0 and
1P = 1 are optimal responses. That is, protectionists vote for the incumbent if he chooses
trade protection in his rst term and for the challenger if free trade is chosen. In order for
rP = 1 to be an optimal response, it must be true from (2.33) that u2P (er) + VP  VP .
This can be rearranged to the following condition:
u2P (er)  (1  )VP (2.34)
To see this, consider that f (rP ) and 1   f (rP ) are weights for u2P (er) + VP and VP ,
respectively, in the value function. Voter P maximises his effect on f (rP ) through rP = 1,
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and thus places the largest possible weight on u2P (er)+VP relative to VP . Hence, rP = 1
can only be optimal if (2.34) holds.
Recall that P voters receive a payoff x if r = 1 and 0 otherwise. Since Pr(r = 1 in 1st
term) =  + (1   )p, it follows that u1P () = [ + (1  )p]x > 0. Moreover, since
Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term j r = 0 in 1st term) = 0, it follows that u2P
 e0 = 0. That is, the
incumbent reveals himself to be a free-trader if he chooses r = 0 in his rst term, given
v > 0. Since the incumbent follows his preferences in his nal term in ofce, P voters
can be certain of a 0 payoff. If the incumbent sets r = 1 in his rst term, then voters can
update their beliefs regarding the probability of r = 1 being chosen in his second term, if
re-elected. Applying Bayes' rule for e1, P voters can expect u2P  e1 = x+(1 )p .
It must be true that VP  11 u1P (), where 11 u1P () is the discounted stream of period
1 utilities, if the incumbent is never re-elected. Substituting into (2.34) yields:
u2P (er)  u1P () (2.35)
This must hold for rP = 1 to be optimal, for all r, but leads to a contradiction. It cannot
be true that u2P
 e0  u1P () since u2P  e0 = 0 and u1P () > 0. Hence, rP = 1
(for all r) cannot be an optimal response. Since u2P
 e0 < u1P (), a new politician is
always a better bet than an incumbent who set r = 0 in his rst term. Hence, 0P = 0 is
optimal. Moreover, continuation payoff 1
1 u
1
P ()must be smaller than 11 u
2
P
 e1 under
the equilibrium strategies of incumbents', so 1P = 1 is an optimal response.
The value function of free-traders, VF , is symmetric to VP and the optimality strategies
0F = 1 and 1F = 0 follows with arguments symmetric to those used above. We can thus
conclude that the politicians' and voters' strategies constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium
of the game.
2.B Equilibrium Uniqueness
There are two symmetric cases, v > 0 and v < 0, where reputation-building through
strategic policy implementation forms part of incumbents' optimal strategies. In each of
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these symmetric cases, there is a unique equilibrium. To show that the equilibrium found
in the chapter is unique, consider a distribution of swing voters under which v > 0 from
the implementation of trade protection in the rst term.
Recall that when a high cost cH is drawn, it is a dominant strategy for free-trader politicians
to set r = 1. Moreover, let rP denote the probability that a P voter votes for the incumbent,
given policy r in his rst term of ofce. Under a sufciently low cost draw, cL, it must be
the case that 1P > 0P for a free-trader to deviate from r = 0. Similarly, for a protectionist
to deviate from r = 1 in his rst term of ofce, it must be true that 1P < 0P . Hence, in
any equilibrium at most one type of politician deviates from his preferred policy in the rst
term.
Moreover, to show that mixing between r = 0 and r = 1 cannot be an equilibrium, consider
a strategy where a free-trader incumbent sets r = 1 with a probability less than 1 when
c = cL. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that 1P   cL = 0P and
hence that cL = (1P   0P )  . Inspection of VP in Appendix A shows that 1P = 1
and 0P = 0 remain optimal. This, however, implies that cL =  that contradicts the
assumption that  > cL.
It can similarly be shown that a strategy in which a protectionist sets r = 1 with less than
certainty can never form part of an equilibrium. Such a strategy requires that 1P =
0P   cL, that implies cL = (0P   1P )  . This is impossible, however, since voters'
optimal strategy in this case is to set 1P = 1 and 0P = 0. It follows that the unique
equilibrium outcome is for an F incumbent to set r = 1when c = cL and for a P incumbent
to also set r = 1 under a low cost draw.
We can conclude that the equilibrium discussed in the chapter is unique for distributions
of swing voters that satisfy the conditions for this case, and sufciently low p and cL.
Symmetric arguments apply for the alternative case where v < 0.
2.C Untested Candidates 97
2.C Untested Candidates
Consider an election taking place between two randomly selected candidates, each with a
probability  of being protectionist. Since neither candidate has a history of a trade policy
decision on which swing voters can condition their voting decision, the swing voters cast
their vote on the basis of a coin toss. Each candidate can thus expect to gain 1
2
(sP + 
s
F ).
Hence, the Democrat candidate gains sD+ 12 (
s
P + 
s
F )+
s and the Republican candidate
gains sR + 12 (
s
P + 
s
F )   s. For the D candidate to win a majority in state s, 2s = "s
must exceed sR   sD =  !sp. Let sdenote the probability that the D candidate wins a
majority in state s. It follows from the distribution of "s that:
s = Pr
 
"s >  !sp

= 1 H( !sp) (2.36)
= H
 
!sp

(2.37)
Hence, 1   H  !sp is the probability that R wins majority in state s: Hence state-level
outcomes depend only on the political lead in s andH("s). This stems from the assumption
that single-issue voters randomly select between the two candidates, so each candidate can
expect to gain support by half. An alternative voting strategy could allocate swing voters in
a different proportion. For example, when candidates are not distinguishable with regards
to trade policy, voters may cast a vote on the basis of underlying ideological position, that
is otherwise dominated by trade policy considerations.
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2.D Variables and Instruments
The following table provide a descriptions of all the variables and instruments used in the
empirical analysis of section 2.2.
Table 2.4. Variables and instruments list
Variable Description
NTBi Aggregate US Non Tariff Barriers coverage ratio across all partners for industry i
qi Constructed measure of the concentration of 4-digit SIC industry i in swing and decisivepolitical states
Ii Dummy variable, value 1 when sector i is politically organized
zi Inverse of import penetration ratio divided by 10000 (= (US consumption in 1983/ UStotal imports)/10000) in sector i
ei Price elasticity of imports in sector i, corrected for errors-in-variables (GB, 2000)
Interm. tariffs Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i
Interm. NTBs Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i
Instrument
1 Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i
2 Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i
3 Price elasticity of imports (1986)
4 Logarithm of the price elasticity of imports ei
5 Measure of the size of firms in an industry: Value added per firm, 1982, ($Bn/firm)
6 Share of output in a sector produced by the four largest producers. concentration ratio,1982
7 Share of employees in the industry defined as scientistsand engineers, 1982
8 Share of employees in the industry defined as managerial, 1982
9 Share of employees in the industry defined as unskilled, 1982
10 Real Exchange Rate elasticity of imports
11 Cross price elasticity of imports with resepct to domestic prices, corrected for errors-in-variables (GB, 2000)
12 Log percentage of an industry’s output used as intermediate good in other sectors
13 Logarithm of the intermediate goods buyer concentration
14 Herfindahl index of the industry
15 Ad valorem tariff
16 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for food processing industry
17 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for resource-intensive industry
18 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for general manufacturing industry
19 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for capital intensive industry
20-36 Instruments 3 to 19 squared
37-52 Instruments 4 to 19 x price elasticity of imports ei
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2.E TheQs measure by Strömberg
Strömberg (2007) builds a probabilistic-voting model of the Electoral College system with
political competition. The model is applied to presidential elections in which the number
of visits to the different states inuences the probability of winning the state. Abstracting
from non-Democrat or Republican parties and candidates, the model rst identies the ap-
proximate probability of winning the election, and then characterises the Nash Equilibrium
in which the two candidates will spend the same number of days visiting a given state. It is
also
characterised by candidates spending more time in states with a higher value ofQs = @P
D
@us
.
PD (u) is the approximate probability of winning the election and
u = (u1;u2; :::;us; :::;uS)
is the vector of utility differentials us that follows from the two candidates allocating
campaign time differently in each state s 2 [1; S]. Qs can be separated in two compo-
nents reecting the reason for favouring states with high Qs: rst, the candidates have an
incentive to increase the expected number of electoral votes won, and second, they also
seek to inuence the variance in the number of electoral votes.
According to the model, the value of Qs depends on several parameters: the number of
electoral college votes assigned to each state, es, the expected state-level Democratic vote
shares for each state and each election, st, the national, , and independent state-level
uncertainty, st, in these shares. t denotes the year of the election. Apart for the elec-
toral college votes, es, the other elements need to be estimated by Strömberg. Strömberg
(2007) initially assumes that all states have an equal variance of preferences, that the vari-
ance in state specic shocks is equal across states and that the predicted mean st of the
ideological preference distribution is a linear function of a set of observable variables, such
that st = Xst. Through a standard maximum-likelihood estimation of the time random-
effects model hence derived from the main model, he estimates the parameters , st and
.
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The variables in Xst are taken from a state-level election-forecast model derived in Camp-
bell (1992). At the national level, they are: the previous election Democratic vote share,
Democratic vote share of the two-party vote share in trial-heat polls from mid September,
second quarter economic growth, incumbency at the party and candidate level. At the state
level, they are: difference from the national mean of the Democratic two-party vote share
in the two previous elections, average ADA-scores of the states' Congress members in the
year prior to the election and the difference between the state and national polls. As these
were only available after 1984, prior to that, other variables used were the president's home
state, the Democratic vote-share in the midterm state legislative election and rst quarter
state economic growth.
Using data for 50 states between 1948 and 2004, the parameters , s and  are estimated
by ^, ^s(=0.073) and ^(=0.035). Also, ^st = ^Xst is estimated and used in conjunction
with ^s and ^ to calculate Qs, according to the main model.
Strömberg (2007) then shows that Qs measures the joint probability of state being ex post
facto, a swing state (as having a very close state-level election) and decisive in the Elec-
toral College. Simulating the electoral vote outcomes of one million elections in 2000 and
2004, it is shown that the correlation between the simulated probabilities of a state being a
decisive swing state and Qs is 0.998. Also, the correlation between these probabilities per
electoral college vote and Qs per electoral vote is 0.998, so the probability does not just
reect size.
The measureQs, reecting the probability of being a decisive swing state, is proportional to
the number of electoral votes, implying that smaller states will hold an advantage. Another
characteristic shown by the author is that this probability per electoral vote is higher in
states where the forecasted state election result is between 50% and the forecasted national
election outcome. Besides, the optimal allocations of campaign visits or other resources
will be concentrated among fewer states as the forecasts of state-elections outcomes be-
come more precise. Finally, a lagging candidate will have an incentive to increase the
variance in electoral votes by spending more resources in large states in which he is behind
than those in which he is ahead.
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This appendix has described how Strömberg (2007) theoretically derives and then estimates
the measure Qs. Moreover, it has interpreted the measure and described its characteristics.
Given that it reects above all the swingness and decisiveness of each state, it constitutes a
very well suited measure for our purpose and we use its values for the 1984 election in our
empirical analysis.
Chapter 3
Imports and Exports at the Level of the Firm:
Evidence from Belgium
Joint authorship with Mauro Pisu
Introduction
It is a well known fact that the world is becoming economically more integrated. Between
1990 and 2004, world exports of goods and non-factor services increased by 116 per cent,
surging to $9,216 billion. This outstripped the rise in world GDP (in nominal terms), which
during the same period rose by 63 per cent (UNCTAD, 2005). Recently, research efforts
on the effects of the rising internationalisation of national economies on such outcomes
as growth, employment and wage levels, have increasingly relied on the availability of
rm-level data sets. This has shifted the focus of research from the level of countries and
industries to the underlying micro-economic determinants of trade ows and their effects
on rms and workers.
In this chapter, we extend the evidence of the micro-econometric literature on international
trade by offering a complete view of the international trading activities of rms. While the
next chapter will concentrate on the determinants of exports, and in particular on liquidity
constraints, this chapter seeks to describe and understand the patterns of trade transaction
data. For this purpose, we use a data set covering the whole population of Belgian com-
panies matched with export and import data covering the period 1996-2004. This allows
us to identify importers and exporters along with the country of destination of exports and
origin of imports. In addition, we observe which and how many products are traded by in-
dividual companies as well as a number of other rm-level characteristics. The dataset also
allows us to consider the broad Belgian economy rather than manufacturing rms only, and
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to compare both importing and exporting activities. With the exception of Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2005) for the US, this is a clear improvement on the literature22.
This burgeoning micro-econometric literature on international trade has mostly focused on
exports. This branch of the literature, starting from Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Aw
and Hwang (1995), has allowed a detailed investigation of the choices of export market
participation at the level of the rm. Greenaway and Kneller (2005) and Wagner (2007)
provide two recent surveys of the literature. One of the main ndings of this research is
that exporters are superior to non-exporting rms along several rm-level characteristics,
such as productivity, employment and R&D expenditure. The existing evidence suggests
that trade is mostly conducted by a relatively small number of companies23.
Thus far, imports have been less studied by the empirical literature. This is unwarranted
given the recent surge in imports of intermediates24. There are also strong theoretical rea-
sons to expect that access to a larger variety or better quality of inputs, and technological
spillovers across international borders, might have a positive impact on rm-level produc-
tivity (Ethier, 1982; Markusen, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Feenstra, Markusen
and Zeile, 1992).
Studies have overwhelmingly found that exporters are larger and more productive than non-
exporters. This is mostly explained by the presence of xed costs of exporting combined
with the coexistence of rms with different productivity levels operating within a given
industry25. Theoretical models (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003)
formally show that the most productive rms self-select into export markets. Firms whose
22 MacGarvie (2006) also considers the importing and exporting activities of French rms, but she focuses
on their effects on patent citations. Tucci (2005), using a survey of Indian rms, nds that those engaged in
both imports and exports have higher productivity levels than those that are not.
23 Bernard and Jensen (1995) for the US and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) for France, using compa-
rable data sets in terms of coverage, nd that only a minority of manufacturing rms (15 per cent in US and
17 per cent in France) export.
24 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) nd that, for OECD countries, around 20 per cent of total exports are due
to imported intermediate inputs being used for further processing. Besides, one should not neglect the fact
that imported nal goods reach nal consumers through rms operating as intermediaries.
25 Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report that there is great dispersion in productivity levels across rms even
in narrowly dened industry.
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productivity is above a certain cut-off point will nd it protable to pay the xed costs of
exporting and start shipping goods abroad.
Part of our results corroborate existing ndings while others are novel and lay the ground
for future research. Considering rms operating in all sectors of the economy and not in
manufacturing only, we nd that the number of rms engaged in international trade has
been increasing, along with their employment levels. However, their share in the total
number of rms and employees in the economy has decreased during the sample period,
due to new rms and jobs being generated mostly in the service sector. By denition,
service rms are less likely to trade goods than rms in manufacturing or in the wholesale
and retail sectors. Similarly, companies trading internationally are larger in terms of value
added and employment than non-trading ones, although their contribution to value added
and employment of the whole economy declined over the sample period.
Among traders, we nd rms that solely import are the only category of traders accounting
for a rising share of total value added and employment. This is also because importers are
the only kind of trading rms whose share in the total number of rms increased. This
suggests that importing activities (including international outsourcing and offshoring) are
becoming an increasingly common practice even among service rms. Importers grew
faster in terms of value added than exporters, but slower than companies that both import
and export26.
Our ndings also point to the existence of xed costs of importing besides xed costs of
exporting. Both imports and exports appear to be strongly concentrated among the largest,
in terms of both employment and value added, and most productive rms. As previously
described in the literature focusing on exporters only, we show that traders outperform non-
traders. They are more productive and spend on average more on R&D. Furthermore, two-
way traders do better than traders on these two scores. The concentration of international
trade among the largest and most productive rms may be generated by xed costs, since
only the best rms can afford to meet them and then start trading internationally.
26 Henceforth, we will refer to companies that both import and export as two-way traders to distinguish them
from rms that just export or import, which we will simply call traders.
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Only a minority of rms import and when they do so, most rms source intermediate goods
from a small number of countries. This corresponds to the behaviour of exporting business.
Firms tend to export only a small share of their output and serve only few foreign markets.
There is a negative relationship between the number of exporting rms and the number of
export destinations they serve27. The same type of relationship holds true at product level.
Traders export or import a relatively small number of goods and the number of trading
rms decreases as the number of products traded increases.
Our results also suggest that the number of export markets served and the number of import
origins increases with productivity. Furthermore, productivity is also increasing as the
number of products exported or imported rises. These positive relationships suggest that
both xed costs of imports and of exports are incurred for each new country or product
with which rms start trading.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section briey overviews the existing
literature concerning importing and exporting behaviour at the level of the rm. The data
set is described in Section 3.2. The evidence we provide is discussed in Section 3.3, while
Section 3.4 presents some conclusions.
3.1 Exports, Imports and Firm-Level Characteristics
The micro-economic literature in international trade was pioneered by the work of Bernard
and Jensen (1995) and Aw and Hwang (1995) on export market participation. These and
many successive studies spanning different countries and time periods have overwhelm-
ingly conrmed the theory that exporters enjoy better performance characteristics than
non-exporters. The theoretical models of Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003) build these stylised facts into an international trade general equilibrium
model to show how the most productive rms self-select into export markets.
27 Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Damijan, Polanec and Prasnikar (2004) present similar ndings
concerning the exporting activities of French and Slovenian rms.
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An alternative explanation has been also put forward to explain the productivity advan-
tage of exporters over non-exporting rms (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998), namely the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Testing the self-selection versus learning-by-exporting
hypothesis has attracted a great deal of research effort. Initial evidence provided convinc-
ing support for self-selection. The arguments were perhaps most powerfully put by Bernard
and Jensen (1999, 2004). In their study of US plants, they found that even though exporters
had a higher level of productivity, the rate of their productivity growth was not signicantly
different from that of non-exporters. They also provided evidence that new exporters were
already among the best and differed signicantly from the average non-exporter28.
More recently, the hypothesis under test has evolved and started to consider whether or not
there is any productivity improvement that is conditional on self-selection: does the per-
formance of newly-exporting rms improve relative to similar rms that did not start ex-
porting? This involves controlling for the selection effect in the export decision. Here, the
results are less clear-cut. On the one hand, Baldwin and Gu (2004) for Canada, Castellani
(2002) for Italy, Damijan, Polanec and Prasnikar (2004) and De Loecker (2004) for Slove-
nia and Van Biesebroeck (2005) for a set of African countries nd evidence of productivity
improvements in companies after they started to export. On the other hand, Wagner (2002)
for Germany nd no evidence supporting the learning-by exporting hypothesis.
Recently, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Damijan, Polanec and Prasnikar (2004)
have added a new dimension to the literature on exports at company level by investigating
export-destination data. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) look at a cross section of
French rms in 1986. Their contribution runs along two main lines of thought. Firstly, they
show that there is a negative relationship between the number of rms selling to multiple
markets and the number of foreign markets they serve. Secondly, the variation of French
exports across destinations is mostly evident at the extensive margin (i.e. number of rms
selling there) rather than the intensive margin (i.e. output rms already exporting sell there).
28 In this literature, different measures of productivity have been used. Some studies have used labour
productivity (i.e. value added per worker). Others have employed total factor productivity measures, which
take into account the contribution of all inputs. Results overall appear to be robust the methodology used to
compute productivity.
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They show that a 1 per cent increase in the French export market share of a foreign country
market (i.e. gross production plus imports less exports) reects a rise of around 0.88 per
cent in the number of rms exporting there, whereas only 0.12 per cent is due to higher
sales of rms already exporting to the same destination.
Damijan, Polanec and Prasnikar (2004) show that productivity is positively associated with
the number of export markets rms serve29. This suggests that xed costs of exporting
re-occur at the entrance of each new export market. Also, they show how rms penetrate
new export markets gradually (on average one every two years) and start exporting to the
countries with low xed costs.
The abundance of empirical evidence concerning the export behaviour of rms contrasts
with the paucity of studies focusing on their importing activities30. It is a truism to say that
the surge in international trade is due not only to the rise in exports, but also in imports
and that therefore both sides of the coin deserve to be investigated. However, anecdotal
evidence of the rise in international outsourcing makes the study of imports at the level
of the rm all the more interesting in itself. Surprisingly, there is little systematic and
consistent evidence across countries on the increase in trade in intermediates. Hummels,
Ishii and Yi (2001) calculate the degree of vertical specialisation for a number of OECD
countries using input-output tables. They nd that, between 1970 and 1990, the share of
imported inputs used to produce goods that are exported rose by around 30 per cent to 21
per cent of the total exports of the countries considered31.
Also, there are theoretical reasons to expect that imports of intermediates will impact upon
rms, in particular on productivity levels. Building on Ethier (1982), Markusen (1989) ar-
gues that trade liberalisation of intermediates raises technical productivity at the nal good
production stage, if the nal and intermediates sectors have non-constant returns to scale.
This is because of the complementarities of domestic and foreign specialised inputs. With
29 They analyse a Slovenian rm-level data set from 1994 to 2002.
30 There are a number of empirical works that have investigated the effect of import competition. For
instance, Pavcnik (2002) shows that rms in import-competing industries experienced productivity gains
after trade liberalisation.
31 See Campa and Goldberg (1997) for the US, UK and Canada and Strauss-Kahn (2003) for France.
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free trade in inputs, "each country essentially confers a positive technological externality
on its trading partner" (Markusen 1989). Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile (1992) show that
an increase in input variety is positively correlated with total factor productivity (TFP). In
endogenous growth models with international trade, the productivity level of a country can
increase because of externalities not only from its own R&D spending, but also from R&D
expenditure by trading partners. (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).
To date, there is only scant empirical evidence on the effects of imports on rm-level char-
acteristics. The available studies suggest the existence of a positive relationship between
imports and productivity32. Only Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) for the US, Tucci
(2005) for India and MacGarvie (2006) for France have so far provided a comparative
analysis of the exporting and importing behaviour of rms and its impact. The analysis
that follows is more in the spirit of the study of Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005). They
show how US imports and exports are both heavily concentrated in the hands of a relatively
small number of rms. Furthermore, they show how traders account for a disproportionate
share of total employment, when compared with their numbers, and how rms that trade
with more countries and/or more products tend to be larger33. They also argue that com-
panies which both import and export tend to dominate US trade ows and employment
among trading rms.
32 Schor (2004) compares the effect of output and input tariff cuts on Brazilian manufacturing productivity
and nds that they are similar in magnitude. Muendler (2004) extends her analysis to consider explicitly
the role of imported inputs in a production function. He nds that imported equipment and intermediates
have a larger effect on output than domestically produced analogous inputs. However, their contribution
to aggregate productivity changes is minor when compared to productivity improvements within individual
rms and the exit of less productive rms due to import competition. Amiti and Konings (2005) make a
comparative analysis in the spirit of Fernandes (2007). They study the different effects of output and input
tariff cuts on rm-level productivity in Indonesia. They nd that both tariff cuts boost productivity, but that
the effect of reducing input tariffs is three times larger than that of cutting output tariffs. Furthermore, the
effect is even stronger for importing rms. Halpern et al. (2005) show that the signicant effect of imports
on total factor productivity in Hungary in the 1990s operates through productivity improvements and through
the reallocation of capital and labour to importers.
33 MacGarvie (2006) studies the effect of imports and exports of French rms on foreign patent citations.
Importing activities cause the number of foreign patents cited by importers to increase, whereas this is not
true for exporters. This is taken as evidence that imports, contrary to exports, facilitate access to foreign tech-
nology. Tucci (2005) nds a combined effect of imports and exports within trade networks when analysing
a survey of Indian rms. She shows that the more a rm participates in international networks, dened by
the combination of import and export shares, the higher its productivity advantage. Also, Indian rms that
concentrate export and import activities on a specic geographical area are more productive.
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3.2 Description of the data and sample coverage
Firm-level accounts. The Central Balance Sheet Ofce at the National Bank of Belgium
(NBB) collects the annual accounts of all companies registered in Belgium. Most limited
liability enterprises, plus some other rms, have to le their annual accounts and/or consol-
idated accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Ofce every year. Large companies have
to le the full-format balance sheet. Small companies may use the abbreviated format34.
There are some exceptions. Some enterprises do not have to le any annual accounts35. In
certain cases, these companies have to submit a social balance sheet to the Central Balance
Sheet Ofce. The social balance sheet contains specic information about the workforce,
such as the number of people employed, personnel movements, training, etc.
The data set does not cover rms in the nancial sector. For this study, we selected those
companies that led a full-format or abbreviated balance sheet between 1996 and 200436.
To avoid double counting, we did not select rms ling consolidated balance sheets, ei-
ther. Those balance sheets that cover more than one year or report data from two different
calendar years were annualised to match the customs data.
Customs data. Trade data on individual transactions concerning exports or imports are col-
lected separately at company level for intra-EU (Intrastat) and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade.
Different types of international trade transactions are reported. To classify rms as ex-
porters and/or importers, we consider only those involving a change in ownership37. Com-
34 Under the Belgian Code of Companies, a company is regarded as large if: the annual average of its
workforce exceeds 100 persons or more than one of the following criteria are exceeded: 1) annual average of
workforce: 50; 2) annual turnover (excluding VAT): 7,300,000 euro; 3) balance sheet total: 3,650,000 euro.
35 These include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability: general partner-
ships, ordinary limited partnerships, cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose mem-
bers have unlimited liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships;
hospitals, unless they have taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds,
professional associations, schools and higher education institutions.
36 This is because social balance sheets contain only limited information.
37 Records of international trade transactions also have to register movements of goods across borders which
do not involve any change of ownership. These concern movements of stock, or goods sent or received for
further processing, or for repair (after the repair has been executed). Furthermore, international trade transac-
tions have to register the return of merchandise and other special movements of goods. For more details, see
also Institut des comptes nationaux (2006). In order to give more information, recorded international trade
transactions regard only goods that have actually transited the country. This therefore excludes the so-called
triangular trade, whereby two rms in two different countries (for instance A and C) exchange goods through
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panies report Intrastat transactions monthly. Companies are only liable for Intrastat decla-
rations if their annual trade ows (receipts or shipments) exceed the threshold of 250,000
euro.
There are two kinds of declaration, the standard one and the extended declaration. Both
declarations must include for each transaction the product code, the type of transaction,
and the destination or origin of the goods, the value, the net mass and units. Companies
which exceed the threshold of 25,000,000 euro for their annual receipts or shipments must
ll up the extended declaration38. In addition to the same common variables of the standard
declaration, the means of transport and the conditions of delivery must be included in the
extended declaration.
Extrastat contains exactly the same information as Intrastat for transaction ows with coun-
tries outside the European Union. The data is collected by customs agents and centralised
at the National Bank of Belgium. The Extrastat data cover a larger share of the total trade
transactions than Intrastat data, because all ows are recorded, unless their value is smaller
than 1000 euro or their weight smaller than one tonne.
an intermediary operating in a third country (B). The intermediary buys the goods from the seller in country
A and sells them to the buyer in country C. However, the goods are shipped by the original seller (in coun-
try A) to the nal buyer (in country C), without transit through country B. Ofcial gures suggest that this
kind of trade is a non-negligible phenomenon in Belgium, but it will be recorded among imports or exports
of services and not of goods.
38 They must le an extended declaration for the ow of goods which exceeds this threshold. The extended
declaration was introduced in 2002.
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Table 3.1. Merged balance sheet data and customs data
Number of firms Number of employees
(thousands)
Value added
(thousands of Euros)
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Firms included in the balance
sheet data set 216,137 301,674 1,590.89 1,817.1 99,790.8 147,668.7
of which, firms with at least 1
full-time employee
96,417
(44.61%)
107,180
(35.53%)
1,589.43
(99.91%)
1,804.1
(99.29%)
93,931.09
(94.12%)
137,351.2
(93.01%)
Firms included in the customs
data set, but not in the balance
sheet data set
15,601 94,223
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.
Merger of balance sheet and customs data. The Belgian Balance Sheet Transaction Trade
Dataset (BBSTTD) results from the merging of the balance sheet data and the customs data
at the level of the rm through the value added tax (VAT) number. This is a unique code
identifying each rm. The merger was highly successful. As shown in Table 3.1, only 7.22
per cent of the rms in the customs data in 1996 and 4.67 per cent of them in 2004 were
not merged with the balance sheet data set. These legal entities have a VAT number but do
not le any accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Ofce39. Although these rms only
make up a marginal fraction of the whole population, they accounted for 26.4 and 35.9 per
cent of total imports in 1996 and 2004 and 25.5 and 37.2 per cent of total exports. More
information about these unmatched rms is given in Table 3.2. The bulk of trade conducted
by unmatched rms in 2004 was attributed to foreign rms with no actual production site
in Belgium. Therefore, our results are unlikely to be biased by this matching issue.
In the data, there are a large number of rms reporting no employees at all or only one part-
time equivalent employee. In the following analysis, we focus only on those rms with at
39 These entities can well be rms that are part of larger group ling consolidated accounts. We do not use
consolidated accounts. But even with consolidated accounts, it would be extremely difcult to disentangle
the data related to those rms trading internationally but not ling accounts from the information concerning
other rms in the group.
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least one full-time equivalent (FTE) employee40. Although selecting just these companies
means losing more than half the total number of rms recorded in both 1996 and 2004
(see Table 3.1), this does not lead to any signicant loss of information. The selected rms
together account for most of the economic activity in Belgium. Table 3.1 shows that rms
employing at least one worker accounted for 94.12 per cent of total reported value added41
in 1996 and 93.01 per cent in 2004. Hence, our matched data set appears to adequately
represent the Belgian economy.
Table 3.2. Unmerged balance sheet data and customs data (year 2004)
Type of firms % of
unmatched
exporting firms
% of
unmatched
exports
% of
unmatched
importing firms
% of
unmatched
imports
Foreign firms with no
establishment in Belgium 14.4% 59.7% 13.7% 58.6%
Foreign firms 8.5% 21.4% 10.8% 21.1%
Non-profit organisations 2.5% 13.5% 3.6% 14.3%
Others 74.6% 5.4% 71.8% 6.0%
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.  Note: The judicial situation of firms with no Balance Sheet is obtained
through the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises (BCE-KBO).
Table 3.3 provides more information about the non-merged observations for 2004. As can
be seen, more than 55 per cent of both export and import trade not merged with annual
accounts data is conducted by foreign rms with no establishment in Belgium. These are
trading rms with a VAT representative. They are most probably trading platforms of other
European rms using Belgium as their port of entry. Some might have been established for
40 Henceforth, if we refer to an employee or worker one should understand Full-Time Equivalent Employee.
This corresponds to item 9087 in the balance sheet.
41 Value added is measured differently for rms ling full-format or abbreviated balance sheets. The differ-
ence between sales and inventory in products, services and miscellaneous goods is computed for full-format
balance sheets as items (70/74  740  60  61). In the case of abbreviated accounts, it is approximated by
the gross operating margin (70/61 or 61/70).
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scal reasons by Belgian rms to conduct trade for them, but this cannot be checked in the
data. About 20 per cent of the unmatched imports and exports can be attributed to foreign
rms producing in Belgium. Their annual accounts are not available, but this is probably
because they are part of a larger group of rms ling consolidated accounts.
To investigate the sample coverage at industrial level, Table 3.3 shows the shares of rms
and employment levels for different sectors of the economy, considering rms with at least
one employee and those with at least ve employees. To provide an overview of the dynam-
ics of broad sectoral divisions of the Belgian economy, we consider the following indus-
tries: agriculture, shing and mining, manufacturing, recycling, utilities and construction,
wholesale and retail, services, coordination centres and rms with no industry classica-
tion.
Overall, the gures in Table 3.3 are broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting
that most of the new small rms and start-ups are in the service sector, whereas manufac-
turing is shrinking and moving towards a process of consolidation favouring large rms42.
The share of manufacturing declined during the same period. Considering rms with at
least ve employees, their share decreased from 24.3 per cent to less than 20 per cent. The
decrease was a little milder when including smaller rms. Recycling, utilities and construc-
tion - another important sector - maintained a stable share in the total number of rms.
The last two columns of Table 3.3 show the shares of employees in each broad sector.
Manufacturing and services are the two largest employers, each accounting for between
30 and 40 per cent of total jobs in our sample. Other large employers are, in descending
order, wholesale and retail (around 20 per cent), and recycling, utilities and construction
(between 10 and 11 per cent). Services and manufacturing appear to be on divergent paths.
In 1996, manufacturing accounted for more than 36 per cent of jobs in the whole economy.
The contribution of services was around 31.5 per cent. This ranking was reversed in 2004
42 In both 1996 and 2004, the service and wholesale and retail sectors accounted for the majority of all rms
in the economy. The number of rms in the service sector increased in both employment classes we consider.
This sector's share rose from 33.1 per cent to nearly 38 per cent (for rms with at least one employee) and
from 27 to 32.7 per cent (for those with at least ve employees) from 1996 to 2004. The contribution of the
wholesale and retail sector to the total number of rms, although still prominent in 2004, declined during the
sample period. The decrease was sharper when considering rms with at least one worker.
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as their respective shares were now 30 and 37 per cent. Also, during this period, the share
of the wholesale and retail sector in terms of employment increased while that of recycling,
utilities and construction remained stable.
Table 3.3. Number of rms and employees per sector
Number of firms
Number of employees
(thousands)
At least 1 full-
time employee
At least 5 full-
time employees
At least 1 full-
time
employee
At least 5 full-
time
employees
Sector NACE
Code
Bel
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Total 96,416 107,180 37,518 42,730 1,589 1,804 1,477 1,660
of which:
Agriculture,
Fishing,
Mining
1-14 1.9% 2.1% 1.6% 1.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7%
Manufacturing 15-36 15.8% 13.3% 24.3% 19.9% 36.5% 29.6% 38.4% 31.4%
Recycling,
Utilities and
Construction
37-49 14.3% 14.6% 15.9% 15.5% 11.0% 10.5% 10.7% 10.2%
Wholesale and
Retail 50-54 34.2% 31.9% 30.4% 29.6% 19.4% 21.1% 18.2% 20.1%
Services 55-98 33.1% 37.9% 26.9% 32.7% 31.6% 37.3% 31.4% 37.1%
Coordination
centres 74152 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6%
Unknown 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.
Overall, Table 3.3 suggests that, as expected, rms and jobs are deserting manufacturing
and growing in the service and wholesale and retail sectors. This is likely to have an impact
on the evolution of the number and percentage of companies trading goods.
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3.3 Evidence
Having described the dataset and considered its coverage, this section aims at exploring its
content and highlighting several key elements related to exports and imports. In the follow-
ing subsection, we investigate the number and percentage of rms and jobs accounted for
by non-traders, and by traders, distinguishing between importers, exporters and two-way
traders. We then break down these dynamics even further for the manufacturing sector.
Next, we examine and compare the degree of concentration of both imports and exports.
Then, focusing on the manufacturing sector, we analyse the rm-level characteristics of
traders and non-traders. The information on export destinations, origins of imports and
products traded are explored in the following two subsections. Finally, we provide some
evidence on the productivity differential between non-traders and the different types of
traders.
3.3.1 Importers, Exporters and Two-way Traders
As discussed in the introduction, the literature on rm-level trade has so far concentrated
mainly on the exporting behaviour of rms. Few papers have considered their importing ac-
tivities. This subsection provides new stylised facts on how intertwined these two activities
are, and on their frequency both over time and across broad sectors.
Table 3.4 considers the number of rms in the sample distinguishing between the shares of
non-trading rms, importers, exporters and those that both import and export (i.e. two-way
traders)43. Again, we focus our attention on rms with at least one or ve employees.
43 We performed the same analysis considering trade with countries outside the EU only. Trade data relating
to transactions with non-EU countries are more reliable than data relating to EU counterparts. This is because
the recording of trade transactions with EU countries is undertaken by the rm. On the contrary, transactions
with partners outside EU are recorded by customs at the borders. Also, if the EU is considered as one single
economy, only extra-EU trade would be considered as trade. The results for non-EU trade are similar to those
found in Table 4. They are available upon request.
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Table 3.4. Number and employees of traders and non-traders
Number of firms Number of employees (thousands)
Firms with at
least one FT
employee
Firms with at
least 5 employees
Firms with at least
one FT employee
Firms with at least
5 employees
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Total 96417 107180 37496 42730 1589.4 1804.1 1477.5 1660.3
of which:
Non-Traders 72.4% 77.0% 56.8% 62.4% 38.4% 38.4% 34.4% 34.4%
Importers 6.6% 8.0% 8.1% 10.9% 10.8% 10.8% 11.1% 11.1%
Exporters 4.2% 4.3% 5.0% 6.2% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6%
Two-way Traders 16.8% 10.7% 30.1% 20.5% 47.3% 47.3% 50.9% 50.9%
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.
Overall, only a minority of rms export or import, which is consistent with previous empir-
ical studies. Firms that export, meaning those that just export and those that both export and
import, accounted for around 21 per cent of all rms in 1996 and 15 per cent in 200444. In-
terestingly, our data suggest that importing goods is a slightly more common practice than
exporting. The percentage of rms importing goods was 23.4 in 1996 and 17.7 in 200445.
Also, companies are more likely to engage in two-way trade (export and import at the same
time) than doing just one or the other. The share of rms doing both was 16.8 per cent in
1996, but dropped to 10.7 per cent in 2004. On the whole, larger rms are more likely to
trade.
44 Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) report for the US that only 3.1 per cent of rms exported in 2000.
They nevertheless consider all rms in the US with no limit on employment. Bernard and Jensen (1995) nd
that 14.6 per cent of manufacturers exported, excluding small plants. Eaton, Kortum and Kramatz (2004)
obtain similar ndings for France using cross-section data for all French rms for 1986. They nd that 17.4
per cent of all manufacturers export. The different coverage of the data sets used in other studies made direct
comparisons with other countries difcult. For instance, Kneller and Pisu (2004) nd for the UK that export
participation stands at around 65 per cent. However, the data they use under-represents small rms.
45 When considering all rms in the US economy in 2000 with no limit of size, Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2005) nd that 2.2 per cent of rms import while 3.1 per cent export. With no size threshold, these gures
in the BBSTTD would be respectively 8.5 per cent and 6.9 per cent.
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The last four columns of Table 3.4 show that most jobs in Belgium are generated by rms
that have some type of involvement in trading goods internationally. Besides, two-way
traders are the largest employers. They account for around 50 per cent of total employment.
Comparing the rst four columns of Table 3.4 with the last four, we have the stark contrast
that non-traders make up the majority of rms in 1996 and 2004, but at the same time their
share of total employment is much lower (being below 40 per cent).
As shown in Table 3.5, the growth in the total number of rms is mostly generated by
both the service sector and non-trading rms. Thus, although the manufacturing sector has
become more open and trade in goods has increased in value, a lower proportion of rms in
the economy is involved in importing and/or exporting goods because new rms are mostly
concentrated in the (relatively closed) service sector. The share of trading and non-trading
rms is evolving differently in different industries. In manufacturing, the percentage of
exporting- and importing-only rms increased. Surprisingly, however, the share of non-
traders also rose over the sample period.
These changes are counterbalanced by the drop in the relative number of two-way traders46.
In services, traders of any type account for the decreasing share of the total number of
rms, whereas the share of non-traders is increasing. Wholesale and retail trade is instead
characterised by the rise in the share of importing-only companies.
46 The share of two-way traders decreased in all broad sectors considered. This is at rst sight surprising,
above all in manufacturing, given the increasing importance of international trade. However, it may be
possible that this phenomenon reects a concentration of rms on core competences. This leads rms to
become less vertically integrated and therefore to focus on only a particular stage of the whole production
process, with the result that they will become just importers or exporters.
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In Table 3.6, it can be seen that, not surprisingly, non-traders appear to generate fewer jobs
than traders in the manufacturing sector. In both 1996 and 2004, only around 10 per cent
of employees in manufacturing worked for rms that neither imported nor exported goods.
Wholesale and retail rms' employment became increasingly concentrated in non-trading
rms, rising from 25 per cent to 26.6 per cent, possibly because new rms tend not to trade
immediately.
Another interesting pattern to emerge from Table 3.6 is that the share of employment gen-
erated by importing-only rms increased in all industries. On the other hand, the share of
jobs of exporting-only rms increased in manufacturing (from 1.1 to 2.5 per cent), but de-
creased in wholesalenretail (slightly) and services (markedly). In services, this was mainly
due to the switch in the trading status of one very large rm. Two-way traders' employment
declined in all sectors.
Alternative explanations for these trends can be suggested. It could be that rms increas-
ingly use trade intermediaries or platforms for one leg of the trading activity, thus switch-
ing status from two-way trader to importer or exporter only. The data only identies direct
trade by a company, so there could also be a shift to indirect trade via a domestic wholesaler
or retailer. Alternatively, outsourcing, offshoring or a concentration on core competences
might possibly be affecting these numbers in different ways. These are all questions that
should be addressed by further research.
Our results concerning the dynamics of rms and jobs (as a share of the total economy)
and their trading status are in stark contrast with what Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005)
report for the US. They nd that, over the 1993-2000 period, the contribution of traders
(whether exporters, importers or both) to the total number of rms and workers in the US
economy increased. A possible explanation for the different Belgian and US experience in
this respect is the dissimilar evolution of the service and manufacturing industries in the
two countries. Between 1990 and 2004, the contraction of the manufacturing sector, and
the corresponding growth of the service sector, was in fact more pronounced in Belgium
than in the US. In this period in Belgium, the contribution of manufacturing value added to
total GDP decreased by 9.96 per cent, from 20.28 to 18.26 per cent. On the contrary, the
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relative weight of the US manufacturing sector was virtually unchanged, although it had
shrunk in earlier years. Manufacturing value added accounted for 18.07 per cent of GDP
in 1990 and 18.24 per cent in 200447.
Table 3.7. Export and import share by broad sector
Export Value
(million euros)
Import Value
(million euros) Employment
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Total 86,794 127,187 79,076 120,006 1,589,388 1,804,072
of which:
Manufacturing 71.7% 69.6% 47.6% 47.1% 36.5% 29.6%
Wholesale and Retail 25.8% 26.3% 47.3% 46.1% 19.4% 21.1%
Services 1.2% 2.1% 2.2% 3.0% 29.4% 33.6%
Others 1.3% 2.0% 2.9% 3.8% 14.7% 15.6%
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.
Different sectors contributed in very different ways to the total value of exports and imports
in goods, as they do in terms of other variables such as employment. In 1996, manufac-
turing unsurprisingly accounted for 72 per cent of total exports, while wholesale and retail
and services had respective shares of 25.8 and 1.2 per cent, as shown in Table 3.748. Im-
ports are less concentrated on one particular sector, with manufacturing and wholesale and
retail both importing around 47.5 per cent of the total in 1996, possibly due to the pres-
47 We computed these percentages considering national aggregates in constant 1990 prices in US$. These
values come from the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database as downloaded in January 2007.
For a comparative analysis of the evolution of the manufacturing sector in Belgium with that of other EU
countries and the US in the last 20 years, see Robert and Dresse (2005)
48 The very slight decrease in the share of manufacturing is possibly due to either a question of classication
or to certain services being increasingly attached to manufacturing goods. For example, when a software
company exports its product, the trade will be recorded as the shipment of a CD-Rom, valued as if it were
blank.
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ence of large retailer chains. These companies are likely to source their imports from the
cheapest locations and serve predominantly in the country where they operate.
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from this subsection. First, although the
Belgian economy is becoming more open, most of the new jobs and rms are being created
in the service sector where trade in goods is marginal. Second, if rms trade internationally,
they are more likely to engage in both exports and imports instead of just one or the other.
This fact has not been properly considered thus far by the literature, which has mainly
looked at exports only.
3.3.2 Entry, exit and job creation or destruction in the manufacturing
sector
Given the importance of manufacturing for trade in goods, in this subsection we break
down the described changes in the number of rms and employment across the different
trading categories over our sample period. These dynamics are reported in Table 3.8 and
Table 3.1049.
One must note that we dene entry as the ling of a balance sheet by a rm with a new
VAT number, and exit as the absence of a balance sheet being led by a VAT-entity who
had done so at least in the previous year. This means we are capturing excessive entry
and exit: production units that are bought by other rms will appear as an exit, and rms
created as a spin-off of an existing company will appear as an entry. Although this would
not be a straightforward exercise, some of these errors could be controlled for by a careful
use of data on bankruptcies. However, data at the production unit level is not available to
us, and there is no data that provides the links between various VAT entities of one given
rm within Belgium.
The trend in our data differs strongly across trading groups considered. Within our sample
period, importers and exporters have greatly increased in number. On the other hand, the
number of both non-traders and two-way traders decreased.
49 Similar tables are reported for the whole US economy by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005).
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Table 3.8 also shows how common entry and exit of rms is in all four categories. It
constitutes the most important source of dynamics compared to continuing rms switching
trading status. There are, however, major differences in these movements. Firms are more
likely to keep the same status when they are non-traders or two-way traders. Firm death
is much more rare for rms engaged in international trade, and even more so for two-
way traders. Furthermore, exit appears to be more likely than entry for all types of rms
considered, except for exporters.
Table 3.8. Entry and exit of rms across trading status (manufacturing)
Number of firms
Continuing firms
Trading status 1996
Keep
same
status Exits Entry
Start
trading
Stop
trading
Switched
trading
status 2004
Non-traders 7,962 3,782 -3,428 +3,203 -752 +856 7,841
Importers 975 233 -352 +322 +278 -263 +338 1,298
Exporters 661 100 -251 +303 +264 -213 +275 1,039
Two-way traders 5,595 2,944 -1,478 +753 +210 -380 -613 4,087
Total 15,193 7,059 -5,509 +4,581 14,265
Share of firms relative to 1996 levels (in percentage)
Continuing firms
Trading status 1996
Keep
same
status Exit Entry
Start
trading
Stop
trading
Switched
trading
status 2004
Non-traders 100 48 -43 +40 -9 +11 98
Importers 100 24 -36 +33 +29 -27 +35 133
Exporters 100 15 -38 +46 +40 -32 +42 157
Two-way traders 100 53 -26 +13 +4 -7 -11 73
Total 100 46 -36 +30 94
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.  Notes: The first sub-table gives firm counts, while the second gives
values relative to 1996 values. The first column reports the number of firms existing in each
category in 1996, while the second gives those that had not changed status in 2004. Columns 2
and 3 show death and birth of firms in and out of each status. The next three columns report
the switches of continuing firms between the various trading categories. The movements
between non-traders and the three types of traders are reported in columns 5 and 6, while in
column 7 we report those traders that switch trading type. The last column gives the 2004
figure.
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Table 3.9. Transition matrix and Markov(1) process ergodic distribution
Entry/Exit Non-trader Importer only Exporter only Two-way trader
Entry/Exit 0 0.70 0.07 0.07 0.16
Non-trader 0.43 0.48 0.03 0.03 0.03
Importer only 0.36 0.27 0.24 0.02 0.11
Exporter only 0.38 0.32 0.04 0.15 0.11
Two-way trader 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.53
Steady state
distribution 0.28 0.46 0.06 0.05 0.15
The rise in the number of importing- and exporting-only rms is also due to two-way
traders discontinuing one of their trading activities and to non-traders starting to trade.
Looking at the status of entrants and new traders, it seems that becoming a two-way trader
is a gradual process. Once this status is acquired, a rm is also less likely to stop trading
altogether.
The results in Table 3.8 can be written as the transition matrix of a Markov(1) process, as
in Table 3.9. The steady state vector is reported in the last line of the table and provides the
ergodic distribution of this Markov process. In steady-state, there will be simultaneaous
entry and exit of 28 per cent of rms. The near majority of rms would be Non-traders (46
per cent), while Two-way traders would constitute the majority of trading rms, with 15
per cent against 6 and 5 per cent respectively for Importers only and Exporters only.
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Table 3.10. Entry and exit of rms across trading status in terms of employment
Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: See Table 8 notes. This describes the same dynamics but in terms of
employment. For continuing firms, negative flows are 1996 employment figures, while positive flows are
2004 employment figures. Column 8 reports the change in employment of firms that did not change status
over the sample period.
Change in employment (thousands)
Continuing firms
Firms keep trading
Trading
status 1996
Keep
same
status Exit Entry
Start
trading
Stop
trading
Switched
trading
status
Same
trading
status 2004
Non-traders 57.9 26.4 -22.2 +17.9 -9.3 +10.0 +4.9 59.1
Importers 17.2 5.4 -6.1 +6.8 +5.1 -3.2 +8.5 +1.0 29.3
Exporters 6.6 1.3 -2.2 +2.8 +3.3 -1.9 +4.9 +0.1 13.5
Two-way
traders 498.1 367.7 -87.6 +52.1 +6.4 -7.9 -14.0 -14.1 432.9
Total 579.8 400.8 -118.2 +79.5 534.8
Change in employment relative to 1996 levels (in percentage)
Continuing firms
Firms keep trading
Trading
status 1996
Keep
same
status Exit Entry
Start
trading
Stop
trading
Switched
trading
status
Same
trading
status 2004
Non-traders 100 46 -38 +31 -16 +17 +8 102
Importers 100 31 -36 +40 +30 -19 +49 +6 170
Exporters 100 20 -34 +43 +50 -29 +74 +2 205
Two-way
traders 100 74 -18 +10 +1 -2 -3 -3 87
Total 100 69 -20 +14 -1 92
The surprising drop in the number of two-way traders is due to two elements. Firstly, exits
of rms were not offset by the number of entries, both by new and old rms. Secondly, there
was a relatively large number of two-way traders that stopped both importing or exporting
to concentrate on only one of these two activities.
Most of these comments can be carried over to Table 3.10, which reports dynamics of job
ows. Additionally, one notices that large rms that trade are even more likely to keep
their status by comparing for example the percentage of rms that stay as two-way traders
(53 per cent) and the percentage of workers they employ (74 per cent). This is not true for
non-traders.
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The number of jobs lost through exits is lower in percentage terms for two-way traders (18
per cent of their workers were displaced for this reason) and higher for non-traders (38 per
cent of jobs lost). Importers and exporters are in between, with around 35 per cent of their
jobs destroyed as a result of exits. The net job creation due to entries and exits varies with
the trading status of the rm. Importing and exporting companies created more jobs than
they destroyed, because of entries and exits, whereas the contrary is true for non-traders
and two-way traders.
In the case of continuing rms, it is possible to see that the reallocation of employment
among different types of rms was also caused by switching trading status. Comparing
the employment changes due to starting and stopping trading, it is possible to see the net
contribution is positive for importers and exporters and surprisingly negative for two-way
traders.
Furthermore, considering those rms switching their trading status, but still remaining
traders, the percentage change in employment is negative for two-way traders and posi-
tive for both importers and exporters. However, perusing the gures about the number of
employees in Table 3.10 and number of rms in Table 3.8, it is possible to infer that those
two-way traders that stopped one of their trading activities and became just importers or
exporters were on average smaller rms, accounting for only a small percentage of two-
way traders' total employment. Yet, this is still an important increase in the employment
of importers and, even more so of exporters50.
Finally, rms with the same trading status in 1996 and 2004 have different trajectories
of employment creation, too. The surprising overall decrease in the employment levels of
two-way traders is compounded by the fact that continuing rms in this category on average
saw a drop in their employment levels. Given that the fall in both rm and employment
numbers in the manufacturing industry is concentrated in this category of companies, these
are particularly interesting results that should be analysed further in future research, as
mentioned above.
50 Respectively 68 per cent and 88 per cent, summarised in the 49 per cent and 74 per cent gures of Table
9 which sum up all trading status switches.
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The main ndings reported in this subsection highlight the role of rms' death and birth
and the strength of larger and trading rms. One should also note the gradual process of
entering trade and the drop in employment of two-way traders and their switch to single-
trade activities.
3.3.3 Trade Concentration
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2006) show
for the US that trade is highly concentrated. This subsection looks at this issue in more
detail. Table 3.11 shows the Gini coefcients of exports, imports and total trade (in addition
to value added and employment by way of comparison)51. We report this information for
the whole economy and for manufacturing and wholesale and retail sectors separately.
However it is measured, overall economic activity appears to be unevenly distributed. All
Gini coefcients in Table 3.11 are larger than 0.740. It is noteworthy that international trade
is more concentrated than employment and value added. This is true whether we consider
the whole economy or the manufacturing or wholesale and retail sectors separately. Also,
exports and imports have become more concentrated over time. This is in line with the
evolution in the degree of concentration of employment and value added52.
The degrees of international trade concentration in Table 3.11 are similar to those that
Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2006) report for the whole US economy in 2000.
They nd a Gini coefcient of 0.972 for exports, 0.965 for imports and 0.971 for total
trade. These gures are marginally lower than those for the whole Belgian economy in
2004 and in 1996. So this suggests that international trade in Belgium appears to be even
more concentrated than in the US. In both countries, exports appear to be more concentrated
than imports.
51 The Gini coefcient is a measure of how much a certain variable, say, trade, is equally distributed across
rms. It is bound between zero and one. A value of zero indicates that trade is uniformly distributed and that
therefore all rms account for the same proportion of trade. A value of one points to the fact that just one
rm is responsible for all trade.
52 Employment in manufacturing is the exception since its Gini coefcients decreased from 1996 to 2004.
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In Table 3.12, we delve deeper into the data to investigate the degree of concentration of
international trade, employment and value added for different parts of the size distribution.
The largest rms, i.e. those with more than 500 employees, only make up 0.3 per cent of the
total number of rms and 1.1 per cent of manufacturing rms. Yet, in 2004, they accounted
for 33 per cent of total employment, and 37.2 per cent in manufacturing. Furthermore, they
are responsible for over 40 per cent of exports and imports, and more than 55 per cent in
manufacturing.
Table 3.11. Gini coefcients
Whole Economy Manufacturing Wholesale Retail
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004
Employment 0.826 0.833 0.824 0.815 0.746 0.747
Value Added 0.868 0.868 0.873 0.879 0.799 0.816
Exports 0.984 0.987 0.959 0.962 0.971 0.974
Imports 0.973 0.979 0.956 0.963 0.943 0.952
Total Trade 0.974 0.980 0.953 0.959 0.941 0.952
Source: NBB- BBSTTD
The fact that exports are so highly concentrated among the largest rms is consistent with
recent theoretical models (Melitz 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003) and
empirical evidence showing that only the largest and most productive rms will be able to
meet the xed costs of exports and start selling abroad. A similar phenomenon seems to be
at work for imports. Fixed costs of imports could mean that importing is only protable for
the largest rms. It could also be that importing a greater variety of intermediates, possibly
of higher quality, allows rms to improve their productivity and thus grow more.
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Table 3.12. Concentration of exports and imports
1996 2004
Whole economy Whole economy
Size of
firms
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
1-20 88.8% 23.3% 20.9% 16.2% 18.2% 62,408 88.7% 24.8% 20.5% 11.4% 15.2% 67,335
21-50 7.4% 14.3% 13.3% 10.6% 13.1% 53,807 7.4% 14.1% 12.5% 9.7% 11.8% 66,307
51-100 1.9% 8.3% 7.8% 8.3% 7.7% 55,384 2.0% 8.4% 8.0% 8.0% 9.5% 71,992
101-200 1.0% 8.4% 8.5% 9.6% 10.4% 59,669 1.0% 8.4% 9.0% 10.1% 9.6% 81,311
201-500 0.6% 11.5% 11.9% 14.2% 15.7% 60,430 0.6% 11.3% 12.7% 15.1% 13.9% 86,413
>500 0.3% 34.2% 37.6% 41.1% 34.8% 67,864 0.3% 33.0% 37.2% 45.7% 40.0% 96,632
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Size of
firms
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
1-20 74.1% 11.5% 8.4% 3.8% 4.7% 49,970 75.1% 12.5% 8.7% 3.3% 4.1% 62,554
21-50 14.7% 12.7% 10.2% 7.4% 7.4% 50,792 13.6% 12.2% 8.6% 6.0% 6.2% 59,185
51-100 5.3% 10.1% 8.3% 8.6% 7.6% 50,499 5.1% 9.9% 7.9% 7.4% 5.8% 67,355
101-200 2.8% 10.5% 9.1% 10.0% 9.7% 54,111 3.0% 11.0% 9.7% 9.8% 8.4% 74,856
201-500 1.9% 15.3% 14.8% 14.2% 13.5% 60,006 2.1% 17.3% 16.5% 16.4% 14.9% 81,063
>500 1.1% 40.0% 49.3% 55.9% 57.2% 73,399 1.1% 37.2% 48.6% 57.0% 60.7% 101,677
Wholesale and retail Wholesale and retail
Size of
firms
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
Share
of
firms
Share
of
empl.
Share
of
total
VA
Share
of total
exports
Share
of total
imports
Average
VA/emp
1-20 92.6% 40.6% 36.0% 47.8% 31.5% 56,419 91.6% 38.1% 30.8% 29.9% 26.3% 65,129
21-50 5.5% 18.6% 16.8% 18.5% 18.9% 52,491 6.1% 17.3% 15.6% 17.6% 17.0% 68,332
51-100 1.0% 7.3% 7.6% 7.4% 7.5% 60,649 1.2% 7.3% 7.6% 7.2% 9.3% 79,675
101-200 0.5% 6.9% 10.3% 8.3% 11.8% 88,372 0.5% 6.9% 8.7% 10.8% 11.0% 94,807
201-500 0.3% 10.3% 11.8% 14.4% 18.8% 65,879 0.4% 9.4% 13.0% 12.6% 13.9% 108,847
>500 0.1% 16.3% 17.4% 3.6% 11.6% 81,068 0.2% 21.0% 24.3% 21.9% 22.7% 130,942
Source: NBB-BBSTTD.  Notes: This table divides firms by size according to the number of employees
(FTE) in each firm, as reported in the first column.  The share of firm population, employment, total
exports and imports is then reported for each size class. Average value-added per employee is also
given. This is done for both 1996 and 2004. It considers the whole economy and the manufacturing and
wholesale and retail sectors separately.
Over time, imports and exports have become even more concentrated. International trans-
actions seem to be increasingly conducted by the largest rms. This is not consistent with
the predictions of the Melitz (2003) model, where a fall in trade costs enables smaller and
lower productivity rms to participate in export markets. However, this could be due to a
strengthening of the selection process to start trading internationally. As trade is liberalised
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further, foreign markets become more competitive. This makes it less likely for small rms
to break into export or import markets. Looking at the broad industry gures at the bottom
of Table 3.12, we can see that wholesale and retail trade appears to be less concentrated
than manufacturing, but the degree of concentration has been increasing during the sample
period53.
Illustrating this concentration within the manufacturing sector, Figure 3.1 depicts the Lorenz
curve of total trade (i.e. imports plus exports) with respect to total value added. The top
ten per cent of rms in terms of value added account for around 90 per cent of the value of
international trade transactions, and this proportion increased from 1996 to 2004. Firms in
the top 50 per cent of the distribution of value added are responsible for nearly 100 per cent
of the value of imports plus exports. As shown in Figure 3.2, the concentration in terms of
productivity (measured by value added per employee) is slightly lower, with the top 10 per
cent of rms accounting for around 45 per cent trade in 2004.
This subsection has depicted how extremely concentrated trade is. Both imports and ex-
ports are primarily conducted by the largest rms in terms of employment and value added,
which are also those with higher levels of productivity. The higher concentration of both
exports and imports among a relatively small number of rms may be generated by recur-
ring sunk costs of exports and imports for different markets and products. This leads to the
fact that only the most productive exporters and/or importers nd it protable to trade with
more countries and more products. Therefore, more productive traders will trade more,
and not only at the intensive margin, but also at the extensive margin. This will result in a
higher degree of concentration than in the hypothetical case with just one foreign country
and one product.
53 The gures for wholesale and retail trade seem rather dubious because of the large share of international
trade conducted by rms with less than 20 employees. We conducted a robustness check, looking at the
concentration gures of wholesale and retail sub-industries at 2-digit NACE level. These are: sector 50 "sale,
maintenance and repair of motor vehicles; fuel sale", 51 "wholesale trade & commission trade exc. motor
veh." and 52 "retail trade exc. motor vehicles; repair of pers. goods". Industry 51 and 52 show a similar
degree of concentration to the entire wholesale and retail sector. Sector 50 appears to be more concentrated,
with a handful of rms with more than 500 employees accounting for around 50 per cent of international
trade.
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3.3.4 Firm-Level Characteristics of Traders vs. Non-Traders
The micro-econometric-based international trade literature to date has overwhelmingly
shown that exporters are more productive than non-exporters (e.g. Bernard and Jensen
(1999) for the US; Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005) for the UK; Wagner (2002) for Ger-
many; Castellani (2002) for Italy). Yet, due to a lack of data, importers have so far been
almost completely neglected54.
In this section, we explore the relationships between rm-level characteristics and inter-
national trading status. Table 3.13 exhibits regression results of rm-level variables, in
log, regressed on trading-status dummies. These results, although showing simple correla-
tion, have the advantage that estimated coefcients can be interpreted in percentage terms.
Also, we are able to control for time and xed effects, adding a full set of time and two-
digit NACE-BEL industry dummies55. Table 3.13 shows the percentage differences in the
rm-level variables among different types of rms. Two-way traders appear to enjoy the
largest premia for the various coefcient values followed in order by importers and ex-
porters. Firms that both import and export are on average 35 per cent more productive than
those doing neither. The productivity advantage of exporting- and importing-only rms is
similar at around 17-18 per cent. Furthermore, Table 3.13 suggests that traders are more
capital intensive and invest more per employee than non-traders. Again, two-way traders
have the largest advantage followed by importers and exporters. The sum of the "Ex-
porter only" and "Importer only" coefcients is signicantly smaller than the "Two-way
trader" coefcient for (the logarithms of) employment, value-added and investment, as re-
ported in the last lines of Table 3.13. This suggests there might exist additional spillovers
between importing and exporting that a two-way trader benets from. The sum of the co-
efcients is signicantly greater for (the logarithm of) value-added per employee, although
54 Two exceptions are MacGarvie (2006) and Tucci (2005). The former shows, for a panel of large French
rms, that importers have similar value added per worker to exporters and that they are more productive than
both non-importers and non-exporters. However, she does not consider separately rms that both import and
export at the same time. Tucci (2005), using a survey of Indian rms, nds that those engaged in both imports
and exports have higher productivity levels to those that are not. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2002 and 2005)
also give a description of US import transactions, but with limited information on rm productivity.
55 These regressions use rms in the whole economy from 1996 to 2004.
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the difference is not large. This should be investigated further using alternative measures
of productivity. As for investment per employee and capital per employee, the differences
between the two-way traders and sum of exporter-only and importer-only coefcients are
not signicantly different from zero.
Table 3.13. Characteristics of rms per trading status - descriptive regressions (whole econ-
omy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent
variable
Log
employment
Log
value-
added
Log VA
per
employee
Log
Capital
Log
capital
per
employee
Log
investment
Log
investment
per
employee
Exporter
only 0.554** 0.743** 0.181** 0.597** 0.044** 0.545** -0.020*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Importer
only 0.779** 0.973** 0.189** 0.840** 0.059** 0.857** 0.071**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Two-way
trader 1.504** 1.865** 0.356** 1.601** 0.102** 1.560** 0.059**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Year
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
observations 914935 897766 897766 845069 845069 785667 785667
R2 0.22 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.04
Two-way -
(exporter +
importer)
0.171** 0.149** -0.014** 0.164 -0.001 0.158** 0.008
Wald test:
F-statistic 406.48 248.92 8.42 171.38 0.00 134.12 0.41
Wald test:
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.0037 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.52
Source: NBB - BBSTTD. Notes: OLS regressions. Industry dummies for 2-dig it NACE-Bel. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Constant included but not reported. The
two-way trader coefficient minus the sum of the coefficients on exporter only and importer only is reported. Wald
test (F-statistic and p-value reported) in last rows tests whether the sum of the coefficients on “Exporter only” and
“Importer only” is significantly d ifferent from the coefficient on “Two-way trader”.
In this subsection, we have provided evidence concerning possible relationships between
international trading status and rm-level characteristics. Overall, two-way traders appear
to be the largest and most productive companies whereas non-traders are the smallest and
least productive. Also, importing-only rms enjoy larger premia when compared to non-
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traders than exporting-only enterprises. These patterns hold true for capital intensity and
investment per employee, albeit to a lesser degree.
3.3.5 Export destinations, import origins and products traded
Products and destinations have been the focus of recent literature on manufacturing rms'
export behaviour, as described in Section 2. Given our previous evidence, and in order to
obtain results comparable to other countries, we will concentrate on the manufacturing sec-
tor in this section. Trade ows are determined by several dimensions. The literature denes
the intensive margin, quantities traded by a rm, and the extensive margin, the number of
trading rms. This can be further separated between the country extensive margin of
trade, how many countries a rm trades with, and the product extensive margin, how
many products a rm trades in.
We rst consider destinations of exports and origins of imports. The number of rms ex-
porting to at least a certain number of export destinations and the number of rms importing
from at least a certain number of foreign countries are represented in Figure 3.3 and Fig-
ure 3.4. There is a clear negative relationship between the number of trading rms and the
number of countries traders trade with. The maximum number of export destinations and
origins of imports are respectively 157 and 62. The number of export destinations appears
to decrease more quickly than the number of origins of imports.
This is more apparent from Figure 3.5, which plots the histogram of the number of coun-
tries importers and exporters trade with. The mean of trading partners is 11.3 for exporters
and 6.6 for importers, whereas the median is at about 5 for both types of rms. Both distri-
butions are skewed towards the right and have a mode at one. It is worth comparing in more
detail our ndings with those of Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) and Bernard, Jensen
and Schott (2005) for French and US rms. Our result that the frequency of rms trading
with a certain number of countries decreases as the number of partner countries increases
is consistent with both. In 2000, US exporters traded with on average 3.5 countries and im-
porters sourced from 2.8 countries. Around 56.6 per cent of US exporters ship products to
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just one foreign country, while 7.7 per cent of them ship to ten or more overseas markets.
The corresponding gures for French manufacturers are 34.5 per cent and 19.7 per cent.
Our data suggest that 18.8 per cent of Belgian exporters serve just one market whereas 31
per cent of them ship to ten or more56.
Thus, Belgian exporters appear to serve more markets than French and US exporting enter-
prises. French exporters fall somewhere in between Americans and Belgians. This could
be attributed to the small Belgian domestic market: Belgian producers have to export to
more destinations than French and US rms to take full advantage of increasing returns to
scale, which is one of the reasons for Belgium being a more open economy than the US.
The same is true when France is compared to the US.
Despite the similarities in the distribution of trading partners for exporters and importers,
there are also interesting differences. The frequency of import origins seems to be bimodal.
Declining from one to three countries, it then rises and peaks at ve. Thereafter, it declines
monotonically. Also of interest is that the distribution of export destinations dominates that
of origins of imports in the one-to-three country range57. Thereafter, the distribution of
imports dominates that of exports for up to 13 trading partners. 57 per cent of importers
trade with 4 to 13 countries while only 37 per cent of exporters do the same. Beyond 14
trading partners, export destinations dominate import origins again. Such a pattern is also
reported by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) for the US58.
The distribution of export destinations and import origins is likely to be determined by
xed costs of exports and imports respectively. The degree of concentration of imports
shown in the previous tables suggest that xed costs of imports may be as relevant as xed
costs of exports59. There is some evidence that xed costs of exports re-occur at each new
56 The French gures refer to the year 1986, the US and ours to 2000. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005)
include manufacturing and other sectors of the economy, whose rms are less likely to trade in goods. By
doing so, we nd that 30.3 per cent of Belgian exporters ship products to just one destination, while 21.2 per
cent of them ship to ten or more. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) consider only manufacturing rms.
57 37 per cent of exporters export goods to one to three countries, whereas the corresponding gure for
importers is 33 per cent.
58 The gures they report suggest that exporters are more likely than importers to trade with just one or with
ten or more countries. However, in the two-to-nine-countries range, the frequency of imports is higher than
that of exports.
59 The presence of xed costs of importing are modelled by Kasahara and Lapham (2005).
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foreign market entry (Damijan, Polanec and Prasnikar, 2004). This could constrain the
majority of exporters to sell to just a few foreign markets. The same appears to be true for
imports. If xed costs relating to importing goods re-occur for each new sourcing country,
the majority of rms will import goods from a relatively small number of countries. In our
data, 90 per cent of importers import from less than 14 countries. Multi-stage production
is an alternative and compelling explanation of rm importing behaviour, but the data does
not allow us to distinguish such type of transactions.
We now turn to the product extensive margin, given that our data set allows us to inves-
tigate the number of products rms trade across national borders. Bernard, Jensen and
Schott (2005) investigate the same issue using data for the US. They report that on average
exporters traded 8.9 products in 2000, whereas importers purchased around 10 products
from abroad. The BBSTTD suggests that Belgian manufacturing rms, in 2000, shipped
to other countries on average around 12 products and sourced about 34 products from
abroad60. Therefore, Belgian companies appear to be more geared towards trading interna-
tionally than US rms.
Looking in more detail at imported and exported products, Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show
that the number of trading rms declines systematically with the number of products they
trade internationally. As in the case of trading partners, however, the number of exported
products appears to decline more steadily than the number of imported goods. Figure 3.8
depicts the histogram of the number of products exported or imported. Both exporters and
importers are more likely to trade a single product: around 20 and 11 per cent of exporters
and importers, respectively, do so. Both distributions are skewed towards the right, as when
considering destinations and sourcing countries.
Furthermore, from Figure 3.8 it is possible to note that Belgian traders are more likely to
source ten or more products from abroad than to export them: only around 31 per cent
60 The median of the two distributions is around 5 for exports and 17 for imports. If all sectors of the Belgian
economy are considered to compare with the US data, the average number of products exported by rms is
12 and 29 for imports.
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of exporters sell more than ten products abroad compared with 62 per cent of importers
sourcing more than ten goods61.
3.3.6 Destinations, origins and gravity
A very large strand of the literature in international economics has developed strong ev-
idence that distance reduces trade ows. Heterogeneous rm models predict that market
size is also a determinant of how many rms will enter a specic market, given that only
the most productive rms can incur the xed cost of serving many markets. Besides, higher
income and market size implies that less productive rms will nd it protable to bear the
xed cost of exporting to a given market.
By simply looking at the top destinations and origins of trade, we show that the BBSTTD
is consistent with these ndings. The top ten export destinations and sourcing countries are
shown in Table 3.14.
61 This is consistent with the ndings of Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) for the US, where about 17 and
21 per cent of exporters and importers, respectively, trade more than ten products.
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Table 3.14. Top ten export destinations and source countries for manufacturing rms (year
2000)
Top 10
export
destinations
Number
of firms
% of
exporting
firms
Average
value of
exports
Top 10
sourcing
countries
Number
of firms
% of
importing
Firms
Average
value of
imports
Netherlands 3,635 67.0% 3,028.5 Netherlands 4,095 73.1% 3,513.3
France 3,518 64.8% 4,329.6 Germany 3,958 70.6% 2,793.3
Germany 3,170 58.4% 4,802.1 France 3,779 67.4% 1,925.2
United
Kingdom 2,429 44.8% 2,885.9 Italy 2,629 46.9% 672.4
Luxembourg 1,977 36.4% 496.2
United
Kingdom 2,551 45.5% 1,263.0
Switzerland
and
Liechtenstein 1,896 34.9% 704.4 United States 1,730 30.9% 2,216.4
Italy 1,766 32.5% 2,734.1
Switzerland
and
Liechtenstein 1,681 30.0% 204.6
Spain 1,748 32.2% 1,862.1 Spain 1,656 29.5% 705.0
United States 1,661 30.6% 3,629.4 Austria 1,129 20.1% 334.4
Sweden 1,366 25.2% 1,149.0 Luxembourg 1,044 18.6% 245.5
Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: Destinations and origins are classified according to the number of firms
that trade with them, rather than the total trade value.
There is a high degree of overlap between the most frequent export and import trading
partners62. The Netherlands, France and Germany share the top three places in both rank-
ings. Other countries Belgian rms frequently trade with are the UK, Italy and the US.
Austria and Sweden are the only two countries not appearing in both tables, the latter be-
ing the tenth most popular export destinations and the former being the ninth source of
imports. The fact that direct neighbours are the most frequent destination for Belgian ex-
porters conrms the importance of distance, whereas the variation in average shipments to
each country illustrates the importance of market size.
62 This could be explained by the prevalence of multi-stage production within advanced industrialised coun-
tries.
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The top ten export destinations and import origins outside the EU15 are shown in Table
3.15. Consistently with the market size hypothesis, the US is the most popular country
among importers whereas the country exporters trade most with is Switzerland. Other
common export destinations are countries relatively near Belgium, such as Norway, Poland
and the Czech Republic or countries that are rich and large but distant, such as Japan or
fast-growing economies like Turkey.
Table 3.15. Top ten export destinations and sourcing countries outside the EU for manu-
facturing rms (year 2000)
Top 10
export
destinations
Number
of firms
% of
Exporting
Firms
Average
Value of
Exports
Top 10
sourcing
countries
Number
of firms
% of
Importing
Firms
Average
Value
of
Imports
Switzerland
and
Liechtenstein 1,885 34.7% 702.6 United States 1,730 30.9% 2,216.4
United States 1,642 30.3% 3,649.3
Switzerland
and
Liechtenstein 1,681 30.0% 204.6
Poland 1,198 22.1% 757.2 China 546 9.7% 962.0
Czech
Republic 990 18.2% 501.0 Japan 533 9.5% 2,357.8
Norway 970 17.9% 393.5 Poland 526 9.4% 885.7
Israel 831 15.3% 904.8
Czech
Republic 524 9.3% 587.4
Japan 824 15.2% 1,412.2 Canada 411 7.3% 1,032.3
Hungary 802 14.8% 683.4 India 400 7.1% 563.8
Turkey 797 14.7% 895.7 Taiwan 396 7.1% 451.2
Canada 763 14.1% 650.8 Turkey 360 6.4% 660.1
Source:  NBB-BBSTTD.
Among the top countries of origin of imports, we can see three Asian countries, namely
China, Taiwan and India, and two European transition economies, Poland and the Czech
Republic. These are usually associated with cheap imports. However, crude cost consider-
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ations are probably not the only causes of imports since among the top sources of imports
there are also other developed countries besides the US, such as Canada and Japan.
3.3.7 Exporting, Importing and Productivity
In this section, we explore the relationship between productivity, measured as value added
per worker, and exporting and importing activities of rms. We also investigate the role of
the number of products traded and the number of countries rms trade with. For compara-
bility with existing studies, we focus on manufacturing.
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 plot the relationship between value added per worker and total
exports and imports. Labour productivity appears to be increasing as rms become more
involved in international markets through exports or imports. Yet, no causal link should
be deduced from these graphs, as we cannot say whether this is due to self-selection into
international markets or to post-entry productivity improvements.
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 show the relationships between labour productivity and the
number of export destinations and the number of countries of origin of imports, respec-
tively. There is a positive correlation in both cases.
Again, as explained in previous sections, this suggests that xed costs of imports may be as
relevant as xed costs of exports: only the most productive rms are able to import inputs
from a large number of countries.
The possible presence of xed costs of importing and exporting each single product is
illustrated in Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14. They depict the relationship between labour
productivity and number of products imported and exported. In both cases, there is a clear
positive relationship between value added per worker and number of goods shipped to or
sourced from abroad. These positive correlations suggest that xed costs of imports and
exports might be related to specic products in addition to countries.
To investigate further the relationship between types of involvement in international trade
and productivity, we run simple value added per worker regressions on dummies identifying
the trading status of rms. We control for year and industry effects by including time and
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industry dummies. The results are shown in Table 3.16. The reference category is that
identifying non-traders.
Table 3.16. Labour productivity regressions
Dependent Variable Log (Value added per employee)
(1) (2)
Two-way traders 0.27***
(0.010)
Importer 0.17*** Importers only 0.15***
(0.010) (0.013)
Exporter 0.09*** Exporters only 0.06***
(0.010) (0.015)
Log (Employment) 0.06*** Log (Employment) 0.06***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 10.24*** Constant 10.24***
(0.017) (0.017)
Year dummy Yes Year  dummy Yes
2 digit sector dummy Yes 2 digit sector dummy Yes
Observations 152,375 Observations 152,375
R-squared 0.03 R-squared 0.03
Source:  NBB-BBSTTD.  Notes: Table reports OLS regressions. Two-way traders are firms that both
import and export. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level.
We also add as regressor the log of employment to control for any size effect and capture
genuine productivity differentials. In the rst column, we consider rms that import and
export, whereas in the second, we consider two-way traders as different categories63.
The results show that importers have a larger productivity advantage than exporters when
compared to non-traders. Importing companies appear to be 17 per cent more productive
63 In the rst columns, exporters may also import and importers may also export.
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than non-traders, whereas exporters are 9 per cent more efcient. In the third column,
however, our results show that two-way traders have the largest productivity advantage.
They are 27 per cent more productive than non-traders. Importing- and exporting-only
companies are, respectively, 15 and 6 per cent more productive than enterprises with no
involvement in international trade. Overall, these results suggest that the current literature
may have overstated the productivity advantage of exporters by not taking into account the
role of imports.
3.4 Conclusion
Using a newly-available data set merging balance sheets and international trade transactions
data, covering both imports and exports of Belgian rms, the BBSTTD, this chapter offers
a broad view of international trade in goods at the level of the rm and of transaction
trade data for Belgium. More specically, we provide a comparative analysis concerning
importers and exporters considering the destinations of exports, origins of imports and the
number of products in which rms trade.
Some of the ndings we report conrm previous results, whereas others are novel and de-
serve further investigation. Considering the whole economy, we nd that the number of
rms importing and/or exporting has been increasing, along with their employment levels.
Also, companies trading internationally, whether importers, exporters or both, are larger in
terms of value added and employment than non-trading rms. However, their contribution
to the total number of rms, employees and value added has decreased during the sample
period. This is mainly due to the fact that new jobs and rms are being generated mostly in
the service sector, which are less likely to trade in goods than companies in manufacturing.
This result is in contrast to Bernard, Jensen and Schott's (2005) ndings for the US. We
nd conspicuous heterogeneity among different types of international traders. Importing-
only rms' share of the total number of rms increased along with their contribution to the
economy-wide value added and employment levels. Importing, whether through interna-
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tional outsourcing or offshoring, thus appears as an increasingly common practice, even
among service-sector rms.
Our results also suggest the existence of xed costs of importing in addition to those of
exporting and points to the existence of multi-stage production across countries. More
specically, and in keeping with the existing literature focusing on exports, we show that
traders in general, whether importing, exporting or doing both, are more productive than
non-traders. Furthermore, both imports and exports appear to be strongly concentrated
among the largest and most productive rms. These facts suggest that a process of self-
selection might characterise not only the entry into export markets, as suggested by the
literature, but also the entry into import markets.
Using information about destinations of exports and origins of imports, we nd that most
manufacturing rms source intermediate goods from a small number of countries. This
corresponds to the pattern of exporting activities. In general, the number of trading rms
decreases as the number of countries they trade with rises. The same type of relationship
holds at the product level. Traders export or import a relatively small number of goods
and the number of trading rms diminishes as the number of products traded rises. These
trading patterns are consistent with those reported by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005)
for the US. In addition, labour productivity is increasing in the number of countries rms
trade with and the number of products exported or imported. These positive relationships
tend to suggest that xed costs of imports and exports are incurred for each new country
a rm starts trading with and for each additional new product shipped to or sourced from
abroad.
Finally, simple OLS regressions exploring productivity differentials among rms involved
in international trade in different ways suggest that rms that both import and export enjoy
the largest productivity advantage when compared to non-traders. They are followed, in
order, by importing- and exporting-only rms. Although we can not infer any causal link,
this does suggest that the productivity advantage of exporters towards non-exporters may
be overstated in the current literature, because imports were not taken into account as well
as exports.
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This chapter has described a newly available dataset and presented the patterns emerging
in the trade transactions data for Belgium. In the next chapter, I use the export data from
the BBSTTD to analyse in more detail the determinants of export behaviour, in particular
the role of credit constraints.
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Fig. 3.1. Concentration of trade value across total value added percentiles (manufacturing)
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Fig. 3.2. Concentration of trade value across value added/employee percentiles (manufac-
turing)
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Fig. 3.3. Number of export destinations (year 2000)
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Fig. 3.4. Number of sourcing countries (year 2000)
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Fig. 3.6. Number of products exported (year 2000)
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Fig. 3.7. Number of products imported (year 2000)
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Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: Firms in the top and bottom value added per worker
percentile have been deleted, and so have firms that export more than 500 million Euros.
The positive relation is statistically significant and robust to using a lower threshold and to
using logarithms of the variables.
Fig. 3.9. Value added per employee and total exports for manufacturing rms (year 2000)
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Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: Firms in the top and bottom value added per worker
percentile have been deleted, and so have firms that import more than 300 million
Euros. The positive relation is statistically significant and robust to using a lower
threshold and to using logarithms of the variables.
Fig. 3.10. Value added per employee and total imports for manufacturing rms (year 2000)
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Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: The sample is truncated by taking out firms that
export to more than 170 destinations, and the top and bottom percentile in
terms of value added per employee. The positive relation is statistically
significant and robust to using a lower threshold and to using logarithms of the
variables.
Fig. 3.11. Value added per employee and number of export destinations for manufacturing
rms (year 2000)
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Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: The sample is truncated by taking out firms that
import from more than 70 destinations, and the top and bottom percentile in terms
of value added per employee. The positive relation is statistically significant and
robust to using a lower threshold and to using logarithms of the variables.
Fig. 3.12. Value added per employee and number of origins of imports for manufacturing
rms (year 2000)
3.A Figures 151
pr od_2000
0
100000
200000
300000
npr odexp
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: The sample is truncated by taking out firms
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Fig. 3.13. Value added per employee and number of products exported for manufacturing
rms (year 2000)
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Source: NBB-BBSTTD. Notes: The sample is truncated by taking out firms that
import more than 500 products, and the top and bottom percentile in terms of
value added per employee. The positive relation is statistically significant and
robust to using a lower threshold and to using logarithms of the variables.
Fig. 3.14. Value added per employee and number of products imported for manufacturing
rms (year 2000)
Chapter 4
Exporters and credit constraints. A rm-level
approach
Introduction
In an era of increased globalisation, governments implement policies seeking to encourage
local rms to become global and sell their goods on foreign markets. Governmental export
agencies put in considerable effort and resources in setting up trade promotion trips, infor-
mation packs, loans and subsidies, etc... Behind these policies lies the belief that it would
be protable for rms to export, but that they often lack the information and funds to go
ahead, which is where their national authorities can help them. Despite the widespread use
of these interventions, there is little empirical evidence on how important nancial consid-
erations are for the international expansion of rms.
Building a theoretical model and taking it to the data with two novel datasets, this chapter
considers the determinants of rm exporting behaviour. In particular, it seeks to analyse
whether there is any interaction between nancial and credit constraints, and exports. The
literature on rm-level trade has so far mostly concentrated on the interactions between
trade and productivity. Another critical issue, besides productivity, in understanding the
exporting decisions of rms is the nancial situation of the rm, and in particular the credit
constraints they face. Decisions by rms cannot solely rely on productivity considerations
given that rms might be nancially constrained. In particular, these constraints will affect
volumes and patterns of trade and the efciency of the equilibrium outcome.
Building a heterogeneous rms model of international trade with liquidity-constrained
rms yields several predictions on the equilibrium relationships between productivity, credit
constraints and exports that are then veried in the data. My main nding is that rms are
more likely to be exporters if they are more productive and less credit-constrained. Regard-
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ing the patterns of trade, I show that rms are more likely to start exporting to a new des-
tination and to export to many destinations if they face fewer liquidity restrictions. Once
they do start exporting to a given country, credit constraints do not affect the value and
growth of their exports. There is therefore a strong relationship between the extensive mar-
gin of trade at the destination level and credit constraints, while the intensive margin is not
affected. This is the second prediction of the model and holds in the data. Third, the data
conrms the theoretical prediction of a pecking order of trade: rms exporting to the small-
est and furthest away economies are more productive and less credit-constrained. Finally,
the model allows me to consider an additional effect of the presence of credit-constrained
potential exporters, by decomposing the consequences of a domestic currency appreciation
on trade ows. I show in the data that three effects hold: existing exporters will export less,
the least productive existing exporters stop exporting and the most productive constrained
non-exporters start exporting.
The issue of nancial constraints has very rarely been considered in the literature on inter-
national trade, and this is the main contribution of this chapter. As described in Chapter 3,
there is a large literature on exporting behaviour at the rm level and the characteristics of
exporters, with a strong emphasis on the link between trade and productivity. On credit con-
straints, Chaney (2005b) provides a theoretical model of trade with heterogeneous rms,
along the lines of Melitz (2003), and introduces an exogenous liquidity constraint to de-
rive his results. However, he does not include any empirical test of his predictions. The
model in this chapter builds on his work but improves the way liquidity constraints are rep-
resented, thus yielding a richer framework. In Manova's (2006) paper, credit constraints
interact with rm productivity, thus reinforcing the way those rms with higher productiv-
ity select into exporting. Despite the model being at the rm level, the focus of her paper is
on the differences in countries' and sectors' access and need for external nance and how
these shape export patterns. In my model, I borrow her specication of nancial constraints
to which I add an exogenous component, but by considering a general rather than partial
equilibrium, I concentrate my analysis on the rm-level interactions between exports and
credit constraints.
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Empirically, an important contribution of this chapter is the detail of the datasets I use and
their suitability for the question addressed. First, the trade and balance sheet data used
covers the full sample of Belgian manufacturing, at the rm level, with detailed informa-
tion on export participation, but also on the destinations and products exported. Manova
(2006) uses industry- and country-level data to test the predictions of her model. The lit-
erature on nancial institutions and trade does likewise, showing that export volumes from
nancially-vulnerable sectors are higher in nancially-developed countries (Beck, 2002
and 2003, Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005 and Hur et al., 2006). Using rm-level analysis al-
lows a better understanding of how rms vary within a given sector. The implications of
the results would therefore allow policies to be better targeted. Second, the measure of
credit constraints I use is unique in its type, as it is a yearly measure of the creditworthiness
of rms, established by an institution external to the rm, a credit insurer - Coface Inter-
national. Campa and Shaver (2001) present evidence of the relationship between export
status and liquidity constraints for manufacturing rms in Spain in the 1990's. However,
their data does not allow the actual export patterns at the rm level to be analysed in detail.
Greenaway et al (2005) explore the impact of nancial constraints on export participation
by using balance sheet variables to measure these constraints. Also, a vast literature on
the importance of liquidity constraints for rms, which I will describe when presenting the
Coface score and its advantages, has developed several measures which mainly allow to
categorise rms between nancially-constrained or unconstrained. It examines the effects
of credit constraints on different decisions, such as investment, but none of them applies
these techniques to understanding exporting behaviour.
This chapter demonstrates the importance of credit constraints when considering export
patterns at the level of the rm. It leads to a more general question of the role of liquid-
ity constraints for rm dynamics and growth (Rossi Hansberg and Wright, 2006) and for
exports growth within the rm, fruitful areas for future research.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 develops the model and its predictions.
Section 4.2 presents the data, and demonstrates in particular why the Coface score is an
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appropriate measure of credit constraints. Section 4.3 contains the empirical analysis of
the links between export patterns and credit constraints and section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 The model
In this section, I present a model of trade with liquidity-constrained rms in a Melitz
(2003)-type heterogeneous rms model of international trade. A rm's liquidity comprises
two elements. One is exogenous, as in Chaney's model (2005b), while the other is due
to imperfect nancial contractibility which leads to credit constraints, as in Manova's ap-
proach (2006). The purpose of writing a model featuring both types of constraints will
allow us to properly specify our empirical approach using rm-level data and capture cer-
tain specicities of the data.
4.1.1 Set-up
The economy consists of two countries Home and Foreign (which we hereafter denote with
an asterisk *). The only factor of production is labour, and population is of size L. There
are two sectors. One sector provides a single homogeneous good which is freely traded.
This good is used as the numeraire, and its price is therefore equal to 1. Production in this
sector is characterised by constant returns to scale with q0 = A  l0, l0 being the labour
used to produce quantity q0 of the good. By choice of scale, the unit labour requirement at
home is 1=w (A = w)and 1=w in foreign( A = w). Therefore, as I shall assume, if both
countries produce the homogeneous good, wages will be xed by this sector's production
at w and wrespectively. The second sector produces a continuum of differentiated goods.
Each rm operating in this sector supplies one of these goods and is a monopolist for its
variety.
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4.1.2 Demand
Consumers are endowed with one unit of labour and their preferences over the differenti-
ated good display a constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Given their love of variety,
they will consume all available varieties. I can therefore represent the utility function of
the representative consumer by U :
U  q1 o
0@ Z
x2X
q(x)
 1
 dx
1A  1 (4.1)
where the utility level is determined by the consumption of q0 units of the homogeneous
good and q(x) units of each variety x of the differentiated good. The set X includes all
varieties x and is determined in equilibrium. The constant elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties of the differentiated good is denoted by  > 1.
If all varieties in X are available domestically at price p(x) the ideal price index will be:
P =
0@ Z
x2X
p(x)1 dx
1A 11  (4.2)
This implies that the representative consumer has an isoelastic demand function for each
differentiated variety q(x):
q(x) = wL

p(x) 
P 1 

(4.3)
This demand function, given the domestic price p(x), implies that the representative con-
sumer spends r(x) on each variety x, where wL is the total amount spent on differentiated
goods:
r(x) = wL

p(x)
P
1 
(4.4)
4.1.3 Production
Production in the differentiated goods sector is characterised by a constant marginal cost.
Both countries enjoy the same technology and the marginal product of labour is constant.
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As in Chaney (2005a), it is assumed that there is a xed number of potential entrants
proportional to the size of the country, such that the mass of rms in each country in that
sector is also proportional to L or L. There are xed costs for a rm to start producing:
each rm has to pay a xed entry cost Cd in terms of domestic labour, at a price wCd
in terms of the numeraire. This introduces increasing returns to scale in the production
process.
Each rm draws a random unit labour productivity x  0 which determines its production
cost. There are also two types of trade barriers if a rm wishes to serve Foreign. First,
the rm needs to pay a xed cost of exporting Cf , paid exclusively in terms of foreign
labour, which is wCf in terms of the numeraire. The crucial assumption of this cost being
borne in terms of foreign labour is justied, as rms need, for example, to cover the cost of
travelling to the country for prospection, buying local information, carrying out marketing
and competition studies, tailoring goods to local demand and establishing a distribution
network. A second part of xed costs of exporting paid at home in terms of domestic labour
would lower the number of exporters and amount of total exports but would not change the
qualitative results of the model. The same assumption is made in Chaney (2005b).
Serving the foreign market also involves a variable "iceberg" transport cost  . Shipping one
unit of any variety of the differentiated good implies only fraction 1= arrives in Foreign
because the rest melts on the way.
These different assumptions mean that the cost of producing quantity qd for the home mar-
ket is cd (qd):
cd (qd) = qd
w
x
+ wCd (4.5)
and cost of producing qf units for the foreign market is cf (qf ), given the rm is already
producing for domestic consumers:
cf (qf ) = qf
w
x
+ wCf (4.6)
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Given rms are monopolists for the variety they produce, they set the price. Given the isoe-
lastic demand functions, the optimal price is a constant mark-up over unit cost, including
transport cost. This implies:
pd (x) =

   1 
w
x
(4.7)
at home, and:
pf (x) =

   1 
w
x
(4.8)
in foreign.
These pricing choices imply that any given rm having drawn productivity level x, could
make a prot of d (x) in the domestic market, and f (x) abroad:
d (x) =
rd (x)

  wCd = 

wL


   1
w
xP
1 
  wCd (4.9)
f (x) =
rf (x)

  wCf = 

wL


   1
w
xP 
1 
  wCf (4.10)
In order to survive, a rm will need to produce domestically with a prot, whereas in order
to export, it will need to protably produce for foreign consumers. Given equations (4.9)
and (4.10), this leads me, as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2005a and b) to dene two
productivity thresholds, xd and xf , at which rms respectively choose to start producing
and exporting, when they face no liquidity constraint:
d (xd) = 0 and f (xf ) = 0 (4.11)
The monopolistic competition setting and the heterogeneity of rms in terms of produc-
tivity implies a partition of rms between producers/non-producers and exporters/non-
exporters if trade costs are sufciently high. From the prot functions, it is clear that
more productive rms will be able to charge lower prices, therefore ensuring themselves
larger market shares and beneting from larger prots, both in the domestic and exports
market. On the domestic market, this means that the least productive rms do not sur-
vive, although the imperfect nature of competition implies that some low-productivity rms
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are protected from competition if  is nite and can therefore survive. Similarly, on for-
eign markets, a partition is made as only the most productive rms export. Given that
(xf=xd )
 1 = ( 1Cd=Cf )  (L=L)  (P=P ), if I assume that trade barriers are high
enough, xf > xf will always holds. This implies that rms that are productive enough to
export are also producing domestically.
The model so far is identical to Chaney (2005b), and almost identical to Melitz (2003) but
for the presence of a numeraire sector, the rms' entry process and potential asymmetry
between countries. I now introduce liquidity constraints.
4.1.4 Liquidity constraints
In the setting above, exporting involves xed costs. These must mostly be paid before
any prots are made abroad. If nancial markets are imperfect, this leads to ex-ante under-
investment in exporting activities. A different nature of contracting and informational envi-
ronment in Foreign implies that this is more the case than for domestic entry costs. Foreign
activities are less veriable and are considered more risky, they involve, for example, the
use of a foreign currency. The weak contracting environment in some foreign countries
means it is harder to recover unpaid dues abroad, and therefore rms are unable to pledge
as much collateral for exports. These different elements mean that potential investors or
lenders may not be willing to help would-be exporters cover the xed cost of starting to
export.
Combining the assumptions made in Chaney (2005b) and Manova (2006), allows the con-
struction of a richer model, which will be better suited to analyse the data thereafter. Mod-
elling the investor's decision in extending credit to rms more explicitly than in Chaney's
set-up allows me to capture the interaction that exists between a rm's performance and its
liquidity. But by including an exogenous component to liquidity as in Chaney (2005) al-
lows for the presence of rms with no liquidity constraints but low productivity, as in the
data. Also, by making some simplifying assumptions on price indices, as in Chaney, I can
solve the model in a general equilibrium and thereafter analyse the effects of exchange rate
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appreciations. The resulting model offers interesting predictions that are then taken to the
data.
I assume, for simplicity, that there is no liquidity or credit constraint for rms to nance
their domestic production. In a rst step, I also consider, as in Manova (2006), that rms
can nance the variable cost of exporting internally. I assume that the xed cost of ex-
porting is nanced in three different ways. First, a rm can use the prots generated from
domestic sales d (x). Second, each rm is endowed with an exogenous random liquid-
ity shock A, denominated in units of domestic labour. Its value is hence wA. A and x
(the productivity parameter) are drawn from a joint distribution with cumulative distribu-
tion function F (A; x) over R+  R+, and Fx (x)  limA!1 F (A; x) over R+. It is also
assumed that the group of entrepreneurs, and hence the mass of rms entering the lottery,
is proportional to L, the size of the country.
Third, a rm can decide to borrow an amount E on nancial markets. In order to do so, it
must pledge tangible assets as collateral, and it is assumed that these will be proportional
to the xed cost paid to enter domestic market (e.g. cost of building the factory). The
proportionality ts is inherent to the nature of the industry with s denoting the sector, as
in Manova (2006) and Braun (2003): tswCd will be pledgeable as collateral on nancial
markets. The probability of a rm defaulting on its loan is 1   , which reects the level
of nancial contractibility, exogenously determined by strength of nancial institutions in
the home country (in the empirical section, Belgium). The contracting timing is as follows.
At the start of each period, potential investors receive a take-it-or-leave-it offer contract
from each rm, detailing the amount to be borrowed, the repayment G and the collateral.
Revenues are then realised and, at the end of the period, the creditor claims the collateral
tswCd if the rm defaults, or receives payment G (x) if the contract is enforced.
Given these three possibilities for nancing the xed cost of exporting, the liquidity con-
straint can be expressed as: wA+ d (x) + E  wCf . A higher domestic prot therefore
relaxes the rm's credit constraint. The rm needs to borrow kwCf to cover the xed cost
of exporting, by dening the share (1  k) of this cost that can be covered internally by the
4.1 The model 161
rm such that (1  k)wCf = wA+ d (x). As domestic prot increases, k decreases and
the rm is less credit constrained.
Below, the expression for prots on the foreign market reects the fact that the rm nances
a fraction (1  k) of the xed costs and all of its variable costs internally. As for the share
k that is nanced externally, the exporter pays with probability  the investor G (x) when
the nancial contract is enforced and with probability 1   replaces the collateral claimed
by the creditor. Exporters from Home, choose their price and output levels for foreign by
maximising prots on the foreign market:
f (x) = pf (x) qf (x)  qf (x)w
x
  (1  k)wCf   G (x)  (1  ) tswCd (4.12)
subject to
qf (x) = w
L
pf (x)
 
P 1 
NR (x) = pf (x) qf (x)  qf (x)w
x
  (1  k)wCf  G (x)
B (x) = G (x) + (1  ) tswCd   kwCf  0
There are three constraints to this maximisation problem. The rst condition arises even
without imperfect nancial markets, as it represents the demand condition. The second
condition reects the maximum net revenues NR (x) the rm can offer to the creditor: its
revenue on the foreign market, minus the variable cost and share (1  k) of xed cost, both
nanced internally. The third condition expresses the net return to the investor B (x) being
positive. This is equal to their expected return, given the probability of default, minus the
amount they have lent to the exporter to nance a share k of the xed cost. The investor
will only nance the rm if he expects to at least break even. The amount borrowed by the
rm from the external investor is kwCf = [wCf   wA  d (x)]64.
64 For simplicity, as in Manova (2006), I normalise the outside option of the investor to 0, rather than to the
world-market net interest rate r. This does not change the qualitative predictions of the model.
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As credit markets are competitive, all investors break even and have zero expected prots.
Firms choose G (x) so as to bring the investor to his participation constraint. B (x) = 0
in equilibrium. This implies that the rm's maximisation problem is identical to the case
without credit constraints, except that G(x) cannot be greater than net revenues. Hence, as
in Melitz (2003):
pf (x) =

   1 
w
x
, qf (x) =


   1
w
x
 
wL
P 1 
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If there are no credit constraints, the threshold xf is therefore dened by
f (xf ) = 0 or rf (xf ) = wCf
xf =

Cf
L
 1
 1 
   1
w
P 
(4.16)
Yet, taking into account the presence of imperfect nancial markets and hence credit con-
straints, I include the second constraint of the prot maximisation problem of equation
(4.12): NR (x; pf () ; qf () ; B (x) = 0) = G (x (A)). This yields the following revenue
function:
rf (x (A)) = 
"
1

wCf   (1  )

(ts   1)wCd   (1  )
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wA  (1  )

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x (A)P
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Therefore, if  = 1, I am back to the original Melitz (2003) result of equations (4.13),
(4.14), (4.15) and x (A) = xf . If not, the productivity threshold for starting to export is
dened by:
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Firms with productivity below x (A) will not be able to export due to credit constraints,
despite being sufciently productive to do so protably.
4.1.5 Open-economy equilibrium
In order to consider rm entry and exit and the effect of exchange rates variations, I will,
in this sub-section, compute the open-economy equilibrium.
It is assumed for simplicity, as in Chaney (2005b), that the price index only depends on
local rms' prices and that foreign rms do not face any liquidity constraints. Prices set
by foreign rms for the varieties they sell at home only have a small impact on the general
price index. In a relatively closed economy, it is a reasonable approximation, which allows
for the model to be solved. The price index of equation (4.2) can be approximated by:
P 
0@ Z
xxd
pd (x)
1  LdFx (x)
1A 11  (4.19)
For convenience, I dene function h (:) as:
h () : x 1 =
0@

Z
xx
x 1dFx (x)
1A C () x = h (C) (4.20)
with h0 > 0
This allows me to rewrite the productivity thresholds of equations (4.11), (4.16) and (4.18)
65:
65 Note that these thresholds do not depend on market sizes. This is due to the assumption that prices are
determined by domestic producers only, whose number is proportional to the size of the market. Larger
markets will have more varieties, and therefore prots will not be higher.
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xd = h (Cd) (4.21)
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which are equivalent to the results of Chaney (2005b), and
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All rms with productivity above xd will be producing for domestic consumers. Firms
with a productivity above maxfxf ; x (A)g will be able to export because they are both
productive enough and have sufcient liquidity to cover the xed costs.
Equation (4.23) reects the way rms cover xed costs of exporting and how productivity
levels will affect their decision to export. First, note that if nancial contracts were per-
fectly enforced and  = 1, the two thresholds xf and x (A) are equal. If this is not the
case, looking at A, the amount of exogenous liquidity matters. Firms with a small amount
of exogenous liquidity will need to compensate with a higher productivity level to be able
to have both a larger prot on the domestic market and a better access to external nance
to pay up-front the xed cost of exporting. Firms with higher productivity can obtain more
outside nance because their net revenues and the repayments they offer their investors will
be greater. Naturally, a higher xed cost of exporting Cf also increases the threshold, all
other things being equal. Firms in sectors in which tangible assets are more easily collat-
eralisable (higher ts) will need a lower level of productivity to obtain sufcient external
nance and domestic prots to become exporters. The impact of domestic xed-entry cost
is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher Cd implies lower prots on the domestic mar-
ket, thus reducing available liquidity and increasing the threshold. On the other, it implies
higher tangible assets, and also makes it more difcult for rms to start producing at home,
hence reducing competition, increasing market shares of those that do survive and conse-
quently their prots. The total effect depends on the distribution of rm productivity. Two
other elements will be affecting the protability of the foreign markets, and hence the pro-
ductivity threshold. This is also true for the threshold with no liquidity constraints. First,
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the greater the iceberg cost  , the lower the prots in Foreign. A lower Cd means that more
foreign rms will be entering their own market, hence reducing the market shares of home
exporters and their prots. The reduction in the protability of foreign markets has an ad-
ditional effect in the presence of nancial frictions, as it will reduce the repayments they
can offer to investors. Finally, the relative wage w=w affects the productivity threshold
through three channels. When it decreases, so does w
w
Cf : the xed cost of entry into the
foreign market being paid in foreign wages will imply less domestic liquidity needed to
be an exporter. Second, as in the absence of liquidity constraints, a decrease in Foreign's
wage implies a smaller market abroad. A higher wage at home increases production costs.
Together, these imply lower prots in foreign and therefore a higher productivity thresh-
old. The third effect of a lower relative wage occurs in the presence of liquidity constraints,
where  < 1. Lower net revenues imply a higher liquidity constraint, and hence an even
higher productivity threshold to compensate.
These various elements determine the productivity threshold for exporting that holds when
rms are liquidity-constrained, and hence the number of exporters and their entry and exit
into foreign markets. Some rms, despite being productive enough to protably export will
be liquidity-constrained and will therefore not export if x (A) > xf . Proposition 4.1 states
the condition under which there will be a set of such rms66, and for the remainder of this
chapter, I will assume this assumption holds.
Proposition 4.1 If
264CdCf (1 )(1 ts)Cd+ww Cf
1 (ww )

Cd+(1 )
 
h(Cd)
h(Cd)
!1 
Cd
375
1
 1
> w
w , there is a non
empty set of liquidity constrained rms that are prevented from protably exporting because
they have insufcient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external nancial market.
Proof. See appendix 4.A.
Firms that have a very low productivity, below xd, will not even produce domestically.
Some rms will be productive enough to produce domestically, but for which it will not
66 This proposition is close to Chaney (2005)'s Proposition1.
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be protable to export. Their productivity will be below xf . Firms whose productivity is
between xf and x(A) either have a too low exogenous liquidity shock A, or are not pro-
ductive enough to raise external nance, or a combination of both. Firms with productivity
above x(A) have a sufciently high A combined with a high enough productivity to both
pay the xed cost of exporting and protably export. Some even more productive rms
would be able to export whatever the A they have, as they would be able to cover the whole
xed cost of exporting with domestic prots and external nance. Finally, the most pro-
ductive rms need neither an exogenous liquidity shock A, nor access to external nance,
and exclusively nance their xed cost of exporting through domestic prots.
4.1.1 Destinations
In this section, the model is extended to the case in which there are more than two countries,
and each rm in Home can decide to export to more than one destination.
In that case, it needs to pay the xed cost of exporting to each of the destinations it serves.
Without credit constraints, all destinations to which a rm could protably export are
served. However, with credit market imperfections, if a rm decides to export to n des-
tinations, then the available collateral for each destination will be tswCd
n
. The exogenous
liquidity and domestic prots available for covering the xed cost of serving each destina-
tion will be also divided by n.
In partial equilibrium analysis, in which the price index is taken as given and not affected by
the productivity thresholds that determine entry and exit of rms, this yields the following
productivity threshold:
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(4.24)
In general equilibrium, domestic general price indices are determined in each country by
domestic producers, as approximated in equation (4.19). Assuming Cf is identical for all
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n countries served, the productivity threshold for exporting to one of the foreign countries
with wage w and cost Cf , given you are exporting to n  1 other countries is:
xn (A) =
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
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 1 
 
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w

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(4.25)
The productivity threshold for rms to export will be increasing in the number of destina-
tions they decide to serve when nancial markets are imperfect and  < 1. The exogenous
liquidity shock and the domestic tangible xed assets used as collateral (and hence the
available external nance) will need to be shared to pay for the xed costs of the n desti-
nations served. This will increase the productivity level needed to ensure higher domestic
prots and more external nance will compensate for the additional need of liquidity.
Proposition 4.2 If the condition in Proposition 4.1 holds, there is a non empty set
of liquidity constrained rms that are prevented from protably exporting to n destinations
because they have insufcient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external nancial
market. As a result, more productive and less credit constrained rms will export to more
destinations. Proof. : Given the condition in Proposition 4.1 holds, x (A) > xf . In the
absence of nancial constraints, with Cf common to all markets, xf does not vary across
destinations, nor with the number of destinations served. Hence any rm productive enough
to protably export to one country will also be able to export to n destinations. This is not
the case with credit constraints. As x1 (A) = x (A) and @xn(A)@n > 0, the thresholds are such
that xn (A) > xn 1 (A) > xn 2 (A) > ::: > x2 (A) > x1 (A) > xf , hence the result.
Without considering entry and exit of rms, whatever the number of destinations being
served, the productivity threshold for exporting to larger markets is lower, as can be seen
from equation (4.24). Net revenues for rms exporting to such markets are also larger,
which means they will be less credit-constrained, all other things equal. The effect of the
size of the market needs to be balanced with that of iceberg trade costs: a very large market
will be less protable if it is located far from the Home economy and that trade costs are
therefore higher. From equation (4.24) it is straightforward to show that :
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L
 1
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One can therefore order all potential destination markets according to L
 1 , their size
weighted by the iceberg cost that applies to them. This ordering will also correspond to
the prots derived from exporting to those countries: the higher L
 1 , the higher the prot
as given by equation (4.14). This introduces a pecking order of trade:
Proposition 4.3 Firms will add export destinations in decreasing order of trade cost
weighted market size, L
 1 . More productive rms will export to more destinations, but
also to relatively smaller markets. Proof. : See appendix 4.B.
This result is similar to that of Manova (2006), except for the important trade cost weighting
dimension. It does not carry over directly to general equilibrium because of the assumption
made on prices. In the open equilibrium economy, thresholds will depend on trade costs,
but not on market size.
4.1.1 Exchange rate appreciation effect
An appreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the foreign currency means do-
mestic exporters are less competitive in the foreign market. As argued by Chaney (2005b),
it also relaxes the liquidity constraint faced by potential exporters given the xed cost of
exporting is paid in foreign currency. The value of their domestic liquidity in terms of for-
eign currency, be it domestic prots, exogenous cash ow or credit, has increased. Existing
exporters export less, but some new rms, enter the market. These entrants are liquidity-
constrained rms who are productive enough to export. The liquidity effect dominated
the competitiveness effect, but the appreciation relaxes the constraint and allows them to
start exporting. This means that the extensive and intensive margin of exports to a given
destination are affected differently by an appreciation of the exchange rate. In the model,
exchange rate variations can be modelled as a shock on relative wages. As used by Atke-
son and Burstein (2005), an increase in the productivity in the homogeneous sector at home
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leads to an increase in the domestic wages, and hence in the value of domestic assets (wA
and d(x)). In foreign, pf (x)=P  increases, reecting the loss of competitiveness of do-
mestic exporters, as in the case of an appreciation of the domestic currency.
Proposition 4.4 An appreciation of the exchange rate between the domestic and the
foreign currencies has three effects: (1) Existing exporters become less competitive and
reduce their exports
(2) The least productive existing exporters stop exporting
(3) The most productive constrained non-exporters start exporting
Proof. (1) The revenue, or total value of exports, of a rm that is already an exporter in
foreign and with productivity x is given by rf (x). In the presence of liquidity constraints,
plugging the productivity thresholds of equations (4.21), (4.22) and (4.23) with the price
index in equation (4.19) into the revenue equation (4.4), revenue is then equal to
rf (x) = w
Cd

w
w
x
xd
 1
(4.27)
As domestic exporters face higher-priced inputs at home, they need to charge higher prices
in foreign to maintain mark-ups, thus losing export market shares and reducing exports, as
can be seen from differentiating equation (4.27):
@rf (x)
@w
=  rf (x)(   1)
w
< 0
(2) As a consequence of (1), losing competitiveness also reduces the prots made in For-
eign. Given equation (4.14) and the proof of (1),
@f (x)
@w
=  rf (x)(   1)
w
< 0
For the least productive rms, as the xed cost of entering foreign wCf is unchanged,
exporting is not protable anymore. The productivity threshold xf given in equation (4.22)
increases, as @xf
@w
=
xf
w
> 0
(3) An appreciation causes the exogenous liquidity and domestic prots to increase. This
facilitates the obtention of credit for a given productivity level and therefore relaxes the
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liquidity constraint. Constrained exporters who were prevented entering the foreign market
are now able to do so.
These effects are similar to those described in Chaney (2005b), although the third effect
is slightly modied by the nancial market which is modelled here. In both cases, the
presence of incomplete nancial markets and liquidity constraints implies that exports do
no longer depend only on the competitiveness of exporters. The relative cost of exporting
relative to domestic assets is also important and it varies with exchange rates.
We now turn to the empirical analysis in order to verify whether the model's predictions
are conrmed in the data.
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4.2 Data
4.2.1 The Belgian Balance Sheet and Trade Transaction Data
This dataset was presented in detail in Chapter 3. The balance sheet part of the BBSTTD
is used to extract rm-level annual characteristics, including employment, value added,
nancial situation, sector of activity and to compute total factor productivity. Only the
export data side of the customs data is used in this chapter, and includes the destinations,
products and value information67.
Manufacturing rms only are selected as belonging to sectors 15 to 36 of the NACE-BEL
classication. Firms from sector 232 (rened petroleum products) are excluded as their
total factor productivity (TFP) measures are strong outliers.
4.2.2 Measuring Credit Constraints: the Coface score
As a measure of credit constraints, I use the Coface Services Belgium Global Score for
around 9000 Belgian manufacturing rms between 1999 and 200568. This section de-
scribes the activities of Coface, the construction of the score, justication for using it as
a measure for credit constraints, and an external validation through its comparison with
other techniques found in the literature on credit constraints.
A. The Coface Score
Coface International
Established in France in 1945 as a credit insurance company, Coface has grown in the past
15 years to become a world provider of services to facilitate business-to-business trade.
67 Given the difference of threshold for data to be available when a rm exports within the EU and outside
the EU (see chapter 3), we do not consider as exporters rms that export only outside the EU and whose
annual total of imports and exports is lower than 250,000 Euros.
68 There are 62,569 year-rm observations. In 1999, 9,268 rms, and in 2005, reecting the decline of
manufacturing reported in chapter 3, only 8,411 rms
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Besides offering receivables nance and managing and collecting commercial receivables
for its clients, it also provides credit information and insurance services.
Through a worldwide network of credit information entities, it has constituted an interna-
tional buyer's risk database on 44 million companies. Data from public and private sources
are added to Coface's internal data in order to manage each company's rating and Coface's
risk exposure on a continuous basis.
Based on this database, it can offer credit insurance policies and therefore allows its clients
to tackle customer insolvency, bad debts, overdue accounts, commercial risks and political
risks when trading on credit terms. With the same database, it also provides its clients with
credit information on other rms.
Within the Basel II framework for regulatory capital requirements, banks may choose to
compute their regulatory capital requirement through the internal ratings-based approach,
hence providing a measure of the probability of default for each borrowing company .
There has therefore been an incentive for credit insurance rms such as Coface to also
offer their services to banks who wish to outsource this measurement.
Why is it a good measure of credit constraints?
The Coface score, despite being constructed as a bankruptcy risk measure, is highly corre-
lated with how credit-constrained a rm is. It will reect the same type of information that
a bank would use to decide whether it lends to a rm. In some sense, by covering the risk
for its clients of trading with rms that have a good score, Coface also provides these rms
with a form of extra liquidity through a short-term debt from their suppliers: it gives a rm
the opportunity to pay for the goods or services provided by Coface's client at a later date.
This is reected in the term credit insurance.
Although it is clearly endogenous to the rm's performance and characteristics, it is not
directly affected by its exporting behaviour, given that this is not public information in Bel-
gium and that it does not enter the Coface's score determination model. Being determined
independently by a private rm, the Coface score is therefore a very useful measure of
credit constraint for our purposes. It is unusual for such data to be available and has a great
advantage on measures of credit constraints used in the literature so far: it is rm-specic,
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varies through time on a yearly basis and allows for a measure of the degree of credit
constraint rather than classifying rms between the two constrained or unconstrained cate-
gories. Although the score is updated by Coface on a continuous basis, the data provided
by the company for this chapter only reports the score of each rm on the 31 December.
This corresponds to the date of closure of annual accounts, and therefore allows a good
comparability with employment and productivity data. However, although the trade trans-
actions data are aggregated annually, they occur throughout the year. Different events also
make the score vary continuously. Having the time-continuous data for the score and for
the exporting activity would allow for more precision when considering the interactions
between the two.
The score is endogenous to other of the rm's characteristics, as illustrated in Figure (4.1).
In the empirical section, I will therefore be estimating equilibrium relationships from the
model and not establishing any causality relation. The model presented in the previous sec-
tion predicts that credit constraints are endogenous. The score contains information about
the credit constraints a rm faces but also about its quality, performance and productivity.
Two rms with equally valuable projects, and identical protability and productivity can
be very different in terms of nancial health, board structure, and other elements that will
determine their score and their access to credit. The empirical analysis will therefore seek
to control for a number of variables that could potentially inuence both the Coface score
and the exporting activity under study, such as size and productivity of rms.
The Coface score is a well-suited direct measure of creditworthiness used by other rms
and by banks when extending loans, and will be used in my empirical analysis to measure
how credit-constrained rms are.
Construction of the score
As presented in Mitchell and Van Roy, 2007, there is a large academic literature on bank-
ruptcy prediction models such as that used to construct Coface's score (Vivet, 2004, for Bel-
gium and see, for example, the review by Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). However, privately-
computed probability of default or credit scores such as Coface's are naturally less well-
known. The aim of the score is to predict the risk of default of the rm and therefore
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classify rms between healthy and failing rms. The precise model used to compute
the Coface score is condential, for obvious reasons. As summarised in Figure 4.1, it com-
bines several quantitative and qualitative inputs: nancial statements (leverage, liquidity,
protability, size, etc.), industry-specic variables, macro-economic variables such as in-
dustrial production, legal form, age, geographical location, type of annual accounts (full or
abbreviated), life cycle, board structure, commercial premises, payments incidents, ONSS
(social security) summons and legal judgments.
Coface Score
Other elements:
- Sector
- Legal form
- Location
- Life cycle
- Board structure
- Commercial premises
- Payments incidents
- ONSS summons
- legal judgements
Credit constraints
Firm financial situation and performance
Exporting behavior
Fig. 4.1. The Coface Score
These various inputs are combined using several statistical methods. This combination has
been constructed by a trial-and-error method, which is why I do not use data before 1999.
The result is a score ranging from 3/20 to 19/20. Although the model predicts continuous
scores they are rounded to unity in the data I have obtained. The three categories used by
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Coface are the maximum mistrust (3 to 6/20 inclusive), temporary vulnerability (7 to
9/20 inclusive) and normal to strong condence (10 to 19/20 inclusive).
Selection of rms with a score
Given there is no possibility for the moment to select which rms' score are available,
below I examine descriptive statistics to see if there are any systematic differences between
rms with a Coface score and those without. Table 4.1 shows how rms with a Coface
score are larger and more productive. Exporting rms with a score available export on
average more, more products and to more destinations. However given the high correlation
between size and these variables, a Probit analysis is carried out for the year 2003.
Table 4.1. Comparison of rms with or without available Coface score
No Coface Score Coface Score available
Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se
Employment 12.95 123.28 39092 0.62 53.92 219.63 62416 0.88
Log of TFP Lev-Pet
9.95 1.31 37889 0.01 10.50 1.43 61655 0.01
Total export value
(in million Euros) 7.80 12.20 6819 0.15 12.53 16.42 29585 0.10
Number of
destinations 8.11 15.29 6819 0.19 13.51 23.16 29585 0.13
E
X
PO
RT
E
RS
Number of products 8.22 58.37 6819 0.71 16.59 102.92 29585 0.60
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD in 99 three digit
sector for the years 1999 to 2005. The first four columns depict firms that have no Coface score available. The
firm is however in the BBSTTD (with Balance Sheet information, more than one employee and potentially trade
data) for that year. The Coface Score is a credit rating score constructed for each year and each firm by Coface. In
the four last columns, the score is available. Only firms for which a score is available for each year they file in a
balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample. The mean, standard deviation (sd), number of observations
(Obs.) and standard error of the means (se) are reported for the following variables. Employment represents the
number of full time equivalent employees, “Log of TFP Lev-Pet” is the logarithm of Total Factor Productivity
calculated according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. The last three rows compare exporters in each
category, comparing the total value of their exports, the number of destinations they serve and the number of
products they export.
The results are reported in Table 4.2. Larger rms in terms of employees numbers are more
likely to be included in the sample. It shows that once size of the rm is controlled for, there
are no systematic differences between rms that are in the sample and those outside, given
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that the coefcients on productivity and export characteristics are not signicant. So, there
is no bias to be taken into account in the empirical analysis as long as size is controlled for.
Table 4.2. Probit analysis of being included in the Coface sample
Dependent variable: 0/1 dummy: 1 = Firm with Coface score available0= no score available
(1) (2)
Log (employment) 0.768** 0.377**
(0.022) (0.025)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet) -0.013
(0.013)
Exporter – non Exporter dummy -0.046
(0.031)
Log (total exports) -0.008
(0.013)
Log (number of destinations exported) 0.007
(0.031)
Log (number of products exported) -0.024
(0.025)
Observations 13924 5126
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD in 99 three digit
sector for the year 2003.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; *
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant,
not reported. The dependent variable is the a dummy equal to 1 if a credit rating score constructed for each firm by
Coface is available in 2003. The dummy is equal to 0 if the firm is in the BBSTTD (with Balance Sheet information,
more than one employee and potentially trade data), but no score is available. Only firms for which a score is
available for each year they file in a balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample. Log (x) is the logarithm of
variable x. “TFP Lev-Pet” is Total Factor Productivity calculated according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003)
method. “Exporter-non Exporter” is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports in 2003, and equal to 0 if not.
B. External validation
Having described the construction of the Coface score, I show how it is correlated to rm
fundamentals and how it is related to higher debt. I then present the literature on credit con-
straints and see how the score compares to some alternative methodologies for measuring
them.
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Correlation with rm fundamentals
Given the methodology used to construct the score is not available publicly, I show here
how correlated the score is with the rm's nancial situation and productivity. I choose a
selection of nancial ratios (Lagneaux and Vivet, 2006) to measure each rm's solvency,
liquidity, protability and investment.
Protability is measured with the return on equity (ROE) ratio, net prot after tax over eq-
uity capital. It reects the return to be expected by shareholders once all expenses and taxes
have been deducted. It is widely used in the literature as a indicator of rm performance
(see, for instance, Gorton and Schmid, 2000).
Solvency is measured with two ratios, nancial independence and coverage of borrowings
by cash ow. These summarise the rm's ability to meet their short- and long-term nancial
liabilities. Financial independence is the ratio between equity capital and total liabilities.
It also reects how independent the rm is of borrowings. The coverage of borrowings by
cash ow measures the rm's repayment capability, and its converse species the number
of years it would take to repay its debts assuming its cash ow were constant.
Liquidity in the broad sense ratio is used to assess the rm's ability to repay its short-term
debts. It divides total assets realisable and available by shortterm liabilities.
Investment is assessed by computing the rate of investment and acquisitions of tangible
xed assets over value added for the year.
As shown in Table 4.3, the Coface score is correlated with all these ratios, conrming it
reects nancial situation. The negative coefcient of the return on equity corresponds to
a very low beta coefcient (-0.015) compared to the other ratios (for example, 0.47 for -
nancial independence). Liquidity and solvability therefore appear to be more important
elements than protability in determining a rm's access to credit. Three-digit-sector and
year xed effects are included in the OLS regression, in order to control for possible dif-
ferences in, for example, risk premia across industries and years which might affect the
Coface score and other nancial measures differentially. Such controls will be included in
many other regressions in the chapter.
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Table 4.3. The correlation between the score and nancial ratios
ScoreDependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
Return on equity -0.135**
(0.043)
Financial independ. 7.500**
(0.053)
Borrowings coverage 4.706**
(0.063)
Broad liquidity 0.884**
(0.015)
Investment ratio 22.819**
(8.018)
Log (empl.) 0.756** 0.712** 0.801** 0.827** 0.759**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 61237 61245 61190 61185 60114
R-squared 0.08 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.08
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the
BBSTTD with Coface score available and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit
sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical
significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year dummies, not reported. The
ratios are defined as follows: Return on Equity = Net profit after tax / Equity capital; Financial
independence = Equity capital / Total liabilities; Coverage of borrowings by cash flow = Cash flow /
(Debt + Reserves + Differed tax); Liquidity "in the broad sense" = (Total assets - Long term Loans ) /
Short term liabilities; Investment ratio = Acquisitions of tangible fixed assets / Value-added. The
extreme observations (top and bottom percentile) for each ratio accross all years are removed for the
corresponding regression. Log (empl.) is the logarithm of employment, and allows controlling for the
size of firms. The dependent variable is the credit rating score constructed for each year and each firm
by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. Only firms for which a score is available for each year they file in a
balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample. The variation in the number of observation is due
to firms not reporting some of the variables used in the calculation of a given ratio in their balance
sheet.
Effect of score on new loans
Given the Coface score measures credit constraints, I seek to measure in the data the rela-
tionship between the score and the credit extended to a rm. I therefore start by describing
how the score will affect the probability of obtaining new loans and their size. Although
I do not have exact details on the loans held by the rm, the balance sheet reports the to-
tal amount of nancial debt. I can therefore compute the variation, and consider a positive
increase in the total amount of nancial debt as a new loan. On average, per year, 34% of
rms increase their debt relative to the past year's level. I describe these new loans in Table
4.4.
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Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics of new loan measure
New bank loan
Mean 379,794
Median 92,240
Minimum 46
Maximum 7,367,197
Standard deviation 805,174
25th percentile 23,828
75th percentile 325,000
Notes: A new bank loan is defined as an increase in financial debt relative to the
previous year. Financial debt is computed as the sum of short and long term financial
debt, respectively variables 43 and 170/4 of the balance sheet. We drop outlying firm-
year observations (top and bottom 1%). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian
manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available and includes an
average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005.
Although they are not a perfect measure of new loans, it remains interesting to check
whether they are inuenced by our measure of credit constraint. The impact of the score,
both on the probability to contract a new bank loan and on the size of this loan, after con-
trolling for other credit constraints determinants are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. When
considering the probability of obtaining a new loan, the linear probability model is used
because of the large number of xed effects that are included.
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Table 4.5. Effect of score on the size of new debt
Logarithm of debt increaseDependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (t-1) 0.007** 0.008** 0.007** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Score (t-2) 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(Cash flow (t-1)) 0.001 -0.002 -0.014+
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(Employment (t-1)) -0.052 -0.046 -0.014
(0.040) (0.049) (0.051)
Log(Employment 2 (t-1)) -0.008 -0.006 -0.010
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Change in Log(Value added (t-1)) -0.004 -0.043*
(0.019) (0.021)
Change in Log(Value added (t-2)) 0.009 -0.010
(0.016) (0.017)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.119**
(0.025)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-2)) 0.006
(0.010)
Observations 49229 35473 27025 26784
Number of firms 10094 9134 8340 8273
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Fixed effect OLS regression. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms
from the BBSTTD with Coface score available for each year they file in a balance sheet over the
period. It includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to
2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; *
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Includes constant and year dummies, not reported. The variation in the number of observation is due
to differences in the lags of variables used in the different columns. The dependent variable is
constructed using the change in the logarithm of financial debt (sum of short and long term financial
debt) with respect to the previous year, when there has been an increase in financial debt, interpreted
as a new loan. If there has not been an increase in the debt, it is set to zero. (t-1) and (t-2) indicate the
explanatory variable have been lagged by one or two years respectively. Log indicates the logarithm of
the variable has been used. Score is the credit rating score constructed for each year and each firm by
Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured
according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method, for more details see main text in following section.
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Table 4.6. Impact of score on probability of increasing debt
0/1 Dummy for debt increaseDependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score (t-1) 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Score (t-2) 0.003* 0.003* 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(Cash flow (t-1)) 0.005 0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(Employment (t-1)) -0.027 0.011 0.025
(0.032) (0.044) (0.045)
Log(Employment 2 (t-1)) -0.014* -0.026** -0.028**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Change in Log(Value added (t-1)) 0.012 0.002
(0.015) (0.019)
Change in Log(Value added (t-2)) 0.029* 0.020
(0.012) (0.013)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.046*
(0.021)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-2)) 0.016
(0.014)
Observations 50616 36397 27698 27440
Number of firms 10120 9166 8363 8299
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Firm fixed effect Linear Probability regression. The dataset is an unbalanced panel
of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available for each
year they file in a balance sheet over the period. It includes an average of 8926 firms per
year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes
constant and year dummies, not reported. The variation in the number of observation is
due to differences in the lags of variables used in the different columns. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if financial debt (sum of short and long term financial debt)
increased with respect to the previous year, and zero otherwise. (t-1) and (t-2) indicate the
explanatory variable have been lagged by one or two years respectively. Log indicates the
logarithm of the variable has been used. Score is the credit rating score constructed for
each year and each firm by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of
Total Factor Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method,
for more details see main text in following section.
Score and productivity
In this subsection I also describe the correlation between credit constraints and productivity,
the two determinants, in our framework, of rms' exports decisions. Measuring productiv-
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ity is prone to several problems that have been dealt with in different ways in the literature.
I choose here to report the correlation of the score with three alternative measures of pro-
ductivity.
The rst is simply labour productivity, measured by value-added over employment. The
second is total factor productivity according to the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology
which seeks to solve the simultaneity problem of factor input choices being made by rms
once they observe part of their TFP. Olley and Pakes use the rm's investment decision
to proxy unobserved productivity shocks. The third method, suggested by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) measures TFP using materials as a proxy rather than investment, thus reduc-
ing the number of zero-observations often noted in the data for investment compared to
materials.
Table 4.7 reports the coefcients of the various productivity measures. I regress the Coface
score on productivity, controlling for size. Score is positively but not perfectly correlated
with productivity, conrming that credit constraints and productivity are two different is-
sues to be considered when analysing export behaviour. This is also illustrated in Figure
4.2, which shows there is no clear positive relationship between the score and the rm's
productivity.
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Table 4.7. Score and productivity correlation
Score
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Log (VA/empl.) 1.186**
(0.028)
Log (TFP Olley-Pakes) 1.368**
(0.032)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet) 1.155**
(0.029)
Log (empl.) 0.700** 0.723** 0.363**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 62409 61714 61655
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.10
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regression. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the
BBSTTD with Coface score available and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector
over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the
10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is the credit
rating score constructed for each year and each firm by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. Only firms for
which a score is available for each year they file in a balance sheet over the period are kept in the sample.
The variation in the number of observation is due to firms not reporting some of the variables used in the
calculation of a given variable in their balance sheet. Log (x) is the logarithm of variable x. (VA/empl.) is
the labour productivity measured as value-added over employment. TFP Olley-Pakes is a measure of Total
Factor Productivity measured according to Olley and Pakes's (1996) method while TFP Lev-Pet is a
measure of Total Factor Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method, for
more details see main text in following section. Log (empl.) is the logarithm of employment, and allows
controlling for the size of firms.
The literature on measuring credit constraints
The effects of nancial constraints on rm behaviour are an important area of research in
corporate nance. As originally stated by Keynes (1936), rms with a liquid balance sheet
and/or access to external capital markets will be able to invest in worthwhile projects when
they arise.
In order to identify and classify rms between credit-constrained and unconstrained, one
important strand of the literature has followed Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) in
identifying the cash ow sensitivities of investment. If there were no nancial frictions, in-
vestment would only be determined by the availability of positive net present value projects.
The validity of this argument and of the empirical work that followed has been challenged
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Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score
available in each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an average of 8926 firms per  year in 99
three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. This figure plots 8395 firms for the year 2005. On the horizontal axis,
the credit rating score is reported, constructed for each year and each firm by Coface and ranges from 3 to 19. The
vertical axis measures the logarithm of Total Factor productivity computed according to Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003)
method.
Fig. 4.2. Total Factor Productivity and Score (2005)
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) among others. Nevertheless, the cash ow sensi-
tivity of investment approach has, for example, been used to test the importance of credit
constraints on R&D (Bond et al., 2003) or the importance of the number of bank relation-
ships in the presence of adverse cash ow shocks in Belgium (Fuss and Vermeulen, 2006).
However, using this approach to measure credit constraints would not have allowed me to
test as many implications of the model, which is why I opted for a new and alternative mea-
sure, described above. This is because the cash ow sensitivity of investment only allows
classifying rms between unconstrained and constrained and does not give any scale of the
constraint, while the Coface measure ranges from 0 to 19. Also, a minimum of three years
would be needed to measure how sensitive a rm's investment is to its cash ow, while
the Coface score is a yearly measure and will be changed following precise events occur-
ring within the rm, as detailed previously. Given its exporting behaviour varies through
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time, it is much more convincing to have a precise annual scale of creditworthiness, than a
three-year moving average of whether a rm is credit-constrained or not.
This is also true of a more recent contribution, by Almeida, Campello andWeisbach (2004),
who suggest an alternative criterion. The intuition behind their approach is that rms that
anticipate facing strong nancing constraints will tend to hold more cash available for in-
vestment. They call it the cash-ow sensitivity of cash. In our sample of rms, however,
the basic descriptive statistics that should appear if this approach was valid do not seem to
hold, probably due to the presence of very small rms. The same caveats as those of the
cash-ow sensitivity of investment would in any case apply. I will therefore not consider
this alternative.
As for structural econometric models (e.g. Q models or Euler equations) used to determine
nancial constraints, their specications have been strongly criticised once evidence of
irreversible and lumpy adjustment costs emerged (Cabellero,1997's review).
Other possible methodologies present in the literature are not available to us given the data
I am using. For example, my willingness to keep in my sample private and small rms
does not allow the use of bond or commercial paper ratings, nor Tobin's Q and therefore
the Kaplan-Zingales index following Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) or Almeida et
al. (2004).
One alternative approach to sorting rms into nancially-constrained and unconstrained
types on a yearly basis would be to rank rms according to their payout dividend ratio
(Cleary, 1999). As in Almeida et al (2004) and based on the intuition in Fazzari et al.
(1988), rms in the top three deciles will be considered as less nancially-constrained than
rms in the bottom three. Also, considering size as a good observable measure of credit
constraints based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and as in Almeida et al. (2004),
ranking can be made according to total assets (Allaynnis and Mozumdar, 2004). In the
next point, I show that the score measure is consistent with these two approaches.
Compared to this important literature on credit constraints, it is clear that the Coface score
provides many advantages. It is a direct measure of the credit ratings of rms, which is used
by banks and other rms when they decide to extend credit or not. Adapted according to
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the most recent information available and including many determinants, it is available for
each year. Finally, it does not only classify rms between constrained and non-constrained,
but provides a precise scale of the creditworthiness of the rm.
Dividend Payout and Total Assets
Dividend payout and total assets are two of the many alternative measures used in the lit-
erature to classify rms between nancially-constrained and unconstrained. Firms whose
dividend payouts are in the top 30 percentiles are considered as nancially unconstrained,
whereas those in the bottom 30 percentiles are nancially constrained. I therefore test
whether such classications imply a larger score for unconstrained rms and present the re-
sults in Table 4.8. In the two alternative classication criteria, it appears that unconstrained
rms will have a higher average score than nancially-constrained ones. The means are
signicantly different from one another. This conrms that the Coface score offers a cred-
itworthiness measure that is consistent with the existing literature.
Table 4.8. Score of nancially constrained and unconstrained rms according to dividend
payout ratio and total assets
Score Mean SE Max Min N
Dividend payout
Constrained 13.52 .054 19 3 3074
Unconstrained 14.12 .048 19 3 3073
Total assets
Constrained 10.33 .028 19 3 18762
Unconstrained 13.00 .027 19 3 18767
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the
BBSTTD with Coface score available and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99
three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005.  The credit rating score constructed for
each year and each firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. Its mean, standard error, maximum
and minimum observations are reported for the different categories defined. Using the
dividend payout criterion, only firms whose dividend payout is positive are included, which
is why there is a difference in the number of observations. Firms whose dividend payout is
in the top 30th percentiles are considered as financially unconstrained, whereas those in the
bottom 30 percentiles are financially constrained. The same is done with total assets. The
mean test is passed, meaning that constrained firms have a lower score than unconstrained
firms, in both criteria. This is robust to using only one cross-section of the data, or taking
out observations within the top and bottom percentiles of each measure.
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4.3 Empirical results
4.3.1 The effect of credit constraints on the export status, destinations,
total exports, and products.
As a rst prediction of the model, we would expect that rms that are less credit-constrained
are more likely to be exporters. This appears in the descriptive statistics presented in Table
4.9: exporters are not only larger and more productive, they also have a higher score,
meaning they are more creditworthy and less liquidity-constrained.
Table 4.9. Descriptive Statistics
Non-Exporters Exporters
Mean sd Obs. se Mean sd Obs. se
Employment 15.89 31.11 33425 0.17 97.45 314.65 29036 1.85
Log of TFP Lev-Pet 10.23 1.10 32769 0.01 10.80 1.66 28860 0.01
Score 11.06 3.78 33425 0.02 12.32 3.84 29036 0.02
Number of
destinations 12.74 16.48 29036
Number of products 13.75 23.32 29036
Total export value
(in million Euros) 16.90 104.0 29036
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with
Coface score available and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over
the period 1999 to 2005. Observations are at the firm-year level. The credit rating score
constructed for each year and each firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. The means, standard
deviations, numbers of observations and standard errors of means are reported for the different
variables and categories defined. Exporters are firms that were exporting a positive amount in that
year. Non-exporters were exporting zero in that year.
This is conrmed when considering the coefcients of rm characteristics effect on the
probability of exporting in a given year from the linear probability model in levels reported
in Table 4.10. The totality of the sample of rms for which a Coface score is available in
each year it has led a balance sheet is included. Given the number of xed effects I want
to include in my specication, using a linear probability model allows me to address the
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incidental parameters problem that affects non-linear xed-effects estimates. This speci-
cation is used in Bernard and Jensen (2004) for a very similar binary choice problem despite
the problems this might provoke (e.g. predicted probabilities outside the 0-1 range). Dum-
mies for three-digit industry and year are included, and control for lagged (one year) size
and a measure of productivity: total factor productivity (a la Levinsohn and Petrin). Con-
trolling for these observables and given the composition of the score described above, the
residual is a good measure of credit constraints faced by a rm. Larger and more produc-
tive rms are more likely to be exporting. The rst column replicates the result previously
found in the literature that more productive rms are more likely to export. The coefcient
on the lagged score is positive and signicant in columns (2), conrming that rms which
are less credit-constrained have a higher probability to be exporters. In that specication,
the coefcient on productivity is not reduced compared to the rst column, indicating the
score captures the additional effect of credit constraints. The score is also included in col-
umn (3) which augments the model with an interaction term between the lagged score and
lagged TFP. Probably due to the correlation between productivity and the score which re-
duces the signicance of the variables, the result is not as predicted by the model. The
positive effect of a higher credit score on the probability to be exporter is not decreased
with a higher productivity. When including the lagged export status variable, as in Bernard
and Jensen (2004), our results carry through although the positive coefcient on the score
is not signicant, as shown in columns (4) and (5). This is probably due to rms' scores
not varying much through time, as creditworthiness might not change strongly from year
to year. It could also point to the results of the model showing that credit constraints should
have no impact on a rm's exporting status a given year if it was already an exporter in the
previous year as the xed cost of starting to export would have already been borne.
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Table 4.10. Linear probability model on exporter status
0/1 Dummy non-exporter/exporterDependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.027** 0.016 0.004 0.001
(0.005) (0.035) (0.003) (0.004)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.090** 0.087** 0.085** 0.013** 0.026**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet) x
Log (Score (t-1))
0.001
(0.003)
Exporter/non-exp. (t-1) 0.782** 0.106**
(0.004) (0.010)
Log (empl.) (t-1) 0.143** 0.142** 0.142** 0.032** 0.067**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 50824 50824 50824 50824 50824
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.74 0.02
Number of firms 10080
Firm fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES NO
Notes: Linear Probability regression in levels for columns (1) to (3) and with firm fixed effect for
column (4). The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with
Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an average of
8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5%
level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year
dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the firm exports or not
in that year. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. Log (x) is the logarithm
of variable x. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each firm by Coface ranges from 3
to 19. Log (empl.) is the logarithm of employment, and allows controlling for the size of firms. TFP Lev-
Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003)
method. For column (3), the interaction between productivity and the score is used as an explanatory
variable. In columns (4) and (5), the lagged dependent variable, a dummy indicating export activity in the
previous year, is also included.
Relative to destinations, Proposition 4.2 considers the number of destinations served by a
rm, as being positively related to its productivity and negatively to credit constraints. This
is conrmed in the OLS regression with rm xed effects in the rst column of Table 4.11,
where it appears that the lagged score affects positively and signicantly the number of
markets served by a rm, while the positive coefcient on productivity is not signicant69.
69 When using the logarithm of labour productivity measured by value-added per employee, rather than TFP,
the coefcient is signicant.
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Going beyond the model, I also establish in Table 4.11 that this result is also true when
looking at total exports and products. The number of products exported seems to be less
dependent on credit constraints (the positive coefcient is only statistically signicant at
the 10.2% level) than the number of destinations.
Table 4.11. Total exports, destinations and products
Log (Number of
destinations) Log (Total exports)
Log (Number of
products exported)Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.036** 0.088** 0.024+
(0.011) (0.026) (0.014)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) 0.028** 0.147** 0.028*
(0.010) (0.024) (0.011)
Log (Employment (t-1)) 0.311** 0.757** 0.314**
(0.019) (0.047) (0.023)
Observations 22137 22137 22137
Number of firms 4972 4972 4972
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.02
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Fixed-effect OLS regressions. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing
firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the
period and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to
2005. Only observations in which the firm is exporting are kept. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
+ denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; **
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and year dummies, not reported. The
dependent variables are the logarithms of the number of destinations served (column (1)), of total
exports (column (2)) and of the number of different 8-digit (CN nomenclature) products exported
(column (3)) by a firm in one year. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year.
Log (x) is the logarithm of variable x. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each firm
by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. Log (empl.) is the logarithm of employment, and allows controlling for
the size of firms. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured according to
Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method.
These results clearly establish the relationship that exists between credit constraints and
exporting behaviour, even once productivity and size are controlled for. They conrm the
equilibrium relationship identied in the model holds empirically. In the next section, I aim
at improving these results by analysing the interactions through time.
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4.3.2 The effects of credit constraints over time
A. Becoming an exporter
In order to assess the importance of credit constraints in the decision to start exporting, I
report in Table 4.12 the effects of lagged plant characteristics on the probability of being
a new exporter. New exporters are dened as rms that have not exported in any previous
years of the sample and export every year thereafter. A linear probability estimator with
year and sector xed effect is used to estimate the probability of starting to export, with
two alternative measures of productivity as explanatory variables: TFP a la Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) and value-added per employee.
Table 4.12. New exporters
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy
new exporter
0/1 Dummy
new exporter
Log (Score (t-1)) -0.002
(0.003)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.011** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004)
Log (Employment (t-1)) 0.026** 0.026**
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 21115 21115
R-squared 0.06 0.06
Firm fixed effects NO NO
Year fixed effects YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES
Notes: Linear Probability regressions in levels. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian
manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface score available for each year they file in a balance
sheet over the period and includes an average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the
period 1999 to 2005. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical significance at the 10%
level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Includes constant and 3-digit sector and year dummies, not reported. The dependent variable is a dummy
indicating whether the firm is a new exporter or not in that year. Being a new exporter is defined as a
firm that did not export in any previous year in the sample and did export that year and every following
year. Switchers and firms that export every year in the sample are dropped. Firms that were new
exporters in a previous year are dropped. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one
year. Log (x) is the logarithm of variable x. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each
firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured
according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Log (Employment) is the logarithm of employment,
and allows controlling for the size of firms.
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However my results are surprising as I nd that the probability to start exporting in a given
year depends negatively on both productivity and credit constraints, year and three-digit
sector being controlled for. This is also true when considering productivity as the only
explanatory variable with year and sector dummies. One potential explanation for this
result is that rms that have never exported and start exporting do not use external credit
to overcome the xed cost of exporting to their rst destination, which will most probably
be France. They will rely instead on internal liquidity, corresponding to the exogenous
liquidity shock in the theoretical model. It can also be the case that Belgium being an
open and small country, starting to export close to its borders is not very costly for rms,
compared to the xed cost of expanding to further markets. This is why the next section
concentrates on export destinations.
B. Extensive and intensive margin for destinations
Having considered the decision of starting to export, I now disentangle the effect of credit
constraints on the decision to export to more destinations. This is the extensive margin of
exports to a given destination. According to the theoretical model, credit constraints should
matter for the decision of existing exporters to start exporting to a new country. It should
not however affect the value of exports per destination or its subsequent increases, that is
the intensive margin. Adopting a linear probability specication, the rst column of Table
4.13 shows how the probability of an exporter increasing the number of countries it serves
is positively affected by size, productivity and a higher score (and hence weaker credit
constraints). This result holds when controlling for rm xed effect. When compared to our
results in the previous section, this would suggest that credit constraints are more important
in determining the increase in the number of destinations served than in explaining the
decision to start exporting. The table also reports in the OLS regression of the second
column that the actual increase in the number of destinations served relative to the previous
year is also positively related to creditworthiness. Turning to the intensive margin of trade
to a given destination, it appears in the third column of Table 4.13 that credit constraints
have no effect on the increase in the value of exports to a given destination, as the coefcient
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on the lagged Coface score is insignicant. This is consistent with the results of the model,
as credit constraints affect the ability of rms to cover the xed cost of exporting to an
additional destination. Once the xed cost has been borne, the amount exported to that
destination is not dependent on the availability of credit.
Table 4.13. The extensive and intensive margins per destination
Increase in number of destinations
Dependent variable: 0/1 Dummy
no increase/
increase
Increase in Log
(Number of
destinations served)
Increase in
logarithm of mean
value per destination
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) 0.038* 0.037** 0.034
(0.017) (0.014) (0.028)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.006 -0.022* -0.091**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.021)
Log (Employment) (t-1) -0.035+ -0.037+ -0.116**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039)
Observations 20097 19835 20097
Number of firms 4889 4827 4889
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Linear Probability (column (1)) and OLS (columns (2) and (3)) regressions with firm fixed
effect. The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with
Coface score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an
average of 8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Only
observations in which the firm is exporting are kept. Robust standard errors in parentheses; +
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; **
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and year dummies, not reported.
The first column's dependent variable is a dummy equal to 0 if the firm did not increase the
number of destination it exports to relative to the previous year. The dependent variable for
column two is the increase in the logarithm of the number of destinations relative to the previous
year. The first year a firm starts exporting is dropped from the sample. In column (3), the
dependent variable is the increase in the logarithm of the mean value per destination. This mean
value is per firm, per year, how much (in Euros) it exports on average to each of its destinations.
(t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. Log indicates the logarithm of
the variable has been used. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and each firm by
Coface ranges from 3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity measured
according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Log (Employment) is the logarithm of
employment, and allows controlling for the size of firms.
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4.3.3 Pecking order of trade
Proposition 4.3 shows how rms will follow a pecking order of trade when adding export
destinations to their portfolio: more productive rms will export to more destinations, as
we have shown above, and to smaller markets (weighted by the trade cost). This result
holds in the data, as presented in Table 4.14. The trade cost weighted market size of each
country in each year of our sample is constructed as the Gross Domestic Product70, divided
by a measure of distance from Belgium. GDP is taken as a proxy for L, the market size
in the model, as it represents the market potential of a country. Distance is taken as a
measure of trade costs, as it will be more costly for rms to ship goods to markets that
are further away. Following Head and Mayer (2002) and Mayer and Zignano (2006), the
distance is weighted by the geographic distribution within the country. This is measured
by the share of the main city's population in the country's population and will reect the
trade cost of reaching the consumers around the country. For a given GDP, the further the
country, the smaller its trade cost weighted market size. Similarly, between two equidistant
markets, the larger in terms of GDP will be of a bigger size. For each rm in each year, I
select the smallest market it exports to, as an indicator of how far down the pecking order a
rm is situated. The logarithm of the trade cost weighted market size of that country is the
dependent variable. The rst specication in Table 4.14, an OLS regression with sector and
year xed effect shows how more productive rms export to smaller countries. The second
column shows this result is robust to including nancial constraints: less credit-constrained
rms will go further down the pecking order of trade. When introducing rm xed effects
in the third column, the effects of productivity and credit constraints are not signicant any
more, yet this is probably due to rms not varying strongly from year to year the furthest
market they manage to reach.
These results conrm that the equilibrium relationship between productivity, credit con-
straints and market potentials of destinations identied in Proposition 4.3 of the model
hold in the data.
70 The data used is that of the US Census Bureau International Database (www.census.org).
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Table 4.14. Market size, productivity and credit constraints
Log (GDP/Weighted Distance) of smallest destination
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Score (t-1)) -0.102* -0.044
(0.051) (0.050)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.494** -0.483** -0.033
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Log (Employment) (t-1) -0.603** -0.600** -0.523**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.066)
Observations 20026 20026 20026
Number of firms 0.26 0.26 0.01
R-squared 4882
Firm fixed effects NO NO YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES NO
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: OLS regressions, with firm fixed effect for the third specification in column (3). The
dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface
score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an average of
8926 firms per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Only observations in
which the firm is exporting are kept. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes statistical
significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level. Includes constant and year and sector dummies, not reported. The
dependent variable for all three regressions is the logarithm of the GDP-distance ratio, where the
distance is weighted according to the share of the main city’s population in the country’s total
population. (t-1) indicates the explanatory variable has been lagged by one year. Log indicates the
logarithm of the variable has been used. The credit rating score, constructed for each year and
each firm by Coface ranges from 3 to 19. TFP Lev-Pet is a measure of Total Factor Productivity
measured according to Levinsohn and Petrin's (2003) method. Log (Employment) is the logarithm
of employment, and allows controlling for the size of firms. Source: GDP from US Census
Bureau International Data, Weighted distance from CEPII.
4.3.4 Exchange rates
The last result of the theoretical section of this chapter relates credit constraints and the
sensitivity of trade ows to relative wages uctuations. An increase in the domestic rel-
ative to foreign wages correspond to a loss of competitiveness of domestic exporters, as
would occur following an domestic currency appreciation. The effects of exchange rates
on aggregate trade ows have been shown in the literature to be mostly insignicant (see
McKenzie (1999) for a overview). However, as shown in Proposition 4.4 of the model pre-
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sented in the rst section, this could be due to various effects at play at the rm level that
cancel each other in the aggregate. The rst effect of a domestic currency appreciation (de-
preciation) with respect to a given country is that existing exporters to that destination will
respond with a decrease (increase) in their volume of exports. This is tested in our data by
selecting rms that already exported in the previous year to a given destination, and con-
sidering their response to a change in exchange rates. The results are reported in the rst
column of Table 4.15. An appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency decreases
(increases) the market shares of existing exporters to a given destination, as put forward by
point (i) of Proposition 4.4.
The second effect of an appreciation (but not a depreciation) is that the least productive
exporters to that country cannot export protably anymore and are consequently forced out
of the market. In the data, one can compare the productivity of rms that keep on exporting
to a given destination, even after a domestic currency appreciation episode, with those rms
that stop exporting. The result of a linear probability model with xed-effects is presented
in Table 4.15's second column. The productivity at the rm and year level is summarised by
a dummy reecting low productivity, as it is equal to one when the Total Factor Productivity
is lower than the year-three-digit sector median. Being of the low productivity type will
increase the probability of an exporter exiting the market it used to serve following an
domestic currency appreciation episode vis-a-vis this country's currency.
The third effect presented in point (iii) of Proposition 4.4, is that the most productive non-
exporters that couldn't start exporting because they were liquidity-constrained will now be
able to do so, because the xed entry cost has decreased in terms of domestic currency. This
is tested by considering only appreciation episodes, given that with a depreciation of the
domestic currency, the xed cost would increase. Existing exporters are more likely to start
exporting to a destination whose exchange rate has depreciated (i.e. the Euro, for Belgian
rms, has appreciated) in the past year if they were productive but credit-constrained in
the previous year. This is shown in the last column of Table 4.15 where the dependent
variable is a dummy that is equal to one when the rm started exporting to at least one
destination that experienced an exchange rate appreciation with respect to the previous
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year. It is equal to zero if the rm, an existing exporter did not add to its portfolio of served
markets any destination with an exchange rated depreciation episode relative to the previous
year. credit-constrained rms are those whose score is lower than the three-digit sector-year
median. They are less likely to start exporting following a domestic currency appreciation.
This is reected in the signicantly negative coefcient on the credit constraint dummy.
The positive and signicant coefcient on the interaction between TFP and credit constraint
reects the relationship shown in the theoretical model that the most productive of the
constrained rms are now less credit-constrained and able to overcome the xed cost of
protably exporting to those destinations.
These results conrm that the last proposition of the theoretical model is not contradicted
by the data when considering the relationship between exchange rate movements and rm-
level exporting behaviour.
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Table 4.15. Effect of exchange rate movements rm level export patterns
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Change in
logarithm of
value exported
per destination
0/1 dummy: 1 = exit
from a given destination
0= continues exporting
to a given destination
0-1 dummy of starting to
export to at least one
destination with recent
Euro appreciation
% change in exchange rate -0.285*
(0.131)
Low productivity dummy 0.047*
(0.018)
Log (TFP Lev-Pet (t-1)) -0.069**
(0.012)
Credit constrained (t-1) -1.456**
(0.029)
Log( TFP Lev-Pet) x constrained
(t-1)
0.112**
(0.002)
Observations 212385 14781 14296
R-squared 0.00 0.07 0.24
Number of firms 4672 2873 3720
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Destination fixed effects YES YES NO
Notes: The dataset is an unbalanced panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from the BBSTTD with Coface
score available or each year they file in a balance sheet over the period and includes an average of 8926 firms
per year in 99 three digit sector over the period 1999 to 2005. Only observations in which the firm is
exporting are kept. Exchange rate data is obtained from the National Bank of Belgium Belgostat database. +
denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level. Includes constant, destination and year dummies, not reported. In the
first column, the dependent variable is the change with respect to the previous year in the logarithm of the
value exported to a given destination, if the firm already exported there the previous year. Cases in which it is
a new destination the firm exports to are dropped. The result is robust to dropping Euro-zone destinations in
which the exchange rate did not vary. Clustered (year x destination) standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
In the second column, destinations are only kept for the years they have experienced an appreciation vis-à-vis
the Euro. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable reflects firm exit from a market. It is
a dummy set to 1 if the firm had been exporting to the given destination for at least two years and stopped for
that year and the following year at least. If they are still exporting to the given destination that year and the
following the dummy is set to 0. Other observations are dropped. The explanatory variable is a dummy set
equal to 1 when the TFP measure a la Levinsohn and Petrin is below the year and three digit sector median,
and zero otherwise. The result is robust to using the TFP measure itself.
In the third column, as in the second, destinations-years are only kept if the Euro has experienced an
appreciation vis-à-vis its exchange rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a
dummy which is equal to 1 if in that year, the firm, that was already an exporter in the previous year, started
exporting to at least a destination that had experienced an appreciation of its exchange rate. It is equal to zero
if the exporter did not start exporting to any destination that had experienced an appreciation of its exchange
rate. The explanatory variables are a measure of the logarithm of TFP a la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), a
credit constraint dummy equal to 1 if the score is below the year-3-digit sector median, and the interaction
between TFP and this dummy.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that credit constraints matter for export patterns. I use a
very precise and complete dataset on export transactions at the rm level for the Belgian
manufacturing sector. It is combined with an unusual and very useful yearly measure of
credit constraints faced by rms, a creditworthiness score constructed independently by a
credit insurer. These allow me to examine the relationship between credit constraints and
exports in a novel way. The main prediction of the model is that some rms could protably
export but are prevented to do so due to a lack of liquidity which prevents them from
reaching foreign markets. This is reected in the data, where it is shown that rms are more
likely to be exporting if they enjoy higher productivity levels and lower credit constraints.
The second prediction of the model is that credit constraints are important in determining
the extensive margin of trade in terms of destinations, that is the number of destinations
a rm exports to and the decision of a rm to export to a new destination. The intensive
margin of trade in that dimension, the average exports of a rm to the destinations it serves,
should not be affected by credit constraints. This equilibrium derived from the model also
holds in the data. Third, as derived in the model, rms follow a pecking order of trade,
where more productive and less credit-constrained rms reach markets of smaller trade
cost weighted market size. Finally, the model predicts that the sensitivity of trade ows to
exchange rates variations is composed of several elements. An exchange rate appreciation
will cause existing exporters to reduce their exports, entry of credit-constrained potential
exporters and exit of the least productive exporters. All three effects appear in the data.
These results conrm the link between credit constraints and export patterns. They also
highlight the potential role of institutions in determining, through their policies on credit
constraints, the patterns of trade and hence the productivity levels and gains of productivity,
and the overall welfare. As credit constraints matter, they establish a connection between
the number of markets served by a rm and the growth of its exports, as additional liquidity
obtained on one market may enable entering another one. Examining the dynamics of rm-
level exports and how they relate to liquidity and productivity is an exciting area for future
research.
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4.A Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proposition 4.1 (repeated): If
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a non empty set of liquidity constrained rms that are prevented from protably exporting
because they have insufcient liquidity, both exogenously and on the external nancial
market.
Proof. All rms above xf are productive enough to protably export. Firms whose
liquidity is lower than x(A) are not able to export, even if they could protably do so,
because they do not have sufcient liquidity to cover the xed cost of exporting. Suppose
(A; x) 2 
 iif xf  x < x(A) : Firms in 
 are prevented from exporting because they are
liquidity constrained, despite being able to protably do so. x(0) > xf is a necessary and
sufcient condition for 
 to be non-empty. Given equations (4.22) and (4.23) this will hold
iff
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 is non empty, and there exist
rms that are liquidity constrained.
4.B Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3 (recalled): Firms will add export destinations in decreasing order of trade
cost weighted market size, L
 1 . More productive rms will export to more destinations,
but also to relatively smaller markets.
Proof. : By making higher revenues on a larger market, lower productivity rms can
export to larger markets. Yet, the higher the iceberg cost of exporting to that destination,
the lower the revenues on that market. Hence the productivity cut-off is lower for a larger
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trade cost weighted market: @xn(A)
@ L

 1
< 0. Besides, the relative ordering of countries with
respect to the productivity threshold of rms exporting there remains the same. Therefore,
a rm that increases the number of destinations it serves from n to (n+ 1) will still export
to the n largest (trade cost weighted) markets and add the next largest (trade cost weighted)
market to its portfolio of trade partners.
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have analysed various aspects of the interactions between rms and gov-
ernments in climate change and international trade. First, I presented a novel result: rms
anticipating a Nash-bargained agreement over climate change by their governments will
over-invest ex ante relative to the second-best. The model analyses the effects of invest-
ment by rms on the bargaining position of states in international negotiations on climate
change, or any other global public good. Firms anticipate that their investment in R&D ex
ante will improve the bargaining position of their government in a Nash-bargained agree-
ment on a global public good. This is due to the fact that investment reduces the surplus
of the agreement by improving social welfare more under non-cooperation than under co-
operation: effectively, cooperation means the foreign country reaps part of the benets of
domestic investment, and must therefore compensate the domestic government and, in turn,
the country's rms, by a larger transfer. This partial-equilibrium result improves on the cur-
rent literature by introducing an unanticipated effect of rms having to invest before this
type of international negotiating occurs at government level.
The second chapter analysed trade protection in the presence of electoral incentives by
presenting a new multi-jurisdictional political agency model. A unique equilibrium was
proved to exist, in which political incumbents in their rst term of ofce build a reputa-
tion for protectionism. The distribution of swing voters across decisive, swing states was
shown to determine trade policy incentives. This theoretical hypothesis was supported em-
pirically by augmenting the benchmark test of the lobbying political economy of trade
literature. The results provided reduced-form evidence that the concentration of industries
in politically-important states is a key, though previously disregarded, element in the deter-
mination of trade policy.
The third chapter sought to understand the patterns in the trade transaction data using a
newly-available dataset for Belgium, the BBSTTD. Imports and exports both exhibit an
increasing and strong concentration among few rms. Stylised facts from the literature
on exports by manufacturing rms were shown to be valid for imports, too. Two-way
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traders constitute around 80 per cent of exporters. The number of products traded, the
destinations exported to, and origins of imports share a common particularity: the number
of rms trading in such ways decreases as they increase. Finally, two-way traders are more
productive, followed in descending order by importers only, exporters only and non-traders.
In the last chapter, I analysed the determinants of rm exporting behaviour, in particular
liquidity constraints. This policy relevant topic had so far not been considered much in
the existing literature. Empirically, I used the BBSTTD and an unusually available and
valid measure of credit constraints at the rm and year level. This allowed me to conrm
that the equilibrium relations derived from a heterogeneous rms trade model, including
liquidity constraints, hold in the data. Firms are more likely to be exporting if they en-
joy higher productivity levels and lower credit constraints. Second, credit constraints are
important in determining the extensive margin of trade in terms of destinations. The num-
ber of countries a rm exports to and adding a new destination are negatively related to
credit constraints. On the contrary, the intensive margin of exports to a given destination
is not affected by credit constraints. Third, more productive and less credit-constrained
rms export to smaller trade-cost-weighted market-size destinations: this is the pecking or-
der of trade. Lastly, as predicted in the model, a domestic currency appreciation will lead
existing exporters to reduce their exports, while encouraging entry of credit-constrained po-
tential exporters and exit of the least productive exporters. These results conrm that credit
constraints really matter. They also emphasise the potential role for governments' credit-
constraints-related policies in determining export patterns and hence the improvements of
productivity, productivity levels and general welfare.
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